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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the management and redistribution policies 
implemented in the South African squid industry. This is done within the broader 
context of fisheries policies that have been implemented within the South African 
fishing industry as the squid industry has developed. The study therefore has an 
institutional basis, which reviews the development of institutional mechanisms as they 
have evolved to deal fisheries management problems. These mechanisms (which can 
either be formal or informal) consist of committees, laws and constitutions that have 
developed as society has progressed. Probably the most prominent of these, in terms of 
current fisheries policy, is the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998. The 
broad policy prescription of the MLRA basically advocates the sustainable utilisation of 
marine resources while outlining the need to restructure the fishing industry to address 
historical imbalances and to achieve equity. It is this broad objective that this thesis 
applies to the squid fishery. 
The primary means of achieving the above objective, within the squid industry, has 
been through the reallocation of permit rights. These rights also provide the primary 
means by which effort is managed. A disruption in the rights allocation process 
therefore has implications for resource management as well. Permits rights can be 
described as a form of use right or propertY right. These rights are structured according 
to their operational-level characteristics, or rules. Changing these rules can thus affect 
the efficiency or flexibility of a rights based system. This is important because initial 
reallocation of rights, by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
(DEAT), was based on an incomplete set of rights. This partly led to the failure of early 
redistribution attempts resulting in a "paper permit" market. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that redistribution attempts were based on ill-defined 
criteria that contributed to the failure described above. In addition to this the method 
through which redistribution was attempted is also questionable. This can be described 
as a weak redistribution strategy that did not account for all equity criteria (i.e. factors 
like capital ownership, employment or relative income levels). This thesis thus 
recommends, among other things, that an incentive based rights system be adopted and 
that the design of this system correctly caters of the operational-level rules mentioned 
above. In addition to this a strong redistribution, based on fishing capital, ownership, 
income and the transfer of skills, should be implemented. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 1900s it was largely believed that marine resources were unlimited, and that 
there were few factors that could disturb most world fisheries. This belief seemed to be the 
norm and is best reflected the following statement made by Thomas Huxley in 1883: "I 
believe that the cod fishery ... and probably all the great sea-fisheries are inexhaustible; that 
is to say that nothing we can do seriously affects the number of fish" (cited in Eggert, 
1999:4). The management approach at the time was thus based on the concept that all 
people had the right to harvest maJine resources, and that market forceB would regulate the 
rate of exploitation. This was a time when fish stocks were large and fishing fleets were 
small. However, by the mid_19th century fishing in the inshore waters of countries 
increased and Huxley's words were soon forgotten. During this time very few regulations 
had however existed (Scott, 2000b). 
As offshore fishing activities increased, fishermen began to realise that they had to 
compete with each other for catch. The race-for-fish had begun. Gradually fishermen 
started to use bigger vessels, equipped with better technologies and more powerful fishing 
gear. All of these resulted in increased fishing effort. Fishermen thus began to pressurise 
governments, to ban foreigners and part-time fishers, as catches started to decline (Scott, 
2000a). Gear restrictions and closed season were among the first regulations to be 
introduction. These restrictions were mainly based on biological principles but are still 
very popular regulations used today. After the Second World War, it was understood that 
the world's fisheries were being overfished, so new regulatory measures were proposed, 
some of these being international. Countries soon began to increase their jurisdiction over 
waters adjacent to their coasts, eventually leading to the worldwide adoption of Economic 
Exclusive Zones (EEZs) in the 1970s. These gave coastal states jurisdiction over a 200-
1 
mile zone stretching from the coastal baseline. Throughout this time fishing fleets, and 
fishing capacity, continued to increase and catches gradually declined (FAO, 2000). 
Within their EEZs states thus developed new methods, based on restricting access. 
Limited entry licences were the first among these (Anderson, 1986). These measures 
restricted the number of vessels within a given fishery, thus establishing a level of 
exclusivity within fisheries. This can be seen as the beginning of the present day 
establishment of property rights within fisheries. Up until this point most fisheries had 
been subject to the "law of capture", meaning that no person owned any fish until they had 
been caught I (Scott, 2000a:4). Limited licences thus created exclusive use rights (Charles, 
2000). 
Other controls, either restricting effort (inputs) or limiting catch ( output quotas), were also 
soon introduced. Although most of these were still motivated by biological concerns, they 
soon evolved into some form of property right used to regulate fishing activities. Probably 
the most popular output controls of this nature currently used are individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs), which reduced or even eliminated the incentive to overcapitalise within a 
fishery (Townsend, 1998). Other restrictions also evolved into forms of property rights, 
referred as use rights by Charles (2000). Rights-based management systems have thus 
evolved to become an important part of fisheries management as they internalise the 
external effects associated with fishers' behaviour (Pejovich, 2001a). They provide 
incentives for fishermen to take better care of resources they "own", while at the same 
time reducing transactions costs (Pejovich, 2001a:xvi). This is because the more rights an 
individual has, the closer that person's private cost is to the social cost of using that good. 
Rights-based systems thus determine some level of exclusivity among users. The 
performance of these systems however depends on their design, implementation and their 
operational aspects (Anderson, 2000). These factors in tum depend on the biological, 
economic and social aspects of the fishery for which the programme is being developed. 
I Although most fish stock were subject to the "law of capture" quasi-private property rights had existed 
since the 171h century. However, individual ownership of fisheries was largely restricted to freshwater 
fisheries or inshore fishing grounds (Scott, 200b). 
2 
For example, because these systems limit users, what criteria should be used to determine 
access? Where social issues demand that equity considerations are important, one group of 
users will be given preference over another. This only highlights one possible issue that 
that adds to the complexity of designing such a system. This thesis will thus attempt to 
deal with more of these within the context of the South African chokka squid fishery. 
These are issues that will be discussed and dealt with in more detail throughout this thesis. 
1.2 CONTEXT OF RESEARCH 
From section 1.1 above it can be argued that the overexploitation of marine resources is 
primarily due to the failure of traditional market rules to properly regulate valuable natural 
resources. Fisheries are the classic example of the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 
1986), which means that if a resource is unregulated and open for all to use it will be over-
utilised (Gordon, 1954). The argument is that if access is open to all, the ecological costs 
of fishing are transferred to no one individual, yet everyone has an incentive to fish as 
much as possible (Friedel, 2000). This is based on the standard neo-classical model of 
rational behaviour (Guyader & Thebaud, 2001). The only way to avert this rational 
incentive is to define some form of ownership over a resource. As mentioned in section 
1.1, this can be done through the establishment of property rights. Property rights thus 
define some form exclusive right over the use of a resource (e.g. the granting of exclusive 
fishing rights). Although fishing rights help to maintain sustainable use rates for a 
resource, they exclude portions of the public from its use. 
Sustainable use of marine living resources is thus a challenging management task. The 
motivation for most governrnents, including South Africa's, is the conservation of marine 
resources for exploitation by future generations. In South Africa this issue is however 
more complicated. With the advent of democracy in 1994 the new South African 
governrnent was faced with the task of normalising society by correcting inequalities 
caused by apartheid. In terms of the fishing industry, fisheries management must thus 
confront issues of race, equity, and historical injustice - a mandate broadly described as 
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the "transformation" of an industry from which non-whites had for the most part been 
systematically excluded (Paul, 2000b and Friedel, 2000). This mandate has been translated 
into policy with the establishment of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998 
(RSA, 1998). A major goal of the MLRA is to broaden access to the "historically 
disadvantaged" non-white South Africans. This is because fisheries management under 
the apartheid system generally benefited white South Africans while excluding the 
majority of non-white citizens. According to Friedel (2000), Whites owned the majority of 
fishing companies, owned most of the vessels, and received fishing rights for the most 
lucrative species; this is a view supported by Van Sittert (2002), Hauk & Sowman (2001) 
and Hersoug & Holm (2000). 
One of the major challenges for fisheries authorities is thus to redress the obvious 
imbalances in a fair and rational manner while at the same time recognising that the 
resources to be reallocated are not infinite. The broadening of access rights and the 
sustainable use of marine resources are thus both necessary elements for creating a stable 
and equitable fishing industry. The major question to be addressed therefore is: how can a 
more equitable and fair distribution of power and wealth be achieved without destroying 
the biological and economic basis of the industry? The challenge for the South African 
government is to translate their political goals into actual programmes that are designed to 
achieve their objectives. The MLRA (of 1998) can be seen as the beginning of such a 
process. This formed the basis for redistribution and restructuring attempts after 1998. 
Initial attempts at redistribution were however fraught with many different problems. 
Some of these relate to ill-conceived redistribution criteria, incomplete management 
systems and a lack of capacity, by relevant authorities, to effectively management 
programmes. These are only a few of the issues that will be addressed within this thesis. 
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1.3 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
This study is undertaken with reference to the South African commercial squid fishery as 
a renewable marine resource. As a renewable resource the squid fishery can be utilised on 
a sustainable basis as long as harvesting rates do not exceed its regeneration rate. Keeping 
this in mind, the fishery, within the context of South Africa, is also subject to social and 
economic factors that affect society. As mentioned in section 1.2, Government policy 
currently demands that all resources be used on a sustainable basis, while at the same time 
granting access to all racial groupings (RSA, 1998). Within the context of the Marine 
Living Resources Act, this can broadly be translated into granting access to those parts of 
society who had previously been denied access. The resource in question is however 
limited and cannot accommodate additional participants without jeopardising its long-term 
viability. Apart from these biological concerns, the squid industry also consists of people 
and businesses that exploit the resource. Their livelihoods will therefore also be disrupted 
if the industry is restructured. After all, if access is granted to historically disadvantaged 
individuals, the access of existing participants will have to be reduced. This in essence 
amounts to a redistribution of fishing rights from existing participants to new entrants. 
Against this background the study therefore aims to achieve the following: 
(i) Based on literature reviewed and data collected (from the EES and MCM 
database), to highlight the current status of the South Africa commercial 
squid fishery from a biological, economic and socio-economic viewpoint. 
(ii) To review the current management system (based on the allocation of 
permit rights) and procedures, and to highlight possible flaws within these. 
(iii) Within the context of (ii) to review the initial redistribution attempts by the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, and to highlight any 
possible shortcomings in the approach adopted. 
(iv) Lastly, based on the objectives above, to make recommendations, if 
necessary, that help to address any deficiencies within systems or 
procedures. 
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All of the above objectives essentially culminate in the review of the "transformation" 
(equitable redistribution) agenda adopted for the South Africa commercial squid industry. 
This process involves the reallocation of fishing rights to accommodate for new entrants. 
The central focus is thus on this rights-based system and the factors that either affect, or 
are affected, by it. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The focus of the thesis is thus to examine the logic behind the fisheries policy and 
redistribution attempts in the South African squid fishery. The approach adopted in largely 
institutional in nature as current policy is informed by changes in society, both locally and 
internationally. And as Pejovich (2001a) states, institutions gradually evolve over time to 
address pertinent issues in society. These institutions can either be formal (i.e. 
government) or informal (i.e. social groups). Nevertheless they play a vital role in 
structuring behaviour within society. 
In terms of the structure of the thesis, Chapter 2 outlines the nature of natural resource use 
and defines the economic objective behind this. The role of renewable resources is also 
highlighted, and within this context the South African commercial squid fishery is 
classified. It is necessary to characterise a marine resource because its attributes determine 
the potential wealth and transactions costs of different property rights arrangements 
(Edwards, 2000). Keeping this in mind, both biological and operational classifications of 
the fishery are outlined. This thus provides a context for further analysis. Chapter 3 
outlines the current status of fisheries around the world. This provides an international 
context for the problems that all fisheries managers currently face. The chapter also 
outlines a simple bioeconomic model, which serves as the basis for fisheries management 
throughout the world. Although the model is largely normative it is useful because it 
provides reference points in terms of management objectives. It also outlines the principle 
result affecting all marine resources worldwide, namely that if resources are free for all to 
use they will most likely to over-utilised (Gordon, 1954). This thus provides the argument 
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behind all fisheries management initiatives. The final part of the chapter outlines the 
various tools available for fisheries management authorities in dealing with resource 
management. 
Chapter 4 looks at the nature of property rights structures and how these can be applied to 
fisheries systems. The chapter emphasises the evolution of property rights regimes. For 
example, in the past most fisheries systems occurred within an open access regime, but 
this has gradually been transformed into a state property regime (through the formation of 
EEZs), then cornmon property and private property regimes (through the issuing of 
exclusive use rights). The evolution of these regimes depends on the structure of property 
rights that have been introduced into various environments. These, in turn, are informed 
by the operational rules that govern property rights. These operational-level rules provide 
the foundation for the design of property rights systems, by creating incentives structures 
that allow for the minimisation adverse effects. This provides the basis for the designing 
of a rights-based management system in the squid fishery. 
The institutional and organisational evolution of the South Africa squid industry is 
outlined in Chapter 5. This shows how the fishery has steadily moved from a situation of 
de facto open access to one that is regulated by effort limitations. It thus outlines the how 
various institutional mechanisms (i.e. the Sea Fisheries Act of 1988 to the Marine Living 
Resources Act of 1998) formed to help regulate the development of the squid fishery. 
Chapter 6 attempts to structure the dynamics of the chokka squid fishery in terms of its 
industry, economic and socio-economic trends. It therefore highlights the dynamic nature 
of the squid fishing fleet and how this has impacted on catch and effort trends. All of these 
issues obviously have implications for resource management. It therefore seems like a 
logical progression to review the current management systems used within the fishery. 
Lastly, the chapter highlights the social and economic aspects of the fishery. This is done 
with the aid of the Economic and Sectoral Study (EES). All of these factors highlight the 
motivation behind the redistribution policies to be implemented by Government. 
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Chapter 7 highlights the "transformation" agenda of the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), as outlined by the MLRA. The chapter thus reviews the 
initial redistribution initiatives instituted by DEAT, which have attempted to reallocate 
permit rights to new entrants. The process is however riddled with many flaws, and has 
thus resulted in chaos within the squid industry. One manifestation of these problems is 
the formation of a "paper permit" market, which essentially undermines all redistribution 
attempts. Chapter 8 concludes on the discussions of the various chapters and makes 
recommendations based on this. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMICS AND RENEWABLE RESOURCE USE: A 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE SQUID FISHERY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The use and allocation of resources is a fundamental part of any economic system. Most 
economists see the ultimate objective of this process as the efficient allocation of 
resources for the purposes of satisfying society's wants. This myopic view has however 
evolved over time to encompass many different objectives. Most of these now include 
social, equity and economic considerations. Generally, the pursuit of these objectives 
has been through economic progress (turning resources into productive assets) . The 
traditional (neoclassical) view of this process has focused primarily on the conversion 
of capital (physical capital) and labour (human capital) into productive means. 
Nevertheless it has increasingly been recognised that natural resources are also an 
important economic asset. If the role of these resources is marginalized, then it is likely 
that they will be overexploited. Their rate of exploitation will however partly depend on 
their characteristics, or the environment in which they occur. It is thus important to 
understand the characteristics that these resources possess and how these enable people 
to use these resources on a more sustainable basis . A classification of various natural 
resources is thus useful. And for the purposes of this thesis there is a specific need to 
classify marine resources, squid being the resource in question, within such a 
framework. 
A classification of squid thus provides a framework to aid in the analysis of this 
resource. Squid resources are divided into their biological and operational categories. 
Firstly, this will help to determine how the resource behaves with respect to its 
reproduction (among other things). This is essential, especially from a biological 
perspective, as it gives managers on idea of how to maintain the resource. The 
operational categories relate to the harvesting of the resource. In essence these look at 
the characteristics of the fishing industry surrounding the exploitation of squid. Yet 
again setting a foundation for further discussion and analysis in later chapters. 
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2.2 ECONOMICS AND NATURAL RESOURCE USE 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The use of resources m the production process adds value to society through the 
achievement of the economic objective (discussed in section 2.2.2) . This objective can 
be described as the efficient and equitable transfer of resources into productive means. 
Resources are thus inputs into the economic process with the objective of achieving a 
desired level of output. However, most economic theory only considers the use of two 
primary inputs (physical and human capital). This situation can be misleading. There is 
a need to move away from considering the economic process, of producing goods and 
services and generating human welfare, to be solely dependent on the accumulation of 
physical and human capital. The importance of natural capital also needs to be 
highlighted. It is therefore essential to classify natural resources, and their use, within 
this framework (as is done section 2.2.3). This classification can help characterise the 
nature of a resource and thus aid its sustainable utilisation and management. 
2.2.2 The Economic Objective 
Since the time of the Classical economists' economics has been concerned with the use 
of resources to enable economic growth. In fact, the problem of resource scarcity dates 
back to the conception of economics as a distinguishable discipline. This is obvious in 
the works of two classical economists, Malthus and Ricardo. Malthus's gloomy 
prediction was that a growing world population would be faced with limited resources, 
thus contributing to a fall in living standards over time. This pessimistic view of human 
welfare contributed to the reputation of economics as a "dismal science" (Heilbroner, 
1986). David Ricardo extended on Malthus' analysis, but importantly, he took into 
account quality differences in agricultural land. 
Ricardo argued that as a population increases (and the demand for food rises), more 
land of poorer quality is brought into production. Food prices thus increase to cover the 
higher costs of farming the marginal fields, the owners of the more fertile lands thus 
earn a surplus, commonly referred to as economic rent or Ricardian rent. Output per 
worker also falls as in Malthus' world. However, the reason for the decline is the 
inferior quality of the new lands brought into production, rather than the addition of 
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more workers to a given amount of (similar quality) land (Heilbroner, 1986). Ricardo is 
thus both more and less pessimistic than Malthus, however resource use and availability 
for both was still a major problem. 
The analysis of the classical economists, with regard to resource use, was extended 
within the neoclassical paradigm. Around the late 1800s, neoclassical economics began 
to form the mainstream of modem day economic thought. It abandoned the labour 
theory of value and used prices as a value of scarcity. Through the interaction of 
production activity and utility theory (consumption activity), resources could be 
allocated efficiently. This was based on Pareto criterion that were deemed to be socially 
desirable. Pareto optimum is a situation where it is impossible to make any individual 
better off without making someone else worse off. This situation could be achieved in 
competitive markets when market equilibrium was attained. This equilibrium is 
considered to be efficient. Government intervention was only viewed necessary if 
market failure occurs. Government is thus seen as an ethical agent only intervening in 
the interest of the public. Collective social welfare is thus achieved. 
The axiom of the social objective is not restricted to economics alone, but in fact has its 
roots in social philosophy and ethics (Amason, 2000). It is justified on the basis of 
social contract theory prescribed by Locke, Kant and Rawls (Rawls, 1971 in Amason, 
2000). According to this social contract, society should be organised in such a way so 
that the supply of valuable resources should be as high as possible and the distribution 
of these to individuals should be equitable. It can thus reasonably be assumed that the 
social purpose of production (from resources) is to maximise the net production of 
goods in an equitable manner. 
From the above paragraphs it can be seen that people derive value from resources by 
using them as inputs in the production process or by consuming them directly. 
Resources are thus seen to be both useful and valuable. The economic objective with 
regards to this thesis is thus to achieve the social objective described above. To restate 
this in another way, the production sector (with regards to marine resources in this case) 
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should be organised and operated so as to maximise social welfare l . The challenge is 
thus to effectively manage resources, on a sustainable basis, so as to maximise the 
satisfaction derived from these resources while enabling an equitable distribution of 
resources. Economics, for the purpose of this thesis, is thus essentially concerned with 
how society allocates scarce resources with the aim the maximising social welfare. It is 
thus more apt to refer to the "economic objective" as the achievement of the "social 
objective". 
2.2.3 Classification of Natural Resources 
The field of resource/environmental economics is the area of economics that deals with 
how society allocates scarce resources. Natural resources are seen as one of the factors2 
that contributes to the "increase in net production of goods and services" (Amason, 
2000: 15), which in tum leads to the achievement of utility maximisation (through the 
consumption of these goods and services). Resources can basically be classified into 
three categories: physical capital resources, human resources and natural resources 
(Barbier, 2002 and Charles, 200 I). The accumulation of physical capital occurs through 
the investment of physical capital units (e.g. buildings, etc.) . Human capital, on the 
other hand, is accumulated through education and training (e.g. knowledge and skills 
development) . Natural resources, or natural capital, by their nature can however not be 
produced (Amason, 2000l They only acquire value once they are extracted from 
nature and used within the economic system. It is this characteristic of natural capital, as 
will be highlighted throughout this thesis, that adds to the complexity of its sustainable 
exploitation and management. 
The classification of natural resources is thus vital, and will now be the primary focus of 
the discussion. Natural resources can be classified in many different ways (Dusgupta, 
1988; Conrad, 1999 and Risvand, 2002). According to Risvand (2002) resources are 
I The allocation of resources stems from the need to determine the most appropriate use for a resource, 
and thus to assign that resource to a purpose that results in its maximisation. Maximisation in terms of an 
aggregate measure that avoids waste and increases production - thus benefiting society as a whole. Lionel 
Robbins (1935) thus aptly defines economics as "the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." 
2 The other two factors (Amason, 2000) are physical capital and human capital (the physical and mental 
abi lity that human labour add to the production process). 
3 Although natural capital is not a primary product of man, the natural production rate of some resources 
can be influenced (as will be highl ighted below). 
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commonly classified with respect to their exhaustibility. However this characteristic 
only focuses on the quantitative availability of resources and not on their potential for 
natural growth and recycling. It is preferable to classifY resources on a somewhat 
different basis within two main classes: renewable and non-renewable resources. This 
differentiation is not necessarily identical to the exhaustibility classes. As Risvand 
(2002) points out, many renewable resources (fish or forests) are exhaustible, and many 
non-renewable resources (stones and various metals) are, economically speaking, 
inexhaustible. Conrad (J 999) uses this classification to arrange natural resources along a 
continuum, from those that are most renewable in the short term, to those that are least 
renewable in the long term 4 . Natural resources can thus be classified within this range 
according to their term characteristics. 
Non-renewable resources do not display significant growth or regeneration over an 
economic time scale. An example of this would be coal that has been built up over 
millions of years on the Earth. The regeneration time scale is thus too great for current 
economic consumption purposes. Increased use in one period diminishes the quantity 
available in another period. The degree to which future use is sacrificed is closely 
related to the possibility for re-use or recycling of the resource. This can thus be used as 
a criterion for dividing this group of resources into sub-classes (Risvand, 2002). 
Non-renewable resources can either be depletable or recyclable. Depletable resources 
exist when full utilisation of the resource results in its total destruction. Examples are 
coal, oil and gas. With a recyclable resource the possibility of reusing the material 
exists. Therefore, in this case utilisation of one unit of the resource does not imply that 
it is totally and permanently lost5. Typical resources of this category are metal ores like 
iron, lead and copper. 
From section 2.2.2 above the classical economists focused mainly on renewable 
resources, namely land. However, at least one classical economist also had something to 
4 The length of time thus required to repl ace a given quantity of a resource could be secn as its cycling 
period. However, any resource can become exhaustible if demand, and hence the rate of utilisation, 
exceeds its cycling period. 
S The material from the resource is locked in a particular use in a certain period, from which a process of 
industrial recycling can release it, and thus be available for another use. 
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say about non-renewable resources. While Malthus ignored non-renewable resources, 
Ricardo pointed out that mineral deposits also vary in quality just like land. As a result, 
he claims, his analysis ofland is equally applicable to minerals. He also recognizes that 
it is possible to discover new mineral deposits and to develop new mining technology 
(Heilbroner, 1986). Interestingly, though, he does not consider the depletable nature of 
mines, and so fails to focus on what many consider to be the fundamental difference 
between non-renewable and renewable resources. 
Jevons (1865), however, in his book The Coal Question does seem to make this 
distinction. In his book he wrote that Britain's industrial vitality depended on coal and, 
therefore, would decline as that resource was exhausted. As coal reserves ran out, he 
wrote, the price of coal, relative to its cost, would rise. TIlls would make it feasible for 
producers to extract coal from poorer or deeper seams. Although he was right about his 
forecast for Britain, he was wrong that the main incentive factor was the cost of coal. 
J evons failed to appreciate the fact that as the price of a resource rises, firms have a 
strong incentive to invent, develop, and produce alternate sources. He also did not take 
into account the incentive of a rise in the price of coal leading to it being used more 
efficiently. Although Jevons, like the classical economists, did express concern about 
the problem of resource scarcity, more specifically coal, in was Harold Hotelling (1931) 
who developed an important breakthrough in the optimal use of depletable resources. 
HoteUing (1931), in his seminal article The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 
explores the optimal output over time for a mine with a given amount of known 
resources. Under competitive assumptions Hotelling shows that firms exploiting an 
exhaustible resource wiII increase price over time at a percentage rate equal to the 
resource owner's discount rate. This was termed to "Hotelling rule", which states that 
with no cost or constant marginal cost, dynamic efficiency is achieved by the real price 
rising at a rate equal to the rate of interest (Conrad, 1999). HoteIIing's work has since 
served as a platform for many further developments in the theory of exhaustible 
resources, their management and use (SaviIIe, 1997). While Hotelling contributed much 
to non-renewable resource management, there is also a need to explore the utilisation of 
renewable resources, which relates to the primary focus of this thesis. This is especially 
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important in the light that most non-renewable resources are finite in an economic 
sense. There is thus a need to increasing shift to sustainable renewable resource use. 
According to Conrad (1999) renewable resources are capable of growth or are 
renewable over a relevant economic time scale. This economic time scale, he argues, 
must be a time interval that is meaningful for the management of the resource. It is 
therefore possible, as in the case of fish , to harvest the resource indefinitell if it is 
managed on a sustainable basis. This also means that the possibility of storing or 
transferring the resource for future use exists. Man can thus influence natural production 
of some renewable resources (Risvand, 2002). Based on these characteristics it is 
possible to distinguish between three sub-classes of renewable resources. 
Firstly, there are renewable resources that do not have storage possibilities. Examples of 
these include wind and solar radiation. If the resource is not used when it is available, 
then it is lost. These are resources that typically have a continuous flow. This means that 
present use of the resource does not diminish future flows. Secondly, there are 
renewable resources that are capable of being stored. One common example is rainfall. 
Rainwater can be stored in dams and the stored flow is thus treated as a stock that can 
be used in a future period 7 . Finally, the last class of resources comprises of biological 
resources that are by definition livings organisms. Here the availability of a 
reproducible stock is probably the main characteristic of the resource. Production is thus 
usually related to the size of the stock, as is the case with fish or trees. Because human 
action can influence the resource flow, there is a "critical zone" for renewals. That 
means that there is a more or less a clearly defined level below which a decrease in 
production cannot be reversed. This can thus lead to extinction of a species if 
exploitation continues (Clark, 1990 and Risvand, 2002). From the above discussion, of 
both renewable and non-renewable resources, it is possible to establish a diagrammatic 
framework to aid with the classification of resources. This is done in Figure 2.1 below. 
6 Seijo, Doefeo & Salas (1998: I), thus state that renewable resources exhibit the characteristic of 
"renewability". Risvand (2002:2) states that renewable resources are commonly referred to as "flow 
resources", as it is possible to maintain use indefinitely, provided its production (the flow) continues. 
7 Note that although the resource can be stored, the production is independent of the quantity stored. 
It This is the case with most fish stocks and will be explained further with the use of the Gordon-Scheafer 
model in Chapter 3. The critical zone of a biological stock was emphasised by Scheafer (1957). 
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Figure 2.1: A Classification of Valuable Resources 
Source: Adapted from Risvand (2002), Conrad {I 999) and Sweeny (\993) 
2.2.4 Fisheries as an Exploitable Renewable Resource 
Although the renewable resource use problem has in part been highlighted since the 
classical economists, the interest in renewable resource economics increased greatly 
after the seminal paper of Gordon (1954) entitled The Economic Theory of a Common 
Property Resource: The Fishery. In this article Gordon developed an economic model 
for fisheries9. The model was based on the contemporary microeconomic principles of 
the time, and was used to help explain low-income levels in Canadian fisheries. 
However, based on the discussion in section 2.2.3, why are fisheries or fish stocks 
considered renewable resources? 
According to Conrad (1999), a primary characteristic of a renewable resource is that it 
is able to regenerate within a relevant economic time scale. This is the case with most 
living marine resources that are able to regenerate from a given stock. This given stock 
must be above the "critical level" described in section 2.2.3. In addition to this, no 
renewable biological resource can regenerate to levels above the carrying capacity of 
9 According to Anderson (1986: 19), a fishery can generally be thought of as a stock of fish and the 
enterprises that have the potential for exploiting them. For a more formal definition we can turn to 
Everhart & Young (1981:21) who describe a fishery in the following way, "A fishery is the complex 
interactions between the population of fish being harvested, the population of fishermen, and the 
environment of each." 
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the ecosystem in which it exists (Pearce & Turner, 1990). These resources can however 
become extinct due to the ability of humans to overexploit them. This will occur if the 
rate of exploitation persistently exceeds the natural growth rate. Fisheries are thus not 
renewable resources that have a continuous flow (like wind or solar energy). The 
optimal use of fisheries renewable resource thus needs to be determined. This is a view 
highlighted by Gordon (1954) as well. 
One ofthe findings, arguably the most important one, of Gordon's (\ 954) work was that 
renewable resources (fisheries, in this case) where subject to overexploitation (this 
argument will be expanded in Chapter 3). Indeed Gordon (1954) went on to argue that, 
unless regulated, a fishery will be driven to harvesting rates that are beyond a 
sustainable level. In their expansion of Gordon's work, Munro & Scott (1985:623) 
noted the following: 
If a [renewable] resource is commercially valuable and is open to unrestricted 
exploitation, the reSOlU'ce will certainly be subject to excessive depletion from society's 
point of view. Since the resource is open to all and owned by none, [there is] no 
incentive to conserve the resource. 
It is thus clearly recognisable that although renewable resources can regenerate, if they 
are "mined", that is, removed at a rate that does not permit renewal, they can be reduced 
to levels below those that are sustainable. This is a conclusion reached not only by 
economists (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Crutchfield, 1956; Smith, 1969; Wilen, 1985; 
and Conrad, 1999 to mention but a few) , but also by environmentalists and ecologists 
alike. Any fishery, being a renewable resource, is thus subject to these effects. 
From an economic viewpoint, the reason why most fisheries resources are subject to 
overexploitation is due to the characteristics that these resources exhibit. Most 
renewable marine resources are referred to as common pool resources (Berkes, 1989; 
Ostrom, 1990; McCay, 2000 and Jensen, 2000b). These resources are however loosely 
known as "common property" resources due to the institutional state within which they 
occur (discussed in Chapter 4). The use of the term "common-pool" resource is however 
more accurate as it refers to the characteristics of the resource (Jensen, 2000b:639). 
Common pool resources are resources with features similar to those of congestible 
public goods (Cull is & Jones, 1992). This is because common-pool resources are those 
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for which it is difficult to exclude outsiders, but use of the resource by one person 
reduces its availability for other users. These resources, like fisheries, are thus 
degradable and their renewable nature is mitigated if too many users exploit them. They 
are thus not able to regenerate in a relevant economic time scale. There is thus a need to 
ensure that these resources are used on a sustainable basis for the benefit of all. 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
Economics, for the purpose of this thesis, thus deals with the achievement of the "social 
objective" in the sense that resources should be used for the achievement of social 
welfare maximisation. Maximisation that goes beyond the narrow definition imposed by 
traditional neoclassical economics, where a role for government (through intervention to 
achieve equity) is necessary. This is especially important given the characteristics of 
natural resources and the role that they play in social and economic development. And 
with future growth and development increasingly dependant on renewable resources, it 
is imperative that these are used on a sustainable basis. 
2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SQUID FISHERY 
2.3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned above (section 2.2) a renewable resource is one that regenerates within a 
relevant economic time scale. According to the classification in Figure 2.1, the second 
tier of classification within renewable resources is between those that are biological in 
nature and those that are physical in nature. It then makes sense to divide biological 
resources into water-based organisms, land-based organisms and air-based organisms. 
This provided the third tier within the classification. For the purposes of this thesis, 
water-based organisms (fresh water and marine) can be further divided into those that 
are exploitable and those that are not. Renewable exploitable resources are either 
exploited for commercial purposes, subsistence purposes or recreational purposes 
(Cochrane & Payne, 1998). Most of the prominent squid fisheries, worldwide, are 
utilised on a commercial basis (Rodhouse, 2001 and Roeleveld, 1998). The South 
African chokka squid fishery is no different in this regard. 
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2.3.2 Biological Classification 
The squid caught within South Africa are scientifically classified as Loligo vulgaris 
renaudii (Augustyn, 1986), and are locally known as "chokka" squid (Augustyn et ai, 
1994). Most squid fisheries around the world target one of two major categories of 
squid. All squid, which are part of the cephalopod family, are divided into two broad 
groupings, the near-shore myopsid squid and the oceanic oegopsid squid (Jackson, 
2002). The myopsid squid have covered eyes and inhabit continental shelf regions. The 
major families exploited are the Loliginidae, whose major classes consist of LoligolO, 
Photololigo and Sepioteuthis (Nesis, 1998). The second group of squid consists of the 
oegopsid squid 11 that form a hugely diverse group of oceanic and deepwater-species that 
have a wide diversity of body forms. The main distinguishing feature of oegopsids is 
that they have an eye that is exposed to the seawater. 
Through the development of reliable ageing techniques (Jackson, 1994 and Jackson & 
O'Dor, 2001), it has been established that squids have very short life spans and fast 
growth rates. According to Jackson & O'Dor (2001) their lives are very much ' life in 
the fast lane' . In fact it is unusual to find a squid with a life span of much greater than a 
year and many tropical species have life spans that are around 6 months or less 
(Jackson, 2002). Loligo vulgaris renaudii, the squid exploited in South Africa, is no 
different in this regard. It has an average lifespan of between 1 and 2 years, reaching 
reproductive maturity in its first year of life (Augustyn, 1990). 
Squid caught in South Africa, as well as those exploited worldwide, can be classified as 
biological renewable resources that are commercially exploitable. Their short life spans 
mean that these resources, as a population, have a rapid regeneration rate. In fact short 
life spans, especially for species that are less than a year old, often result in multiple 
cohorts per year (Roel, 1998). This can however pose problems for the management of 
the resource as heavy exploitation of the resource in one year can reduce the 
reproducible population to levels below the 'critical zone'. There has thus been 
increased concern in most squid fisheries worldwide as world squid catch, like most 
cephalopods, has increased substantially in recent years (Rodhouse, 2001). This has 
10 The squid exploited in South Africa, Loligo vulgaris reynaudii, belong to this grouping. 
II As a point of interest the giant squid (Architeuthis) is an oegopsid squid. 
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primarily been due to the increase in demand for seafood, coupled with the reduction in 
most fin-fished stocks. In addition to this most squid species are, however, typically 
unstable (Roel, 1998 and Jackson & O'Dor, 2001). They react dramatically to any 
changes in environmental conditions12 Squid fisheries are thus, not only of interest for 
their contribution to the protein content of human consumption, but also as possible 
indicators of global ecological change. 
2.3.3 Operational Classification 
Cochrane & Payne (1998) have broadly classified the South Africa's exploitable marine 
resources into those that are exploited on a commercial basis, a recreational basis and/or 
for subsistence purposes. Within South Africa, the chokka squid fishery is a 
commercially exploited fishery. The squid fishery is however not the only commercially 
exploited fishery in South Africa. The South African fishing industry can be divided 
into the demersal13 fishery, the pelagic 14 fishery, the rock lobster fishery15, the abalone 
fishery and various line fisheries. These various fisheries will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. The squid fishery can essentially be classified as one of the various 
line fisheries that exist. This is because squid are caught using hand-line with Japanese 
squid jigs (Sauer, 1992). 
South African fisheries can further be divided by the different types of vessels used 
within these various fisheries. The most popular way of distinguishing between the 
different types of vessels is their length distribution. However other characteristics such 
as gross registered tonnage (GRT) or engine power (measured in kilowatts) can also be 
used. In terms of length, vessels can divided into four categories (Mather, 2004); (a) 
micro, with a length between 5 to 8 meters, (b) small, between 8 and 12 meters, (c) 
medium, between 14 and 25 meters, and lastly (d) large, which are greater than 25 
12The variability in Loligo vulgaris reynaudii is apparently driven by storm conditions during their 
spawning period (Rodhouse, 2001 and Schon, 2000). 
I Demersal fish are species occurring in deeper waters near the bottom of the sea. Such species include 
hake, kingklip, snook and sole and are usually caught with trawl nets. Demersal species can however also 
be caught through longlining, which is a less capital-intensive method. 
14 Pelagic species (such as anchovy, pilchard, redeye, sardine and mackeral) occur in schools nearer to the 
ocean surface and are thus caught with purse seine nets. 
IS The rock lobster fishing industry consists of the West Coast rock lobster fishery operating in the rocky 
inshore areas of the Western Cape, and the South Coast rock lobster fishery where catches are mainly in 
deeper water. 
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meters. The squid fishery consists of vessels that are predominantly within the small to 
medium categories. Along within vessel length, each fishery can further be separated 
into their primarily management method. Fisheries with South Africa are either 
managed through a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE). A TAC 
fishery is managed by regulating the amount of output or catch, while a TAE fishery is 
managed by restricting the amount of effort (or inputs). These concepts will be 
expanded on in Chapter 3. It is now possible to classify the squid fishery within the 
context of the above discussion. A diagrammatic framework is illustrated below. 
Demersal 
Renewable Resources 
I 
Natural (Biological) Resources 
I 
Water-based (Marine) Resources 
South African commercially exploitable marine resources 
TAG fisheries 
__ I __ _ 
TAE fisheries 
_ L __ 
Pelagic Une TAE fisheries 
Squid fishery I 
(Small to medium vessels) I 
Other line fisheries 
e.g. tuna, hake 
Figure 2.2: A Classification of the South African Commercial Squid Fishery 
Source: Adapted from Mather (2004) and Cochrane & Payne (1998) 
The above classification scheme (Figure 2.2) is useful from both a biological 
perspective and an operational perspective. It provides a logical basis from which to 
analyse the South Africa commercial squid fishery. Although both TAC and TAB 
managed fisheries have been mentioned, the primary focus of this thesis will be on 
effort-based fisheries (under which the squid fishery falls). The discussion in future 
chapters will hence be biased towards the sustainable management and utilisation, and 
implications thereof, of effort-based fisheries. However, where it is deemed necessary, 
for purposes of comparison, T AC or output management methods will be mentioned. 
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The operational criteria used within the classification will also be expanded on In 
Chapter 6, specifically with regards to the South African squid fishery. 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
In terms of its biological classification, South African chokka squid are classified as 
Loligo vulgaris reynaudii (Augustyn, \986). Like most squid species there are short-
lived and are subject to much variability (largely due to erratic environmental changes). 
This variability can pose a problem for sustainable management as determining accurate 
stock estimates is difficult. In terms of its operational classification, the squid fishery is 
primarily a commercial line fishery managed by T AE. In order for the fishery to be 
managed on a sustainable basis, the effectiveness of TAE management needs to be 
explained (as will be done in Chapters 3 and 6). These management mechanisms 
however also need to account for the biological constraints imposed by the 
characteristics of the species. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
The classification of the South Africa commercial squid fishery provides a good starting 
framework from which to apply an economic logic to the use and management of such a 
resource. The operational classification provides a management framework that includes 
the physical and human characteristics in terms of the harvesting of the resource. The 
biological characteristics however provide an additional constraint in terms of 
maintaining the viability of the resource (which is in line with the idea of sustainable 
utilisation). All of these factors need to be considered when attempting to deal with 
effective resource redistribution. In addition to these, issues of equity also need to be 
considered (as outlined by the "social objective"). This is especially important when 
focus is turned to the resource distribution issues facing South African fisheries today. 
These place an even further constraint on sustainability. All of these issues will be dealt 
with in greater detail in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESOURCE USE, EXCESS CAPACITY AND BIOECONOMICS: 
THE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROBLEM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2 fisheries resources were classified as renewable resources that are subject 
to exploitation. It was established that these resources can be used on a sustainable basis 
or be subject to overexploitation. In this chapter an attempt is made to highlight the 
current status of most fisheries resources worldwide . From this it will be clear that most 
of these resources are in fact either fully utilised or overexploited. According to 
Greboval & Munro (1999) the apparent reason for this stems from the build up of 
fishing capacity (i.e. due to overcapitalisation caused by increases in the size of fishing 
fleets). This thus results in excess capacity. To better aid discussion a clear definition of 
excess capacity is thus needed. Faced with these problems, fisheries management 
authorities need to find a way to reduce the pressure imposed on marine stocks. 
However, to determine possible reference points, in terms of the desired levels of effort 
or output that authorities strive to achieve, a bioeconomic model is derived. Although 
this is a static bioeconomic model (the Gordon-Schaefer model), it is useful in so far of 
the principle result that it outlines. The remainder of the chapter focuses on some of the 
operational aspects of fisheries management while dealing with such issues as 
enforcement and regulatory instruments. 
3.2 THE FISHERIES PROBLEM 
The ocean and the natural capital stocks that they produce are important from an 
ecological, economic and social viewpoint (Costanza, 1999). Natural resources 
contribute significantly to human welfare, both directly (in terms of consumption) and 
indirectly (through production and employment). The FAO (2000) estimates that 
international trade in fishery commodities was worth about US$51 .3 billion in 1998 and 
contributed to the employment of about 36 million people. It is therefore crucial that 
living marine resources be managed on a sustainable basis. 
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In the case of fisheries, however, the ability to maintain sustainable marine populations 
has become increasingly difficult. The result being that fish stocks' are becoming 
increasingly limited. Many authors (Harder, 200 I; FAO, 2000; Iudicello et ai, 1999 and 
World Bank, 1994) agree that virtually all commercial fisheries have experienced 
drastic declines in fish stocks over the last fifty years. According to the FAO (2000) 
about 47% to 50% of global stocks are fully exploited with no room for further 
expansion. This means that nearly half of the world's stocks have either reached, or are 
very close to, their maximum limits. A further 18% are already overexploited and are in 
danger of total collapse if no immediate action is taken (FAO, 2000). The situation in 
South Africa is not much different. As the largest fishing nation in Africa (Penxa, 
1999), total production (catch) in South Africa is greater than 500 000 tons. Since 
fishing activities began in the 1930's there has been a dramatic increase in catch, with 
landings doubling in South Africa's most important fisheries by the late 1960's (Paul, 
2000b). Most of South Africa's fisheries are currently fully utilised with no further 
room for expansion (Booth & Hecht, 2000). 
If the total collapse of fisheries stocks is to be averted, a major amendment, to revert 
uncontrolled and excessive fishing pressure, needs to be undertaken. The ability to 
manage fisheries is however a very complex process that requires the integration of 
various disciplines. This is because it involves the management of a dynamic resource, 
which incorporates various issues. Fish stocks are not only a renewable resource, but 
are also a variable2 and valuable one. They are subject to environmental conditions, 
such as EI Nino, as well as being a very important source of food, employment and 
revenue. The fishing industry plays a small (about 0.4% of GDP) but important part in 
the South African economy. It employs about 25 000 people in the commercial sector 
and affects about 60 000 people in related sectors, in total grossing about R2.5 billion a 
year (Paul, 2000b). Management issues, in world fisheries, thus range from biological 
concerns (related to maintaining sustainable marine stocks), to social, economic and 
political concerns (related to individual fishermen, communities and countries alike). 
I Stock size is either the number of individuals or the weight, of a particular biological marine resource, at 
any given time. 
2 The variability of a species refers to the fluctuations in the population/stock size over time. For example 
most squid populations fluctuate on an annual basis. 
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The problems facing fisheries are indeed multi-faceted, but from an economic 
perspective the problem is essentially one of having too many vessels, or excess 
capacity3, in many fisheries worldwide (Greboval, 2000). The problem is that although 
many marine fisheries have remained relatively stagnant over the last decade, actual 
fishing capacity4 has been steadily increasing over the last fifty years (FAO, 2003 and 
Greboval & Munro, 1999). This has indeed been the case in some of South Africa's 
larger commercial fisheries, where effort creep and capacity build-up have become a 
problem (Mather et ai, 2003a). The South Africa chokka squid fishery is no different in 
this regard. Although the fishery is still relatively "new", there has been an increase in 
effort and capacity within its 20 years of existence, a fact that will be highlighted in 
Chapter 6. 
The issue of managing fishing capacity at both a national and international level is thus 
important. At an international level concerns about capacity management were formally 
raised by the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COF!) in 1997 (Greboval, 2000). Concern 
was expressed about the growing use of excessive fishing inputs and the incidence of 
over-investment within world fisheries. Greboval (2000) and Pearse (1994) state that 
excess capacity in world fisheries was gradually influenced by various factors . Some of 
these factors include: a) the profitability of fishing activities, either through technical 
progress5 and/or relatively inelastic prices, compensating for diminishing catches; b) 
ineffective policies related to the national exploitation of fisheries within their 
jurisdictions, generally accompanied by sizable subsidisation programmes and; c) the 
failure of fisheries management in general to effectively monitor their fisheries. 
At an individual fishery level, however, all the factors mentioned above essentially stem 
from the widespread tendency of over-investment (leading to increased infrastructure 
3 This can be due to the enhancement of efficiency caused by advances in technology, the refitting of 
older vessels and the failure of fisheries management authorities to effectively monitor and control their 
fisheries (Greboval, 2000 and Pearse, 1994). 
4 Ward (2000:5) states that fishing capacity is the ability of a vessel or fleet to harvest more fish. He 
further states that excess capacity results because fishermen do not have an incentive to conserve fish 
stocks which causes them to over-invest in capital used to harvest fish as well as other production inputs. 
S Technical progress is due to advances in technology. which improves the harvesting efficiency of 
fishermen. This can result in increased revenue, as more fish are caught, without a dramatic increase in 
costs (Matthiasson, 1996: 173). 
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and expanded fishing fleets)6 which in tum lead to overfishing under open acces/ 
conditions (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). This is a textbook case of market 
failure, brought about by a divergence between rational individual investment behaviour 
and societal optimality. This is because common-pool resources have characteristics 
that encourage adverse economic incentives (due to their public good8 nature as stated 
in Chapter 2). Excess capacity its dynamics and control thus seem to be one of the most 
pressing economic9 issues facing fisheries (Charles, 2001; Greboval 2000; Garcia et at, 
1999; Greboval & Munro, 1999; Buckworth, 1998; Hannesson, 1998; Matthiasson, 
1996 and Pearse, 1994). It seems to have broader implications for all other issues. There 
is thus a need to define what capacity and excess capacity are from an economic 
viewpoint and to highlight how these phenomena affect a dynamic fisheries' system. 
These issues, and their effects, will now be discussed in more detail. 
3.3 FISHING CAPACITY AND OVERCAPITALISATION 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Within most world fisheries the presence of excess fishing capacity is, and has been, a 
matter of growing concern and the result of the wide-ranging phenomenon of 
overcapitalisation (Greboval & Munro, 1999). Ward (2000) and Paul (2000a) state that 
excess capacity and overfishing (mainly due to a lack of monitoring and compliance) 
have been identified as the two main problems facing fisheries managers. Overcapacity 
seems to result from overcapitalisation, and in tum results in increased fishing effort lO. 
Excess fishing capacity thus affects the sustainability of many fisheries, undermining 
6 This is known as Qvercapitalisation and will be defined in section 3.3. 
7 Open access conditions result from the fact that most fisheries resources have been unregulated and 
subject to the "law of capture". This means that no one owns fish swimming in the ocean until they have 
been caught, i.e. taken into possession. (Scott, 2000c) 
8 Public goods exhibit characteristics that make it difficult to exclude nonusers, this is also the case with 
fishery resources. 
9 The fi sheries problem is referred to as an economic problem because the incentives that cause 
overcapacity are essentially economic incentives (due to human behaviour). This does however not mean 
that issues pertaining to the biological management of fish stocks are not important. 
10 The economic concept of fishing effort refers to the boats, men, gear, etc. that are required for the 
fishing activity. 
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many of the conservation and management efforts undertaken, and thus leading to 
. 'fi . II slgm !Cant economic waste 
3.3.2 Defining Capacity 
Although there is agreement that excess capacity and overcapitalisation are among the 
major problems within fisheries (as highlighted in section 3.2 above) there is still much 
confusion, within literature, about the definitions of these of concepts. This apparent 
confusion arises from the inconsistent use of these terms. It is therefore useful to tum to 
Grt\boval & Munro (1999) and Cunningham & Gnlboval (2001) to aid with possible 
definitions of capacity and overcapitalisation. It is also useful to firstly differentiate 
between localised overfishing and excess capacity in general. Localised overfishing is 
clearly a case of excessive effort being applied to an isolated stock (Gnlboval, 2000). 
Whereas excess capacity, after allowing for possible reallocations, is clearly about 
having excessive and redundant harvesting capacity throughout the fishing sector or for 
a large group offisheries, which cannot easily be re-allocated (Greboval, 2000). 
Given the discipline that this thesis is grounded in, it is sensible to begin with an 
economic definition of capacity. According to Cunningham & Greboval (200l:part 2), 
economic capacity, based on cost minimisation, is "the level of output of fish caught 
over a period oftime (year, season) where short-run and long-run average total costs are 
equal, for a given fleet size and composition, resource condition, market condition, state 
of technology, and other relevant constraints". 12 
However, smce cost minimisation is not the only objective l3 that can govern a 
fisherman's behaviour, a technical definition of capacity is also vital (Primont, 2000). 
II This manifests itself in the form of redundant fishing inputs and the overfishing of most valued fish 
stocks. There is also the issue of the dissipation of food production potential. 
12 For an economic definition that is more in line welfare criterion, economic capacity levels arc "those 
levels of output of fish caught over a period of time where objectives such as net social benefits arc 
maximized for a given fleet size and composition, resource condition, market condition, state of 
technology, and other relevant constraints" (Cunningham & Greboval, 200 I :part 2). 
\J Economic rationale assumes that individuals attempt to maximise profits, which can also be interpreted 
as the minimisation of costs. In addition to this fundamental premise fishermen also need to account for 
technical factors, e,g, the inputs on a given vessel and how these affect the safety of the crew. 
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Here Cunningham & Greboval (2001) again provide a useful definition. Technical 
capacity is "the level of output of fish over a period of time (year, season) that a given 
fishing fleet could reasonably expect to catch if variable inputs are utilized under 
normal operating conditions, for a given resource condition, state of technology, and 
other constraints" (Cunningham & Greboval, 2001 :part 2). Under this definition, excess 
capacity exists when technical capacity exceeds a target catch level set to rebuild or 
maintain the stock at a long-run target size (the Gordon-Scheafer bioeconomic model 
provides a useful framework to illustrate this, as will be shown in section 3.4). 
The above definition indicates that capacity may be defined with reference either to 
fishing inputs (vessels, potential effort) or to fishing output (potential catch). In both 
cases, it is essential to further clarify the word potential. A general definition can aid in 
this regard (Cunningham & Greboval, 2001 :part 2): 
Fishing capacity is, for a given resource condition, the amount of fish (or fishing 
effort) that can be produced over a period of time (e.g. a year) by a vessel or a fleet 
if fully utilised, that is if effort and catch were not constrained by restrictive 
management measures. 
Taking into account, the idea of localised overcapacity, it is also useful to have a 
definition of fleet capacity. Greboval & Munro (1999) define the capacity of a vessel, 
or a fleet, as its ability, or power, to generate fishing effort per period of time. Capacity 
thus depends on things like, the size of each vessel, the technical efficiency of vessel 
operations, and the potential fishing time of each vessel per specified period of time, 
e.g. year or season. Measuring capacity on this basis is clearly an input measure. 
Whether capacity is measured on an input or output basis, it is important to note that 
both approaches refer to the same fundamental conceptual framework, namely that the 
identification and measurement of excess capacity relates to possible deviations 
between the current capacity of a fleet (input or output measures) and a given target 
level of exploitation that can only be defined in reference to both inputs and outputs. 
Overcapacity therefore describes a situation whereby the capacity of the current fleet is 
higher than that required to ensure a target level of sustainable exploitation. 
Undercapacity and full capacity can be defined on the same basis (Cunningham & 
Greboval, 200 I) . 
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3.3.3 Overcapitalisation and Excess Capacity 
It is generally agreed (Charles, 2001; Cunningham & Greboval, 2001; Ward, 2000; 
Greboval & Munro, 1999; Christy, 1996 and Matthiasson, 1996) that excess capacity is 
largely a result of overcapitalisation, which in tum leads to increased fishing effort thus 
overfishing. According to the World Bank (1994) gross overcapitalisation of the 
world's fishing fleet increased by 180% from 1970 to 1989, a signal of major excess 
capacity problems. Buckworth (1998) argues that capital investment in a fishery tends 
to build up during good times with the anticipation that better gear or more boats or 
processing equipment will increase future revenues. But when the fishery stabilises 
(possibly due to environmental or biological reasons), this over-investment can result in 
unemployment and redundant infrastructure (economic waste). This is outcome that 
Crutchfield (1956) alluded to as early as the mid-1950s. 
Before attempting to define overcapitalisation in the case of fisheries, it is useful to see 
how the concept is dealt with in standard economics. When dealing with an individual 
firm in the traditional theory of the firm, there is a stock of capital (i.e. plant) that would 
be optimal for its given level of output. At this "optimal" capital size, the firm would be 
minimising its costs (i.e. long run average costs). This optimal stock of capital can vary 
over time, due to changing demand and cost conditions. There is thus a time path for the 
optimal stock of capital. However at any given time the actual capital stock can be 
greater or smaller than the optimal one14. Under normal conditions a firm can only 
adjust its capital stock gradually (in the long run). This means that the gap between the 
actual and optimal size will persist for a period of time 15 (in the short run). During this 
time if the level of actual output is greater than the optimal level, there is 
overcapitalisation. The economic consequence is that the firm is producing its given 
level of output at greater than minimum cost because its plant is larger than the optimal 
\4 This means the level of actual output (for a given level of actual capital stock) and the level of optimal 
output (for which the given plant would be the optimal) can follow a similar path . 
" The rcason why the plant size is adjusting slowly is because capital lacks "malleability" (Greboval & 
Munro, 1999). Perfectly "malleable" capital is capital that one can dispose of without fear of capital loss 
at a moment's notice. Capital is thus perfectly mobile, The other extreme. perfectly non-malleable capital 
is capital that, once acquired, cannot be disposed of, other than by destroying it. 
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sIze. When the opposite occurs there is undercapitalisation. These concepts of 
overcapacity/under-capacity can be applied to fisheries . 
If optimal harvesting capacity is defined as the minimum amount (of capital) required to 
harvest a desired quantity of fish at the least cost (OECD, 1996), then this definition is 
consistent with the above definition of capacity as taken from standard economics. The 
same basic principles pertaining to the neoclassical theory of the firm, with regards 
overcapitalisation (and the reverse), can be applied to fisheries. 
Greboval & Munro (1999) however note that there are at least three fundamental 
differences between the case of the firm discussed in standard economics and the 
problem facing fisheries . Firstly, in the theory of the firm, owners are generally faced 
with one stock of capital (although this one stock may contain complex components). 
This degree of simplicity does not exist in fisheries . When dealing with natural 
resources (i.e. fisheries) it is commonplace among economists to describe these 
resources as "natural" capital (as has been defined in Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). These 
resources are thus regarded as assets that are capable of yielding a stream of economic 
benefits through time, with the one difference being that the natural capital assets 
initially come to us as an endowment from nature. If this concept were applied to 
fisheries, then the fish stock would be regarded as a form of natural capital, which, if 
properly maintained, is capable of yielding a stream of economic benefits to society 
indefinitely (as Risvand, 2002 noted). One can thus invest, positively or negatively, in 
the stock. In terms of the economics of fisheries, there are hence at least two types of 
capital, the "natural" capital, and the capital in form of the fleet, referred to as 
"conventional" capital16 by Greboval & Munro (1999). Of fundamental importance is 
the fact that the two stocks of capital interact with one another. 
The second key difference arises from mobility. Capital in the standard theory of the 
firm is treated as stationary. However, conventional capital in fisheries is, more often 
than not, highly mobile. This means that a stock of conventional capital may be 
16 This was classified as physical capital in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1). 
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interacting with several different stocks of natural capital. Moreover, a given biomass 
may be subject to exploitation by several fleets, i.e. by several different gear types. 
The third difference relates to the open access problem afflicting most capture fisheries. 
In the theory of the firm, it is the firm who endeavours to adjust the level of capital to 
the level that is optimum. In the case of fisheries, the optimal stock of conventional 
capital is the stock of capital that is perceived as optimal by the resource managers, as 
opposed to those who are actually doing the investing in such capital, the fishermen. 
Under conditions of open access, it is invariably the case that the fishermen, 
collectively, will have an incentive to invest in capital to an extent that far exceeds the 
resource managers' perceived optimum (Ward, 2000). This is, in fact, just another way 
of restating the open access problem. 
Finally, it should also be noted that the stock of conventional capital should properly be 
expanded beyond the fleet to include capital in the processing sector and "human" 
capital in the form of fishermen's skills17. These skills determine the relative efficiency 
of an effort unit. Fishermen with better skills, should be perceived to catch more fish, 
this can thus also manifest in excess capacity. 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
Excess capacity is a severe problem in most of the world's fisheries (as highlighted in 
section 3.2). The primary cause for this is believed to be the overcapitalisation of 
fisheries through the expansion or improvement of fishing fleets. Section 3.3 thus shows 
how overcapitalisation exists with regards to a target reference point set by management 
authorities. This measure is implicitly assumed to be the optimal level (that which is 
desirable for the maintenance of the fishery). It therefore seems important to gain a 
better idea of the various reference points available. The Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic 
model can provide some insight in this regard. 
17 This is of vital importance when dealing with equity issues relating to skills distribution in a fishery 
especially in cases where a fishery is perceived to be overcapitalised, reducing capacity can result in 
unemployment. 
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3.4 A SIMPLE BIOECONOMIC MODEL 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Section 3.3 outlined the fact that most fisheries around the world are overexploited or 
close to full utilisation. However, how do these problems relate to the management 
measures that authorities attempt to institute? In order to determine some reference 
points, with regards to policy options, a basic model is needed. This section thus 
outlines the Gordon-Schafer bioeconomic model, which incorporates both biological 
and economic information. Although this model is not practical in all cases, it is useful, 
firstly because it is widely used and understood, secondly because it can be used to 
determine reference points in terms of both biological and economic efficiency. 
3.4.2 Bioeconomics: A Background 
According to Scott (2000b), by 1920 European governments realised that fisheries were 
being overutilised; a belief further supported by evidence complied using 'new' 
scientific quantitative methods. Scott (2000b: 3) argued that it was from this point that 
"fisheries science came of age" and it heralded the beginning of biological fisheries 
management. Biologists have thus played a major role in fisheries management since its 
inception. They have dominated management decisions on the quantities of fish to be 
caught and to some extent the allocation of such catches. Pearse (1994) however states 
that regardless of all the policies implemented by biologists, fishing capacity continued 
to expand through to the 1970s. Conrad (1999:52) agrees that there was a continued 
decline in commercial fish stocks worldwide and this has given rise to questions about 
the effectiveness of "any combinations of traditional policies". Fisheries biologists and 
managers, trying to conserve stocks in the face of expanding fishing pressure, began to 
realise that something was fundamentally wrong. 
Fisheries management in South Africa was also initially based on biological principles. 
Six years after South Africa gained independence from Britain, the Sea Fisheries Act of 
1940 was passed. This gave the central government the sole powers of maintaining 
fisheries resources (van Sittert, 2002). However it was not until 1954, with the 
formation of the Sea Fisheries Research Institute, that regulations were put in place. 
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These measure were based primarily on biological principles with the aim of conserving 
the resource. These measures however did nothing to halt the entry of vessels, 
especially foreign vessels, into important fisheries (Mather, 2004). The same holds true 
for the squid fishery. Soon after its initial development, increased effort led to the 
implementation of measures based on biological principles (as will be elaborated in 
Chapter 6). 
According to some economists (Charles, 2001; Cunningham & Greboval, 2001; Scott, 
2000a; Buckworth, 1998 and Pearse, 1994) the problem lay with the fact that profitable 
catches attracted more fishing power, which in turn threatened biological productivity. 
Fishery scientists thus reacted to a symptom of overfishing by introducing restrictions 
(these and other regulations will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4). Pearse 
(1994: 13) referred to this as the "conservation problem 18". These biological 
management measures are however regarded as sub-optimal as they ignore the second 
consequence of overfishing, which Pearse (1994: 13) termed the "economic problem". 
The 'economic problem' resulted from the open access nature of a fishery attracting 
additional inputs, and thus fishing effort, into the fishery, which was due to the rational 
investment behaviour of fishers. This is the classic case of overcapitalisation (described 
in section 3.3.3), which manifests itself in the form of wasted capital and labour as these 
inputs become redundant when catches decline (a disinvestment in natural capital). 
This means that social welfare will probably not be maximised. 
While governments based their regulatory endeavours on policies constructed by 
scientists, in the form of controls on vessels, on fishing gear and other restrictions like 
closed seasons, they ignored this second problem related to commercial fishing. They 
were thus continually trying to find new ways of reducing fishing effort. To quote 
Pearse (1994: 13): 
In many cases regulators found themselves on a treadmill, designing new restrictions 
on fishing to keep pace with the continuing tendency of fishing fleets to expand their 
capacity to harvest fish. 
18 The 'conservation problem' arose from the need to protect a given population of marine resources, thus 
ensuring that sustainable fish populations persisted. 
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Appreciation for the economics of fishing only came about in the 1950s19. This 
materialised following the works of economists like Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955). 
They explained that fishermen where encouraged to expand fishing power to catch more 
fish in an unregulated fishery . If profitable, then this attracted addition fishing effort 
into the industry. 
Management measures based solely on biological principles was strongly criticised by 
Gordon (1954) as they failed to incorporate the costs of harvesting as part of the 
management problem. To quote Gordon (1954: 128): 
The term "fisheries management" ... focuses attention on the quantity of fish caught~ 
taking as the human objective of commercial fishing the derivation of the largest 
sustainable catch. This approach is often hailed in biological literature as the "new 
theory" or "modern formulation" of the fisheries problem. Its limitations, however, 
are very serious, and, indeed, the new approach comes very litde closer to treating the 
fisheries problem as one of human utilization of natural resources than did the older, 
more primitive, theories. 
Biological management therefore, according to Gordon, ignores the human side to 
fisheries management and the costs associated with it. Gordon (1954), Scott (1955)20 
and others (including Crutchfield, 1956; Smith, 1968; Plourde, 1970; Wilen, 1976 and 
Clark, 1985) then went on to expand on existing work or to design alternative 
management models. These were to serve as the basis for the merging of biological and 
economic principles, namely the establishment of bioeconomic modelling. 
I' The major breakthrough in extractive resource use was developed by Harold Hotelling (193 1). 
Hotelling (1931) in his seminal article, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources explores the optimal 
output over time for a mine with a given amount of known resources. Although HoteHing's (1931) paper 
was indeed influential when dealing with non-renewable resource management from an economic 
perspective, it was only twenty years later that decisive work on renewable resources was conducted. The 
origins of renewable resource economics can in fact be traced back to Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) 
20 Scott (1955) in his paper entitled, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole OWllership. expanded on 
Gordon's (1954) work. According to Saville (1997), Scott's article can be seen as the most successful 
extension of Gordon' s work by shifting his model into a dynamic state. Scott (1955) recognised that the 
optimal management of a dynamic resource was based on maximising the net present value of all future 
net returns of the fishery. Subsequent analysis in the 1960s and 1970s however showed that the objective 
of present value maximization, with a positive discount rate, would not be optimal. In 1955, however, this 
direction made eminent sense. 
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Two broad approaches to bioeconomic modelling have been developed within fisheries 
economIcs. These are commonly known as the cohort approach and the general 
production or surplus production approach (Munro & Scott, 1985). The cohort 
approach was primarily developed by Beverton & Holt (1957). Their models are based 
on the cohorts, age or year classes, of a particular population. The approach looks at the 
dynamics of the population, looking at growth as affected by natural mortality and 
fishing mortalit/l The cohort model suggests that effort should be directed at a 
particular age-class in a given stock. Stock biomass" is thus influenced in this way. 
According to Wilen (1985), the cohort approach suffers from several weaknesses. This 
type of modelling calls for fishing gear that is able to precisely select fish of a certain 
age or sizeB However it is very difficult to accurately measure the size of individual 
cohorts in a fishery . The success of using the Beverton-Holt type model, on a 
bioeconomic basis, is thus extremely limited (Munro & Scott, 1985 and Wilen, 1985). 
In contrast to the Beverton-Holt type models, the surplus production or general 
production approach24 typically ignores cohorts by assuming that the most important 
determinant of stock size is the biomass itself. Although these models have their 
drawbacks as well, they have been employed in most fisheries economic studies. These 
single variable models are what served as the foundation for Gordon's work and thus as 
the focal point ofbioeconomic modelling. 
3.4.3 The Gordon-Schaefer Bioeconomic Model 
A number of bioeconomic models have been developed over the years. However, the 
most straightforward and widely used is the Gordon-Schaefer model. This model is 
based on the work of Gordon (1954) and Schaefer (1957) and has become the basis for 
most bioeconomic models associated with fisheries management. The model was 
21 Fishing mortality relates to the number of fish that are removed from a population due to harvesting 
activities. 
22 The biomass is the amount of a resource or population expressed in terms of its weight. 
23 An example of such fishing gear is selecting an appropriate mesh size to allow smaller fish, of a 
particular age, not to be caught. However. harvesting cohorts on an individual basis, what Munro and 
Scott (1985:625) refer to as "knife-edge selectivity", is the exception rather than the rule. 
24 These are the Schaefer type biological models based on a logistic function referred to in section 4.4.3. 
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centred upon a surplus growth model, based on simple biological theory of population 
dynamics. It thus has a strong biological foundation, provided by Schaefer (1957) 
himself. Munro & Scott (1985) agree that every economic model of the fishery has its 
base within a biological framework. The Gordon-Schaefer model is one of a single 
species fishery, in isolation, in which demand for fish and the supply of fishing effort 
are both assumed to be perfectly elastic (Munro & Scott, 1985: 628) . 
Fish stocks are renewable resources. They consist of populations of individuals that 
grow, reproduce and die. As with all renewable resources, it is important to distinguish 
between their stock and flow characteristics. The stock, in most marine resources, refers 
to biomass. This is the amount of a resource expressed in terms of its weight, existing at 
a given point in time. The flow refers to the change in stock over an period of time. 
There is a need to consider the crucial variables that affect a fishable biomass (a given 
stock) capable of growth (represented as a flow). These variables can be explained by 
making reference to Munro & Scott (1985: 624). 
The first two factors deal with the growth of the biomass. Firstly, there is recruitment, 
which is the entry of new fish into an existing biomass. Secondly, there is the growth of 
individual fish. This occurs through an increase in body weight as fish mature. These 
two variables ensure growth of the biomass. However, growth is kept in check by 
mortality. Natural mortality can be due to age, environmental factors and/or predictors 
alike. Net natural growth is thus the difference between the recruitment and natural 
mortality and is referred to as surplus growth25 (Schaefer, 1957). There is also fishing 
mortalitj6, which is as a result of fishing activity. In the absence of fishing mortality 
there is a natural equilibrium, where growth is just offset by natural effects (Anderson, 
1986). Recruitment and individual growth thus add to stock size while mortality 
diminishes it. 
To commence with the derivation of the model, the biological aspects developed by 
Schaefer (1954, 1957) will first be explored. This model provides a good approximation 
25 If surplus growth is positive then the fish stock is growing, if it is negative then the fish stock is 
declining. A basic surplus growth model can be expressed in a discrete form as: Xt+ 1 - Xt = f(Xt), where 
XI is the initial stock size at the beginning of time period (t), and f (XI) is surplus growth. 
26 Fishing mortality occurs due to the harvesting of fish, by fishennen, from a given fish stock/population. 
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of what happens among marine populations, given different starting levels of stocks. 
The fundamental underpinning is that growth, G (in terms of weight), of the population, 
X, over a time period, t, will be a function of the initial size of the popUlation: 
dX 
-' =G=f(X) 
dt ' 
(3.1) 
It is reasonable to assume that population growth is roughly proportional to the initial 
population. Therefore there is the following: 
f(X,)=rX, (3.2) 
Where r is called the intrinsic growth rate and represents the fastest growth rate attained 
by the stock. A given area in the sea is however limited in size and there thus is a 
maximum quantity of fish that can be supported. This limit is determined by the 
envirollmelltal carrying capacity (ECC), which is denoted by K. Thus according to the 
logistic function, at any moment, the growth rate will be proportional to the difference 
between the ECC and the population at that time. Therefore: 
f(X,) = rx,[(K ~X,)] 
X 
=rX,(I- ~) 
(3.3a) 
(3.3b) 
In the above equation, both K and r are positive constants. According to Anderson 
(1986:20) the biomass of the unexploited fish stock will tend to increase at various rates 
and will grow towards some maximum weight (XMa:J that, when reached, will be 
maintained. This, as mentioned above, is termed the Ilatural equilibrium size. There are 
two important features of this model (Saville, 1997). The first feature relates to the two 
equilibrium solutions when X, = 0 and X, = K (XMaeJ. In other words, in an 
unexploited state, there are two levels of biomass at which population growth is stable; 
a zero population and K (the environmental carrying capacity). 
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Therefore: 
and 
. . dX, 0< x,< K ImplIes -- > 0 
dt 
x, > K implies dX, < 0 
dt 
The above states that the resource will exhibit positive growth as long as the existing 
biomass lies between zero27 and the ECC; and the biomass exhibits negative growth if 
the existing biomass exceeds the ECC. As mentioned above, K (and x,) is therefore a 
stable equilibrium, where new growth and mortality balance each other and the system 
is in a natural equilibrium (Clark, 1985; Anderson, 1986 and Iudicello et ai, 1999). The 
Schaefer model thus shows the surplus growth, which is zero at K. and there is thus no 
tendency to move away from the point, as explained above. 
The second important feature of the above model is that the population at which the 
productivity is maximised is not the stable equilibrium. Rather the maximum growth of 
the stock occurs when the population size is half the environmental carrying capacity28 
This occurs when X, = Kl2 and is know as the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 
Smith (1968), Munro & Scott (1985) and Lokina (2000) supports this view by stating 
that growth is large when stocks are small, and as the stock increases, growth increases 
at a decreasing rate until it reaches a maximum and the eventually falls. Growth thus 
reaches a maximum at intermediate stock levels29 Figure 3.1, below, shows the growth 
function and the MSY of the population as based on equation 3.3a. 
21 A consequence of the simplicity of the model is that the minimum viable slock is zero. This implies that 
as long as there is any fish, the stock will grow. The model thus does not capture the fact that a certain 
critical mass of fish is needed to sustain the stock. This is referred to the "critical level" described in 
Chapter 2. However, it can be assumed that the model deals with sustainable growth; levels below this 
could represent the "critical zone", 
28 It should be notcd that the above situation is a special case evident in the Schaefer logistic model where 
we are dealing with lumped parameters. In this type of model no attempt is made to distinguish among the 
factors that detennine net biological growth. However. the study of population dynamics consists of many 
variables, where fish populations are concerned, these include: age, the rate of maturity, spawning 
conditions, availability of prey, to mention a few. Nevertheless the actual shape of the curve, in this case, 
will depend on the values assigned to rand K. 
" Fish stock is thus restricted by K, so that K Gr, ;"0, thenf (XJ reaches a maximum sustainable yield at 
XMsr, and thenf (XJ declines as X, goes from XMsrto K. The fact thatf' (XJ < 0, beyond XMsr, means that 
there is more competition among fish for food or they may be more easily located by predators. 
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XMSY (K/2) 
Figure 3.1: The Schaefer Logistic Growth Model 
Source: Munro & Scott (1985 :627) 
K Biomass (X) 
When Gordon introduced the concept of fishing effort drawing on Schaefer's (1954) 
work, Schaefer (1957) altered his logistic population dynamics equation to reflect 
fishing effort. This means that a new source of fishing mortality affecting population 
size was introduced. Firstly, the catch in a given period (t) will be denoted by Y" which 
is also known as the yield or harvest rate. This yield is dependent on two factors : the 
size of the population at the beginning of the period, and the amount of fishing effort in 
the given period (t), E,30. Therefore: 
Y, =h(X"E,) (3.4) 
There is also a need to define the catchability coefficient, q, which can be seen as the 
state of technical efficiency of the fishing fleet. Seijo et al (1998:8) defines the 
catchability coefficient as "the fraction of the population fished per unit of effort". The 
short run yield equation thus becomes: 
Y, =qE,X, (3.5a) 
" 
30 It is assumed that E = Lei . where n is the total number of fishermen or vessels in a fishery. Total 
;=1 
effort in the industry is thus an accumulation of the effort exerted by all individual fishermen or vessels. 
This could thus be an index measure of the use of all inputs in the fishery. 
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A more generalised yield function can however also be expressed. This is as follows: 
Y, = qE,· xf (3.5b) 
The short run yield curve expresses catch in terms of effort, where q, the catchability 
coefficient, is a constant and where a and f3 are constants" . The altered logistic 
equation showing changes in biomass, including the effect of fishing, is as follows": 
dX, =rX (1- X')_Y 
dt ' K ' 
= rX(I- ~ )-qE; xf 
(3.6a) 
(3 .6b) 
Under the above conditions, the population growth rate becomes a function of the 
intrinsic growth rate (r), the initial population (%,), the carrying capacity (K) as well as 
the catch rate (Y,). When the population is in equilibrium, dX,/dt = 0, the equilibrium 
yield can be defined as: 
x, 
Y = rX (1- - ) 
, , K 
By substituting for 1'; from equation (3.5b)" into equation (3 .7): 
qE,X, =rX,(I-~) 
Equilibrium biomass, x,', as a function of fishing effort can be found as: 
And, in terms of effort: 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
(3 .9) 
31 Equation 3.Sb is the harvest production function, a special form of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. 
32 The change in the natural population, at any given time, taking into account the effects of 
fishinglharvesting can thus be expressed as a discrete function given by:f(XJ - Y, 
3) It is assumed that the constants a and p are equal to one, for simplicity. If these parameters are altered, 
they merely affect the returns to scale property of the function , in other words they determine the shape of 
the yield curve or harvest production function. 
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Equation 3.9 represents the relationship between catch and effort at long-run 
equilibrium. It also gives the long-term production function of the fishery (Seijo et ai, 
1998). The graph is the well-known yield-effort curve, as Schaefer (1957) describes it, 
and is set out in Figure 3.2 below. The yield-effort curve is determined by the biology 
of fish stock, the environment and the effect that effort has on a given fish stock. It 
depicts sustainable yield as a function of effort, E. The curve shows the maximum 
quantity of fish that can be caught in a given year without reducing the stock biomass 
below sustainable levels. 
Sustainable 
Yield 
......................... ::;: ...~ ... -,-~ 
E, 
Figure 3.2: The Sustainable Yield-Effort Curve 
Source: Munro & Scott (1985:627) 
E, Effort (E) 
As can be seen from the Yield-Effort curve (Figure 3.2), it reaches a maximum at the 
MSY then declines as effort increasesl4 At an effort level of zero, no fish are caughes. 
As effort increases, population size can be expected to decrease in relation to the EEC. 
A sufficient increase in effort (beyond E2) causes the sustainable yield to fall to zero. 
When the level of effort exceeds that which is sufficient to generate MSY, biological 
overfishing is said to occur. The biological explanation for such an outcome, of course, 
is that intensive exploitation reduces the fish stock to a level at which its productivity 
34 The effort corresponding to MSY is obtained by the solution of the yield maximisation problem 
(equation 3.9), finding the first derivation (dY/dE) and equating to zero. Thus: 
r }(r E Msr = 2q by substituting in equation 3.9 gives: Y nuy = 4 
JS However, at lower levels of effort the maximum replacement of fish (dXldt) is limited by the fact that 
the population (X) is large in relation to environmental carrying capacity (10. 
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begins to decline (Clark, 1985). There IS thus an mverse relationship between 
sustainable biomass (X) and effort (E). 
According to Loldna (2000), biological overfishing occurs if the same or less fish can 
be caught using less fishing effort. This occurs when effort exceeds the MSY point. 
Looking at Figure 3.2, effort level E2 exceeds the MSY (EMSY) and yields catch h 
However, the same catch can be obtained using less effort at E/. The implication of 
this is that the catch per unit effort (CPUE)36 is higher at E/ than at E2, greater effort is 
thus used to extract the same quantity. 
Since marine biologists have traditionally dominated management of fishery resources, 
the appropriate management criterion was an attempt at achieving MSY or "full 
utilization" of the resource, as Munro & Scott (1985:627) described it. It terms of the 
Schaefer model, this meant that the fishery could expand to EMSY, and stabilise at 
biomass level XMSY (as seen in Figure 3.1). From an economic point of view however, 
MSY does not imply an efficient harvesting of resources. Economists (including 
Gordon, 1954; Plourde, 1970; Munro & Scott, 1985 and Clark, 1985) objected to MSY 
criterion because it ignored the costs of harvesting and the true nature of benefits to be 
derived. 
Adding Gordon's economic component to the Schaefer model thus completes the 
bioeconomic model. Gordon's (1954) development introduced the concept of economic 
overfishing in an open access fishery. According to Munro & Scott (1985), when the 
price of landed fish is assumed constant17, the sustainable yield curve mentioned above 
can be transformed into a sustainable revenue curve. Thus if the sustainable catch (Y,) 
is multiplied by the price, p, the total revenue (TR) function is as follows: 
TR = pY, (3.10) 
36 CPUE can thus be defined as the amount of fish caught when an additional unit of effort is applied to 
fishing. This can be in the form of an additional vessel or additional fisherman depending on the unit 
measure of effort. The Schaefer hypothesis asserts that CPUE is a direct index of stock abundance and 
can be expressed as follows: ytfEt = qXt 
37 Gordon (1954:136) also states that the assumption of a fixed product price is reasonable, if we are 
dealing with one fishing ground. This effectively means that the fishennen arc price takers as no single 
fisher can influence the price. Nevertheless, in reality price would depend on such factors like size and 
freshness, related to the length of stay at sea. Turvey (1964) however agrees that it would be extremely 
difficult to estimate price patterns based on such erratic variables. 
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Next the total cost curve can be found by calculating the cost associated with one unit of 
fishing effo«8, c. This includes fixed costs, variable costs and opportunity costs of 
labour and capital (Seijo e/ ai, 1998). The value of c is assumed to a positive constant 
such that total cost (TC) is as follows: 
TC=cE, (3.11 ) 
It is implicitly assumed that the price of landed fish accurately represents the marginal 
social benefit of harvested fish, and that the unit cost of fishing effort is a true measure 
of the marginal social cost of such effort (Munro & Scott, 1985:628). Accordingly, the 
difference between total sustainable revenue and total cost, at each level of effort, is the 
potential economic rent (profit, denoted by 1C) to be earned, which is as follows: 
1C = pY, -cE, 
= (pqX, -c)E, (3.12) 
The above equation represents the net revenues derived from fishing as a function of 
total sustainable revenues and total costs. The revenue, which will look identical to the 
yield-effort function, and cost curves are represented in Figure 3.3 below. 
Revenue, 
Costs 
Figure 3.3: The Effort-Revenue/Cost Relationship 
Source: Munro & Scott (1985:629) 
Cost 
Effort(Et) 
)8 A unit of fishing effort is not easily quantifiable in reality as there are many different vessels, with 
various types of fishing gear, a diverse number of crew members and different time periods spent fishing; 
all of these contribute to total fishing effort. 
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According to Gordon (1954), in an open access fishery, effort will reach equilibrium at 
effort level E,*. This is where total revenue equals total cost. This means that 
economic rent is totally dissipatedJ9 The justification for this is that the fishery will 
earn profits for any level of effort such that E, < E,*; and thus in an open access 
situation this will attract addition fishers until all profits are dissipated (assuming there 
are no substantive barriers to entry, that is). Thus when economic profits are zero, there 
will be no stimulus for entry or exit into the fishery. Because access is free, the fish 
stock is thus exploited until it is worthless. If in addition to the above, the biomass is 
assumed to be at equilibrium, then the yield equilibrium will be established in both a 
biological and an economic sense. This thus leads to bioeconomic equilibrium. 
Under the Gordon yield-effort model, the bioeconomic equilibrium is given by: 
dX, X ,) 
-=rX (1- - - Y = 0 
dt ' K ' 
(3.13) 
Equation (3.13), above, can be solved for a bioeconomic level of effort. This is given 
by the following equation: 
E; =~(I - P;K) (3.14) 
Biomass at the bioeconomic equilibrium is defined by solving equation 3.12; this is the 
zero profit condition. It is given by: 
X· =~ 
qp 
(3.15) 
The biomass level, within an open access fishery, at the bioeconomic equilibrium 
(described by equation 3.13) will thus be at the effort level where total revenue equals 
total costs. All sustainable rent will thus be dissipated. Turvey (1964:71) agreed with 
Gordon's outcome by stating the following: "In an unregulated fishery .. . resource 
39 In economic tenns this is when the industry is earning normal profit. where total revenue is just able to 
offset the total opportunity cost of operations. The zero profit condition is, in theory, encountered in all 
competitive industries, where it is seen as the outcome socially desirable competitive forces. However, 
this is not the case in an open access fishery. 
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allocation is non-optimal [and] free entry means that . .. no [economic] rent of the fish 
stock is achieved". Bioeconomic equilibrium thus corresponds to a zero profit level of 
effort. Gould (1972:383) also approved of Gordon's principle outcome and noted: "It is 
a widely accepted doctrine that free-access resources are overexploited - that is, they 
attract more resources than is required for allocative efficiency". Munro & Scott (1985: 
631) referred to this as the 'Class I common property problem' in which complete non-
regulation results in rent dissipation and resource depletion. 
Some authors saw Gordon's results in a different light. Smith (1968 & 1969) argued 
that competitive fishing is also subject to various external effects. These external effects 
can represent external diseconomies for a finn, which in tum also influence the cost of 
fishing. These external effects can thus be defined as negative externalities'° Three 
types of externalities where identified by Smith (1969). Stock externalities occur if the 
cost of harvesting decreases as the popUlation of fish increases. Crowding externalities 
arise as the fishing industry increases thus causing the vessel aggregation in a specific 
area to increase, in tum causing increasing operating costs. Mesh externalities (later 
grouped under technological externalities41 ) arise when the use of gear restrictions 
alters the popUlation structure and growth rate of fish stocks. Crowding and 
technological externalities can result in higher costs that effectively reduce the level of 
effort within a fishery. 
According to Smith (1968 & 1969) the higher costs of fishing (due to the factors 
above), will cause a reduction in effort and accordingly catch. An unregulated fishery 
will thus not necessarily be overexploited. To quote Smith (1968:417- 18): 
u .. . it is clear that commercial production from a replenishable resource need not in 
time destroy the resource . .. the existence of external diseconomies (though it leads to 
non-Pareto efficient production states) does provide a built-in mechanism tending to 
resist annihilation of the resource: harvesting depletes the stock, costs rise and ceteris 
paribus, discourages harvesting, ... 
40 External ities in the fishing industry usually result from an external effect caused by individual fishers in 
an open access fishery. These externalities are commonly negative and occur when fishers can freely 
enter a fi shery and capture a resource, but do not consider the effect imposed on others (Seijo, Defeo and 
Salas, 1998). This is possible because of the common-pool nature of the resource, which has 
characteristics that make it difficult to exclude "non-owners". 
41 See Seijo, Defeo & Salas (1998:3) 
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Fullenbaum et al (1971), however questioned the validity of Smith's results and stated 
that the classical theory [Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955)] of commercial fishing still 
stood on a firm foundation. Smith (1971, 1972) partly defended his original position 
only to be refuted again (Fullenbaum et ai, 1972 and Gould, 1972).42 In essence though 
it is the lack of empirical evidence, to show that competitive access does not result in 
overexploitation, that provides that greatest defence for the traditional fisheries 
literature, that is, competition results in rent depletion in open access fisheries. 
Although Smith's (1968) model has been questioned, it did bring to light the fact that 
(along with Turvey, 1964), external diseconomies do exist in most fisheries. Munro & 
Scott (1985: 631), thus make reference to what they term the' Class II common property 
problem'. This refers to the view that the dissipation of rents will result because there 
will be excessive vessels and fishermen competing for a limited resource (this occurs 
through crowding, when vessels impede one another's movement or disrupt one another 
fishing activity, thereby leading to economic waste). This is what Smith (1969) termed 
crowding externalities. Gordon's allusion to rent dissipation at bioeconomic equilibrium 
nevertheless still seems to hold. 
3.4.4 Maximum Economic Yield and Economic Efficiency 
Referring back to Figure 3.3 (above) the bioeconomic equilibrium level of effort 
corresponds to point £,". However according to Gordon (1954), if the fishery is 
competitive and subject to no controls, point £," is not the most efficient point. The 
most optimal size of the fishery is in fact at the point where economic profit is 
maximised. Munro & Scott (1985), state that this point rests upon elementary welfare 
economics. By this they mean that the marginal cost of effort, MC, must be equal to the 
marginal product of effort.43 To illustrate this argument Figure 3.4 has been 
constructed. 
42 Fullenbaum, Carlson and Sell (1971 and 1972) essentially state that Smith's (1968) model uses the 
wrong cost function, which doesn't seem to show that industry cost should change in proportion to an 
increase in the number of vessels. 
43 Munro & Scott (1985:629) state that the marginal product of effort is the value attached to each 
additional unit of effort. If revenue can be equated with value, this is in fact the marginal revenue curve. 
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Figure 3.4: Maximum Economic Yield using Marginal Conditions 
Source: Anderson (1986) and Lokin. (2000) 
Referring to Figure 3.4, the point that corresponds with the efficient level of effort is 
E2* (EMEr). This is because the net benefit, represented in the diagram as the difference 
between total cost and total revenue, is maximised (Lokina, 2000). The vertical 
distance between revenue and costs is thus maximised. This is the point where 
marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MG) . Levels of effort higher than E2* are 
inefficient because the additional cost associated with these levels exceed the value of 
the additional fish caught". EMSY is thus not efficient since the MR at that point is zero 
while the MC is positive. Accordingly the point EJ * is where MC = AR, and is 
inefficient as well. Point E2*, the efficient level of effort, is referred to as the maximum 
economic yield (MEY). And if effort expands beyond E2*, economic overfishing is 
said to occur4S 
44 Similarly the use of effort below E2* is equally inefficient since the additional revenue generated will 
exceed the addition to costs . 
• 5 From an economic standpoint, EMEy is associated with the optimal level of effort - resource rent is 
maximised. Fleet capacity (based on the definition in section 3.3) is thus deemed to exist whenever El > 
EMEy (more vessels are present than is nceded). A movement to bioeconomic equilibrium (E*]) thus 
represents a disinvestment in natural capital (the resource). 
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Gordon's principle result for the open access fishery can now be given. This is that if a 
fishery is left unregulated, it will expand to the bioeconomic equilibrium and will thus 
be over-utilised. Suppose that, momentarily, the fishery is at its optimal size, E2*' 
Since no one governs the resource, the resource rent will accrue to the fishermen and 
vessel owners who exploit that fishery. These users will be earning returns well In 
excess of their opportunity cost (Munro & Scott, 1985:629). If the fishery IS 
competitive, additional fishermen and vessels will enter the fishery and will continue to 
do so as long as super normal profits 46 are being earned. As mentioned, equilibrium will 
thus be achieved where effort is equal to EJ * (where AR = AC). At this point there is 
economic overfishing (E, > E2*) and biological overfishing (E, > EMSY). 
From the theory above it can reasonably be asserted that an unregulated fishery will 
result in economic inefficiency. The most popular policy prescription that was proposed 
at the time was that of sole ownership or privatisation (Scott, 1955 and Turvey, 1964). 
If the fishery belonged to a single owner who could exclude other fishermen, the 
outcome would tend towards efficiencl'. Under sole ownership, fishermen would fish 
at the level of effort that maximises profits (Figure 3.4 shows the rent-maximising level 
of effort). A sole owner, with exclusive rights48 to harvest the fish stock, would invest 
in capital equipment (e.g. fishing vessels) so that effort maximised profit, as described 
by equation 3.12: 
7r = pY(E) - cE 
The simple first-order condition d7rldE = 0 implies pY'(E) = c, where Y'(E) is the first 
derivative of the yield-effort function and p Y' (E) is marginal revenue. Because c is the 
unit cost associated with effort (marginal cost), the level of effort thus satisfies the 
46 In economic terms, super normal profits are synonymous with economic profits and result when total 
revenue is greater than total cost. In Figure 3.4, above, super normal profits will occur up to the point 
where AR is equal to AC. At this point all rents will be dissipated . 
., Clark (1973: 950), however contcnds that the "extermination of [an] entire population may appear as 
[an] attractive policy. even to an individual resource owner." Fisher & Peterson (1977) agree with this 
outcome as well. 
48 An owner with exclusive rights, to harvest fish, would be concerned with prescnt and future catch, he 
would however not have to worry about leaving fish for others to catch. Whereas in an open access 
fishery, whatever is left by a forward-thinking fisherman, someone else would catch right now, ifit were 
profitable to do so. 
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economic profit maximising condition of marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. This 
thus corresponds to the MEYlevel of output (see Figure 3.4 above). 
3.4.5 Conclnsion 
It is relatively clear that an unregulated fishery will be subject to overutilisation 
(Gordon, 1954). The point of overexploitation is defined, using the Gordon-Schaefer 
model, by the bioeconomic equilibrium. At this point biological and economic 
overfishing will occur. The marine stock will be driven below its maximum level and all 
economic rents will be dissipated. The Gordon-Schaefer model, although it has its 
shortcomings, is useful because it provides fisheries managers with reference points in 
terms of the objectives they want to purse. The model is also useful because it states that 
a necessary step, towards effective management, is a movement away from an open 
access or unregulated situation. 
3.5 MANAGEMENT MEASURES AND CONTROLS 
3.5.1 Introduction 
According to the Gordon-Schaefer model, an unregulated or 'free' fishery will be 
subject to overexploitation. This will occur if there are economic profits to be made 
which result in the increase in capacity (e.g. upgrading or buying of vessels). There is 
thus a need to regulate a fishery and prevent the build-up of excess capacity 
(Matthiasson, 1996). This can be achieved through a variety of measures. Most of these 
measures attempt to regulate the fishery, or access to the fishery, resulting in a 
corresponding reduction of fishing effort. It is thus necessary to evaluate the various 
broad classes of management measures to determine the possible impact that these can 
have. According to Charles (2001:89), management measures can be divided into the 
following broad categories: input (effort) controls, output (catch) controls, technical 
measures and indirect economic measures. The first three of these measures can be 
classified as 'traditional management measures' (Anderson, 1986 and Conrad, 1999) as 
they usually deal with the lowest level of management, namely the operational level. 
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3.5.2 Input (Effort) Controls 
Input controls are probably the oldest type of fishery management tool (Scott, 2000a), 
and are the type of measure adopted when a fishery is first managed. The basic idea 
behind input controls is that they attempt to regulate fishing effort. The fishery is thus 
managed by total allowable effort (TAE). Although effort per se does not measure the 
specific impact on fishing, if no effort is applied no fishery exists (Charles, 2001). Input 
controls are thus an indirect means of limiting exploitation of fish stocks and clearly 
lead to a more variable yield than catch controls. Examples of input controls include the 
following: restricting the number of vessels or fishermen in a fishery, limiting the 
capacity per vessel, limiting the time spent fishing and limiting the location of fishing 
(Charles, 2001: 95-105). 
i. Limiting Entry 
One of the earliest effort controls implemented to regulate a fishery was limiting 
the number of participants in a fishery. This can be done through providing 
fishing licences to a limited number of fishery participants. Entry limitations have 
been in place in most fisheries around the world since the late 1960s (Iudicello et 
ai, 1999). Entry limitations are thus widespread and are often seen as being 
attractive due to their administrative simplicity (Eggert, 1999). 
Limited entry schemes reduce the total effort (TAE) in a fishery and thus allow 
the resource to regenerate 49. This means that the fishery is more sustainable in the 
long term. However if existing participants are able to increase their landings, in 
order to realise greater profits, effort will increase. This is because the profit 
incentive can induce more capital investment (to increase the effectiveness of their 
licensed unit), thus potentially resulting in overcapitalisation or capital stuffiniO 
(as discussed in section 3.3 .3). Licence limitations alone are thus not thought of as 
49 Licences can be viewed as an imposed 'barrier to entry' helping to maintain the profitability of a 
fishery. Too many vessels can significantly increase landings causing a collapse in markets, as had 
occurred in the French Mediterranean fishery (Catanzano, Cunningham & Rey, 2000). 
50 This problem can be caused by input substitution where within a licensing system fishers will attempt 
to substitute unrestricted inputs for restricted ones. 
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a means of reducing fishing effort, but rather a necessary initial step to constrain 
further input growth (Anderson, 1986)51. The licence limitation approach 
essentially institutes a form of access right, a concept that will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4. These licences can also be tradable, which means that 
the value of the licence can reflect changes in expected earnings within the 
fishery. 
ii. Limiting Capacity per Vessel 
While limited entry seems to be the principle means of limiting access to a 
fishery, it must not be used as a stand-alone solution. This is because of the 
rational incentive to increase the efficiency of a licensed unit. Each vessel can 
impact on a fishery in a variety of ways, i.e. its capacity (or catching power) is not 
constant, but rather various according to its dimensions, its physical capacity and 
the gear that it uses. Thus in any effort limitation scheme, restrictions may also 
need to be placed on the key components of effort. According to Iudicello e/ al 
(\999:75) the most common approaches are: (a) limiting the dimensions of a 
vessel, and (b) limiting the amount of gear utilised. 
Another measure used to control the fishing capacity on a vessel is the imposition 
of individual effort quotas. These limit the number of effort units that a given 
vessel or licence holder can use (Greboval & Munro, 1999). Examples of 
individual effort units are limits on the number of traps or the issuing of fishing 
permits. The effectiveness of these measures on effort however depends on 
whether they can properly be linked to effort. Input substitution can also result if 
these input controls are not correctly specified (Catanzano et ai, 2000). 
iii. Limiting Fishing Time and Location 
Time limitations are usually expressed as restrictions on the number of days at 
sea. A season restriction (or closed season) is one way of reducing the duration of 
fishing time and thus effort. A closed season is usually justified for biological 
11 Canada introduced limited entry systems in the Pacific Abalone fi shery in 1977, the Atlantic Inshore 
fishery in 1980 and the Pacific Sable fishery in 1981 , however, in all of these, prevention of effort 
expansion reportedly failed (Eggert, 1999). 
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reasons. This is because it can be imposed during the critical stage in the life cycle 
of a specific resource, i.e. during its spawning period. If a closed season is 
however instituted alone, it will not regulate access to a fishery. The problem of 
overcapitalisation will thus still exist (Crutchfield, 1956). These adverse effects 
can result as fishermen fish intensely during the open season. The incentives that 
govern a fisherman's behaviour will thus still present (Cunningham & Greboval, 
2001). 
A limitation on the location of fishing can take the form of a closed area. Closed 
areas may be used to protect the stock at particular locations in a similar fashion 
to closed seasons. A good example, from an ecological viewpoint, of a closed area 
is a marine protected area52 (Anderson, 2000b). The impact of closed areas 
however depends on how effort re-allocates itself outside of the closed area and 
whether the closed area increases the stock size. In the latter case, the effect on 
capacity is likely to be similar to a closed season. Given the importance of 
location, a major traditional management measure is that of territorial allocations 
(Charles, 2001). These are sometimes referred to as territorial use rights infishing 
(TURFs) and will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
3.5.3 Output (Catch) Controls 
While input controls focus on limiting various components of fishing effort, output 
controls focus on limiting what is taken from a fish stock, i.e. limiting catches. They are 
thus direct control measures (Anderson, 1986) that stipUlate the maximum amount of 
fish that can be caught in a fishery during a given time, widely known as total allowable 
catch (TAC). Portions of a TAC can also be assigned to various individuals (individual 
quotas) or user groups (community quotas) of a fishery. Output controls essentially rely 
on the ability to monitor total catch effectively. 
52 A MPA is a true example of an ecological based management tool as there is no focus on an individual 
species, but instead there is emphasis on limiting human activity throughout a designated area (Charles. 
2001). 
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i. Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 
By far the most widely used output control is to regulate the total harvest of a 
given fish stock through a TAC, i.e. the quantity of biomass that is permitted to be 
caught (Anderson, 1986 and Cunningham et ai, 1985). The TAC is thus a general 
measure that is determined for each species based on scientists' advice (biological 
grounds). This amount is usually determined on the basis of stock assessment 
models53 . Although a TAC does seem to reduce catch, there are some problems 
associated with its implementation. Conrad (1999) argues that the appropriate 
harvest is usually ill defined, because it is almost impossible to successfully 
calculate a given fish population (Everhart & Young, 1980). Ill-defined quotas 
can also create strong disinvestment incentives for profit-maximising firms 
(Segerson & Dales, 1993). In addition, limiting the supply of fish, without 
limiting entry into a fishery, effectively results in a regulated open access situation 
(Homans & Wilen, 1997 and Cructhfield, 1956) where the race-for-fish can 
continue54 . A TAC can also be subdivided into quotas for specific participants or 
fishery sectors55 . 
ii. Individual Quotas (IQs) and Community Quotas 
Individual quotas (IQs) are quantitative output rights defining the amount each 
fisher can catch as a percentage of a TAC within a certain time period (Charles, 
2001 :98). A community quota is not all that different from an IQ56, the only 
difference being that the quota share is allocated to a community (thus resulting in 
an institutional form known as community-based management) . A possible 
problem associated with quota shares is how to allocate them. This has important 
ramifications for political considerations (such as equitable policies), and for 
S3 Stock assessment models attempt to measure the abundance, or change in abundance, of a given stock 
or population offish. 
54 This was exactly the case in the marine fisheries of the United States, where "an incentive to fish faster 
and harder to get as large a share of the total allowable catch" developed (Darcy & Matlock, 2000) 
ss As is the case in the European Union (Charles, 2001), where a set TAC is subdivided among countries. 
" Individual quotas can, however, can either be non-transferable (INTQ) or transferable (ITQ). There are 
a number of implications associated with each type, however the issue of transferability will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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economic considerations of efficiency. This is because monitoring IQs can be 
expensive as the incentive to dump, discard and high-grade fish exists. 
3.5.4 Technical Measures 
Technical controls are typically oriented towards meeting biological or conservation 
goals. They attempt to limit effort applied to a fishery by limiting the technical ability of 
fishers. The general purpose is thus to deliberately reduce the catching efficiency of 
fishers (reducing the effectiveness of technical inputs), usually increasing the cost of 
fishing. Such restrictions protect stocks from the use of new technologies that might 
increase the cost-effectiveness of fishing. These restrictions are thus not technically 
optimal. A positive consequence, however, is that restrictions on certain technologies 
can reduce capital stuff mg. Probably the most prominent type of technical measure is 
gear restrictions. Gear restrictions are limitations on gear attributes, such as minimum 
mesh size or a minimum hook size for fishing lines. Gear restrictions however suffer 
from considerable enforcement problems. If enforcement is lacking then fi shermen tend 
to systematically overcome these controls through input substitution (Eggert, 1999)57. 
3.5.6 Incentive-based measures 
One good example of an incentive-based measure that can be used to reduce fishing 
effort is taxes (Turvey, 1964 and Anderson, 1986). The idea of optimal taxes (or 
landing fees) can be traced back to the introduction of the concept to economics, as a 
general device for correcting negative externalities, as used by Pigou (thus these charges 
where later referred to as Pigovian taxes)58. Landings taxes can be charged per unit of 
fish catch or fishing effort applied. This type of regulation can, theoretically, be set at a 
level that induces the desired behaviour from fishermen thus leading to an efficient 
solution. According to Turvey (1964), a tax can be used to limit effort, and the rent, 
once in the hands of government, can be redistributed or used to subsidise fishermen in 
the closed season (or those that have been displaced through reductions in effort). 
57 An example of this behaviour was seen in the Maryland oyster fishery where motors on dredging 
vessels where prohibited thus leading to a commercial sailing fl eet in the 1990s (Eggert, 1999). 
58 Pigou argued that the divergence between private returns/cost and social returns/costs could necessitate 
the use of subsidies/taxes to achieve optimal allocation of resources. This thus provided a case for 
government intervention. 
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Turvey (1964:73), however, goes on to state that to reach optimum optimorum a tax is 
necessary but not sufficient. Fishermen are nevertheless always unanimously against 
landing taxes, and taxes have thus never gained the status as a viable practical approach 
to fisheries management (Charles, 2001 and Eggert, 1999). 
In line with incentive-based management measures has been the developed of rights-
basedfisheries management (Guyader & Thebaud, 2001; Shotton, 2000 and Townsend, 
1998). This method of management makes use of property rights to design systems that 
create incentives to alter the behaviour of fishermen. These systems depend on the 
characteristics that the property rights exhibit. It is however best to leave any further 
discussion of property rights, and their use within fishery systems, for Chapter 4, which 
is the main focus of that chapter. 
3.5.7 Conclusion 
Various types of fisheries management measures exist. These can broadly be divided 
into input, output and incentive-based controls. It however evident that although these 
measures do have some successes, they are usually still subject to adverse effects. These 
mainly include the race-for-fish and overcapitalisation, largely through input 
substitution and over-investment. To help alleviate these unpleasant effects, it is 
important that an assortment of fisheries management controls be used together. 
3.6 A PORTFOILIO OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT MEASURES 
It is clear from section 3.5 that traditional fisheries management, all over the world, has 
come up with a battery of different management tools in a bid to halt the decline in 
marine stocks. Although these various controls do have their successes, in most cases if 
they are used independently, they can suffer from unpleasant side effects (Greiner el ai, 
2000). For example a licence limitation scheme used alone reduces the number of 
participants within a fishery, but the fishery can still suffer from overcapitalisation 
through input substitution. It is thus important to use a range of controls, or a portfolio 
of managements measures, as Charles (2001) calls it. Charles (2001) advises that a 
portfolio of management measures can be used achieve various policy objectives. This 
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seems to make sense since most measures are not mutually independent; there are some 
that overlap in terms of their objectives. These objectives can range from the need to 
maintain a stock (e.g. restricting effort to maximise harvest at MSY), to the need to 
maximise economic rents (e.g. at MEY). 
Most fisheries management measures however strive for the maintenance of productive 
fish populations. In these cases measures have to account for the biological 
characteristics of fish populations. In additional they may also have to account for 
variability of ecosystems. Because of such complicating factors, it is not unusual for 
disputes to emerge among scientists and fishermen over stock abundance, even when 
fishery scientists are confident in their stock assessments (Preikshot, 1998). Economic 
objectives, however, may not rest solely on efficiency criteria; a possible objective may 
require the minimisation of unemployment, thus increasing of effort beyond MEY. The 
same may be required where equity considerations are important; efficiency of 
utilisation thus becomes a secondary objective (Preikshot, 1998). Ultimately though it 
is the policy objective that determines the role that fisheries tools will play. Greiner et al 
(2000:34-35) states that management instruments can be evaluated according to the 
following criteria: (i) effectiveness, (ii) efficiency, (iii) innovation, (iv) equity, and (v) 
political acceptability. 
Effectiveness relates to whether an instrument is "technically suitable for achieving a 
specified goal and whether it will deliver a desired target even when knowledge about 
likely responses is uncertain" (Greiner et ai, 2000:34). Efficiency relates to two aspects. 
Firstly, does the instrument promote productive efficiency in the industry? The second 
aspect relates to "economic efficiency in a collective sense" (Greiner et ai, 2000:34-35), 
as to whether marginal benefits are equated to marginal costs in resource allocations. 
Innovation looks at whether instruments provide ongoing improvements with regards to 
resource use. Equity relates the distributional effects of instrument within and among 
generations - an issue relevant to South Africa. Lastly, political acceptability is usually 
linked to the "compatibility ofa new instrument [to] existing institutions and acceptance 
by all members of parliament" (Greiner et ai, 2000:35). 
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Effectively designed management programmes thus attempt to encompass the above 
criterion. However, any single instrument may not be able to satisfy all these criteria 
simultaneously and appropriate combinations may be required. Tradeoffs, in terms of 
the criteria, do sometimes also exist (i.e. between efficiency and equity). The 
compatibility and feasibility of measures is thus important. Poorly designed 
management programmes are not only a waste of public and private sector resources, 
but create perverse incentives that can lead to further increases in effort (Holland, 
2000b). The use of incentive-reducing tools is thus important. Keeping this in mind, it is 
important to note that the instruments of fisheries management are merely institutional 
mechanisms that have been developed or adopted by governments, and other 
authorities, in an attempt to influence the behaviour of those who use natural resources 
(Greiner et ai, 2000). The evolution of these institutions are inextricably linked to the 
development of property rights (Pejovich, 2001). Property rights and the social and 
economic system within which they occur can thus eliminate the adverse incentives that 
create excess capacity (Holland, 2000b and Townsend, 1998). The development of 
rights-based systems is thus the next step in the development of effective management 
tools. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
Excess capacity is a severe and costly problem that has led to both overfishing and 
reduction in the net benefits (through the dissipation of resource rents) derived from 
fishery resources (FAO, 2003). However it appears to merely be an underlying 
symptom that results from the failure of management systems (Holland, 2000b). The 
Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model, which essentially states that an open access 
resource will be overutilised, outlines this failure. Fishermen thus have a rational 
incentive to increase investment within a fishery as they attempt to extract additional 
rents from that resource (Gordon, 1954). If the resource is free for all to utilise, then due 
to its common-pool nature, fishermen have to catch as much as they can before others 
do so. This is because common-pool resources have a subtraetability characteristic. The 
Gordon-Schaefer model states that both economic overfishing (effort greater than MEY) 
and biological overfishing (effort greater than MSY) will occur until bioeconomic 
equilibrium is reached. To help deal with this problem fisheries authorities have 
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developed tools that can be used as control measures. However, for these measures to be 
successful a portfolio of controls is needed (Charles, 200 I). This because individual 
measures can still suffer from adverse effects. This idea will be further extended in 
Chapter 4, as these measures are used to determine a use rights system. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FISHERY SYSTEMS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is apparent from Chapter 3 that most fisheries are in a state of crisis. This is mainly 
due to problems of overcapitalisation resulting in excess capacity resulting in increased 
fishing effort over time. These issues (overcapitalisation and excess capacity) are 
however normally associated with the problem of open access. In fact Cunningham & 
Greboval (200 I) argue that the fundamental origin of excess capacity is due to the free 
or open nature of a resource. Van Santen (1996) states that fish, in an economic sense, 
are a free good. There are no nominal costs associated with their growth in the sea. 
When these fish are caught, they are transformed, through the production process, into 
resources that attain economic value. This value is reflected by consumer's willingness 
to pay for fish. According to Hannesson (1998), fishermen are therefore encouraged to 
increase capacity to harvest additional fish, but there is no appropriate incentive to 
manage the resource. The free nature of a resource is however defined by the property 
rights regime structure that it occurs in. According to Pejovich (200Ia) as pressures on 
the environment increases, property right regimes change ultimately to protect the 
economic interests of fishers (and also to protect the environment). 
The evolution of property rights regimes however depends on the structure of property 
rights introduced into different environments. Here property rights refer to "the 
socially sanctioned and protected entitlements of individuals and governments to use, 
to change the form and substance of, to benefit from, and to alienate ownership of 
these rights to assets, including natural resources" (Barzel, 1989 in Edwards, 2000: 3). 
If these property rights are not clearly defined and enforceable, market failure can 
occur. Poorly defined property rights can thus be seen as one of the main reasons for 
conflict within fisheries throughout the world (FAO, 2000a; Ward, 2000; Hara, 1999; 
Pearse, 1994; Tisdell & Roy, 1997; Hanna et ai, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1989 
and Bromley & Cernea, 1989). This chapter thus explores the various forms of rights 
and rights structures that occur within a fishery system. These rights can either occur 
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'naturally' or can be introduced (Charles, 2001). Rights can also occur in various 
forms (also within the range of property regimes) and contain various characteristics. 
All of these factors have implications for the establishment of an effective fisheries 
management system. 
4.2 PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The concept of property rights, within natural resource systems, is made useful by 
identifying the various regimes or institutional frameworks within which they fall. The 
objective is to find an adequate means of defining property for sustainable resource 
use, especially in terms of their application to fishery resources. In specifying these 
various contexts, focus will primarily be on the definitions instituted by Bromley & 
Cernea (1989) in their discussion document The Management of Common Property 
Natural Resources: Some conceptual and operational fallacies. For most purposes 
Bromley & Cernea (1989: II) state that it is sufficient to consider four possible 
property regimes. These are open access (res nullius), private property, state property 
(res publica), and common property (res communes). Berkes (1989), Ostrom (1990) 
and Tisdell & Roy (1997) agreed with these and also stated that reality can sometimes 
consist of a mixture of these idealised types. Bromley & Cernea (1989:5) describe a 
resource regime as "a structure of rights and duties characterising the relationship of 
individuals to one another with respect to that particular resource." This can refer to 
the relationship between individuals and/or a group and/or a corporate entity. 
4.2.2 Open Access 
An open access situation will occur when there is no property (Davidse et ai, 1999), 
therefore meaning that no property rights exist in such a scenario. Pearse (1994: II) 
gives an example of open access when making reference to the high seas (the ocean 
space outside a nation's jurisdiction). He states that because no property exists, that 
neither individuals nor governments have any claims. Anyone can thus exploit these 
resources. The fish thus belong only to those who take possession of them by catching 
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them. If property and the management arrangements that go along with them are not 
defined, then the "institutional vacuum of open access ensures that use rates will 
eventually deplete the asset," (Bromley & Cernea, 1989:20). This is exactly the type 
of situation that can result, as described by Gordon (1954) in Chapter 3, if a fishery is 
totally unregulated - fishing effort moves beyond MSY. A pure open access regime 
can result from the breakdown of the authority systems in other property regimes as 
will be described later. Institutional failure will thus lead to an open access regime. 
Homans & Wilen (1997), however, also make reference to a regulated open access 
situation. This will occur if the output of a fishery (e.g. catch) is regulated, but the 
inputs (e.g. the fleet) are not. Homans & Wilen (1997:1) state that most of the world's 
important fisheries probably operate under these conditions. In such a case, the fish 
stocks may not necessarily collapse (as described by Clark, 1990), but fishing fleets 
may overcapitalise as they are driven by the race- for-fish. In both a regulated and pure 
open access regime some form of entry limitation will thus be beneficial. 
4.2.3 State Property 
According to Bromley & Cernea (1989: II), in the state property regime, ownership 
and control over the use of the resource rests in the hands of the State. Individuals are 
allowed to use the resource however this is governed by the State. Hara (1999) agrees 
with this when he states that ownership is held by the state on behalf of its citizens, but 
government exclusively holds the rights until access rules and levels of exploitation are 
determined. 
The need to regulate and manage marine resources, due to their overexploitation, lead 
to the emergence of Ecol/omic Exclusive Zones (EEZs) during the 1970s and 1980s 
(IDGEC, 2000). These gave states sovereign rights over natural resources located in a 
zone stretching 200 nautical miles (320 kilometres) sea wards, as measured from their 
coastal baselines. This effectively brought more than a third of the world's oceans 
(IDGEC, 2000), formally within an open access regime, under the jurisdiction of 
coastal states, thus causing an institutional change into a state property regime. The 
logic of converting away from an open access regime into a state property regime is 
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that this institutional context allows the government to determine the rules, regulations, 
distribution and restrictions on the use of these natural assets (Bromley & Cernea, 
1989: 11). The state can thus directly control the resource through government 
institutions or lease the right to such a resource out for a specified time period. The 
members who receive these rights do not have ownership of the resource, but merely 
use of it. 
4.2.4 Private Property 
"Private property is the legally and socially sanctioned ability to exclude others", 
(Bromley & Cernea, 1989: 12). Private property thus has an exclusionary aspect. With 
the help of the state's power, an excess population can be excluded from a resource 
and effectively resist unwanted intrusions. This thus means that private property 
regimes appear stable and adaptive because they have social and legal endorsement. A 
distinction can also be made between private property held by individuals and that held 
by corporate entities or corporations. In both cases economic and legal rights must be 
such that the good in question displays private good characteristics of rival 
consumption and excludability (Cullis & Jones, 1992:60-63). It is only when these two 
characteristics exist that private property right regimes will be efficient, that is, all 
costs and benefits will be internalised. However because most fisheries exhibit the 
characteristic of non-excludability (due to their common-pool nature), exclusive use 
rights need to be set up and enforced by the state. This thus means that a monopoly 
right to the use of the resource will exist (Mather, 2004). In this case there is 
essentially a single owner in the fishery and effort should revert to MEY. 
4.2.5 Common Property 
The use of the term 'common property' is a very controversial one. The term was first 
used by Gordon (\ 954). In so doing he provided the principles for the development of 
subsequent theories in renewable resources. Gordon (\ 954) argued that if left 
unregulated, resources held in common would be overexploited. Hardin (1968) 
however also made use of the term in his paper entitled The Tragedy of the Commons. 
Hardin envisioned a situation in which too many users placed too much livestock to 
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graze on common (communal) land eventually leading to its depletion. Hardin's 
(1968: 162) sentiments can be encapsulated by the following statement: "Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in freedom of the commons". 
Since Hardin's (1968) use of the term was popularised in the journal Science, it is 
continually viewed as being the same as an open access situation that has come to 
symbolise the degradation of the environment expected whenever many individuals 
use a scarce resource in common (Ostrom, 1990). Jensen (2000b) and Pearse (1994) 
see this as a 'common property' problem. The rationale behind this concept implies 
that if people act in a self-interested manner when harvesting shared natural resources, 
then the inevitable outcome results in the depletion of the resource. 
Bromley & Cernea (1989:7) however contend that Hardin's use of the term in his 
metaphor was socially simplistic and historically false. They further argue that among 
the property regimes, common property carried a false affliction of resource 
degradation that should be attributed to open access, which means the resource is not 
owned by anyone. McCay (1996) agrees with this and contends that the confusion 
resulted from the semantic use of the term. Development communities realised that in 
order to be successful in stopping the degradation of natural resources that the very 
nature of property and their authority systems had to be redefined to prevent the 
current misunderstanding. 
A common property regime is thus not the free-far-all of open access. A common 
property regime in effect represents private property for a group (others being 
excluded from its use). This means that a user group and their rights to use a resource 
is limited and defined (Holland, 2000a). However, the individuals of the group have 
rights and obligations in situations of common property. As Davidse et al (1999:538) 
put it, "there are balances to be maintained between the group ... [among the group 
members], as well as in terms of individual behaviour in using and maintaining the 
resource". According to Jensen (2000b), this is because of the inherent subtraetability 
characteristic present in the use of the resource (i.e. the use of the resource by anyone 
user detracts from the welfare of others). 
63 
The difference between a private property regime and a common property regime is 
not to be found in nature of the rights and obligations so much, but rather in the 
number to which inclusion and exclusion applies (Bromley & Cernea, 1989). 
Common property and private property therefore both have the characteristic of 
exclusion of non-owners. A private property regime is however usually seen as being 
more efficient than a common property regime (Scott, 1955 and Hannesson, 1998). 
This is because even in a well-organised common property regime there is still a need 
for consensus among "co-owners". Exclusion of potential users can thus be 
challenging, as it has to be dealt with by the definable group (Charles, 2001)'. This 
form of interaction needed to reach consensus thus incurs transactions costs (Demsetz, 
1964). Bromley & Cernea (1989:15) contend that these costs may not be seen as 
tedious to everyone as members of a common property resource group have a common 
interest coupled with a certain amount of interaction between members. 
4.2.6 Property Regime Transformers 
Institutional arrangements can be used to transform a property regime from one form 
to another (Mather, 2004). In a fishery these property regime transformers are used as 
tools to reduce the costs of stock failure (i.e. the fishery collapsing due to 
overexploitation). Open access regimes were transformed into state property regimes 
through the use of EEZs as an international institutional arrangement. A state property 
regime can further more be transformed into a common property regime or private 
property regime depending on the number of users (Holland, 2000a). Within these 
regimes, however, property is not ownership of a physical object, but rather a right to a 
stream of benefits that materialises once those with a duty respect the conditions that 
protect such a stream (e.g. the government or users). 
I Hannesson (1998) argues that as the number of agents ("co-owners") increase, effective solutions 
become less and less likely_ Apart from greater transactions costs, the larger the number of participants, 
the greater the potential for a build-up in fi shing effort. According to economic intuition, a rational and 
effective management system occurs with fewer vessels, less infrastructure, and lower total costs. 
2 According to Holland & Ginter (2000), although fisheries within an EEZ is state property, they are 
often de facto open access and de jure common property to the citizens of the state until access rights or 
regulations are imposed. Jensen (2000b) thus refers to these resources as "common-pool" resources due 
to the nature of their characteristics, as outlined in Chapter 2. 
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Bromley & Cemea (1989) argue that essential to any property regime is the authority 
structure that will ensure that the rights holders expectations are met (this is especially 
true for a private property regime, where the state and its coercive power ensure that 
there is no intrusion from non-owners). When this authority system breaks down in a 
common property or private property regime, then, for all practical purposes, it 
degenerates into an open access system. The resource is then subject to external 
threats. Bromley & Cemea (1989:18) outlines at least one other situation, within 
common property regimes, that could lead to such a breakdown. This relates to the fact 
that if there is a deterioration in compliance by co-owners (e.g. if the resource in 
question fluctuates seasonally then overuse may occur due to a lack of monitoring and 
compliance). According to Charles (2001), the formal or informal institutions that 
determine the rates of use thus do not function properly (or common property systems 
have not developed strong institutions to conserve resources to ensure sustainability). 
Finally the rule-of-capture ensures that resources are transformed from the other 
property regimes to that of private property. That is when fish are captured, and 
provided that the individual has the right to harvest them, they are converted from a 
resource under a common property regime or state property regime or an open access 
regime into the realm of a private property regime (Mather, 2004 and Charles, 2001). 
Private property does however not mean that individuals have ownership of a resource. 
Individuals merely have use rights to a resource (Charles, 200 I :288). This means that 
a right is merely being allocated, whether limited in time or granted in perpetuity, to 
harvest part of a yield of a fishery. In other words fishers may hold the right to 
potentially catch an amount of fish. As Bromley & Cemea (1989) emphasize, these 
rights can only be defined once the party with an interest has a protected right and the 
other has a duty. "Thus property rights give entitlements with regard to resource use 
and rules under which those entitlements hold" (Hara, 1999:4). 
Various types of rights thus exist under various property regimes - with the regime 
acting as an institutional context that specifies the structure of rights and duties 
characterising the relationship of individuals to each other and/or a group. These 
different types of rights and the rules that specify them will be discussed in section 4.3. 
It is however important to note that as institutional structures are transformed from an 
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open access situation to one of state property to common property to private property 
greater limitations are placed on access to, and use of, a resource - rights thus become 
more exclusive. 
4.2.7 Conclusion 
It can thus be seen that four broad property rights regImes exist. However, it is 
important to point out that property rights regimes, especially with regard to natural 
resource systems comprise of a "spectrum from open access to private property" 
(Hanna et ai, 1996:4). This continuum is characterised by the structure of rights and 
duties that an individual or user group is entitled to within the different property 
regime types. However within an open access regime no duties exist. This situation 
will thus result in the overutilisation of an unregulated fishery (Gordon, 1954). The 
growing realisation thus is that part of the remedy to the fisheries problem is in 
designing appropriate access rights to manage fisheries. This will avert the common 
cause of 'too many fishers continually taking too many fish'. These rights can exist in 
any of the other property rights regimes, namely state property, common property and 
private property. 
4.3 PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEMS 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Open access or unregulated fisheries are a major threat to sustainable marine resource 
use. The solution therefore seems to lie in limiting access through the allocation of use 
rights. The idea of use rights is by no means new. They have existed in various forms; 
in part defining property or quasi-property rights. In the context of fisheries, use rights 
determine who can gain access to a fishery and how much fishing activity can take 
place (Charles, 2000). The distribution and allocation of use rights is however 
established by collective-choice rights. It is thus important to explore the various types 
of rights that can exist, and see how these can be used in a response to better 
management fishery systems through the design of rights-based systems. 
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4.3.2 Types of Property Rights 
Before identifying the various types rights that are present, it is important to 
distinguish between rights and rules. This is because the terms rights and rules are 
often used interchangeably with reference to their uses in natural resources. Rights, 
according to Ostrom (1990), refer to particular actions that are authorised. Rights 
define the uses that are legitimately viewed as exclusive and the duties or penalties for 
violating those rights (Pejovich, 2001a). Rules, however, define how rights are 
exercised. They are the "generally agree-upon and enforced prescriptions that require, 
forbid or permit specific actions for more than one individual" (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1992:250). Thus for every right that an individual holds, rules exist that authorise 
particular actions in exercising that right. For example, a right provides the authority 
for a fisher to operate in a specific fishing ground. How the fisher exercises that right 
is however specified by the rules, which may stipulate the type of fishing gear to be 
used. 
Referring to section 4.2, it is clear that an open access regime, by default, lacks 
effective rules for defining rights (Ostrom, 2002). This is because the rules that govern 
such a right are not enforceable - the resource is not contained within a state property 
regime or no individual has successfully laid claim to legitimate ownership. An open-
access situation can hence also result from the ineffective exclusion of non-owners by 
the individual assigned formal rights of ownership. To possess a right implies that 
other individuals have a commensurate duty to observe that right (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1992). And it is the rules that specify both these rights and duties. Rules are therefore 
important as they can create different incentives among users within various 
institutional frameworks . 
Having outlined the differences between rights and rules, a distinction can now be 
made between the different types of rights that can exist. These types differentiate 
between "rights to control, regulate, supervise, ... and allocate property on the one 
hand, and rights to use and exploit economically property rights on the other" (Von 
Benda-Beckman, 1995: 314 in Charles, 2001). The latter group refer to use rights 
(Charles, 2000) or operational-level rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). The former 
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group refers to collective-choice rights, which allow authorities to devise operational-
level rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
Although there is considerable diversity within use rights systems, they can generally 
be placed into two categories. According to Charles (2000: I) these are access rights 
and withdrawal rights. Access rights authorise entry into a fishery, or a specific fishing 
ground. Withdrawal rights involve the right to engage in a specific level of fishing 
effort or to take a specific catch. Withdrawal rights can thus be seen as rights to 
harvest a given stock. Each of these categories can occur at various organisational 
levels, i.e. rights held by individuals, by communities or regions. There are also 
various operational forms of use rights. These will however be discussed in more detail 
in section 4.3.3 below. 
4.3.3 Forms of Use (Operational-level) Rights 
According to Charles (2002) whenever a fishery is managed by restricting access, 
either to determine how much fishing activity (fishing effort) individual participants 
are allowed, or to determine how much catch each can take, those who receive such 
entitlements are said to hold use rights. Such use rights have been assigned by a 
relevant management authority (whether formal or informal), which holds collective-
choice rights. Management measures can thus be seen as a (negative) restriction or a 
(positive) use right, with fisherman acquiring certain entitlements with restrictions 
(Pomeroy, 2002). Use rights are usually established to answer two questions (Charles, 
2000:1): "who can go fishing? " and "how much fishing can take place?" The first 
question is answered through allocating an access right, and the second question 
through a withdrawal right. 
Well-defined use rights are significant because they give clarity by providing some 
security over access to fishing areas, use of an allowable set of inputs, or harvest of a 
quantity of fish . If use rights are well established, fishers know who can or cannot 
access the fishery resource, how much fishing each is allowed to do, and how long 
these rights are applicable. The more complete the set of rights, the less exposed the 
fishers are to the actions of others, the less risks that the fishermen face, and the more 
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stable are expectations concermng catch and management (Pomeroy, 2002). This 
therefore provides fishermen with an incentive for longer-term sustainability and thus 
a motivation to maximise economic benefits. 
Although use rights occur in two categories, various operational forms of these rights 
exist as fisheries management tools. When the form of use right is based on restricting 
access, two common forms exist. Firstly, access can be limited through entry licenses 
(which have been discussed in Ch3, section 3.4.2). Secondly, rights can be allocated to 
engage in fishing in a certain geographical location; these are known as territorial use 
rights in fishing (TURFs). On the other hand, withdrawal rights can be in the form of 
an input right (effort control) or harvest right (output control). These are often 
expressed as a T AE or TAC set at either MSY or MEY. Both of these have been 
briefly discussed in Chapter 3 as fisheries management measures. Having identified 
the categories and forms of use rights, a framework can now illustrated. 
~cess Rights 
I 
Use Rights 
I 
I Withdrawal Rights I 
I 
I 
TURFs Limited Entry Rights 
(e.g. Licences) 
Input (Effort) Rights Output (Catch) Rights 
Figure 4.1: A Framework of Fishery Use Rights 
Source: Charles (2000:2) 
Figure 4.1 above shows the various forms of use rights that can exist. As can be seen, 
these can be expressed in terms of restrictions, where the primary choice is between an 
access restriction and a withdrawal restriction. According to Mather (2004), the form 
of rights developed by Charles (2000) is very useful, but does not take into account the 
fact that an access right can be limited by a withdrawal right and vice versa. In fact 
Mather (2004) goes so far as to say that experience in most of the world's fisheries 
follows the sequence of primary access rights later limited by withdrawal restrictions. 
For example, if an access right is granted in the form of a limited entry licence, but is 
subject to input controls (e.g. vessel size limits), then the withdrawal right, in terms of 
harvesting a fishing stock, acts as a further limiting restriction. 
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Although there are exceptions, generally the following results will hold true. Licences 
without withdrawal restrictions (rights over the allocation of fishlng effort or allowable 
catch) give rise to capital stuffing as the incentive to race-for-fish still exists. 
Similarly, T AE forms without access restrictions give rise to these problems through 
input substitution. Another problem with individual input rights is the tendency of 
fishers to adjust for improvements in technology, thus improving fishing efficiency. 
All of these cases have been discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
Mather (2004) goes on to define four levels of restrictions [expanding on the 
definitions instituted by Charles (2000) and Scott (2000a)] that can occur within a use 
rights framework. Within this framework, or decision tree as Mather (2004) terms it, 
the first two choices (1 ° and 2°) are identical to Charles' (2000) and the second two (3° 
and 4°) are in accordance with Scott's (2000a) observation. These can thus be 
illustrated in Figure 4.2 below. 
I Forms of Use Rights I 
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Withdrawal limitations Withdrawal limitations Access limitations Access limitations 
__ I......_r·············· ··········rJ _-l..J_-T ·······················r J......~: ... ··· ... · ............... rl -...I--.,r .... .1: .. 
Output Ikn~ Effort limit Output limit Effort limit Licence l1JRF Licence l1JRF 
Figure 4.2: Decision Tree representing the Forms of Use Rights and their Limitations 
Source: Mather (2004:121) 
Figure 4.2 presents the form of rights (1 ° and 2°) with limitations (3° and 4°). 
According to Mather (2004) the first and second level can be either in the form of 
primary access rights instituted by imposing second level licences or TURFs, or 
through a primary withdrawal right with either output or input (effort) restrictions as a 
second level limitations. However four equivalencies are possible. For example, 
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primary access rights in the form of a licence but limited by an output restriction is 
equivalent to a primary withdrawal right in the form of an output restriction but limited 
using licences. The other three (Mather, 2004:121) are: i) licences with input 
restrictions and effort restrictions with licences, ii) TURFs with output restrictions and 
an output restriction with TURFs, and iii) TURFs with input restrictions and effort 
restrictions with TURFs. These various forms can thus be used to regulate a fishery 
and enable the allocation of fishing rights. The most effective form will depend on the 
characteristics within a given fishery. For example, a fishery that has a large amount of 
variability will not be effectively managed through output limitations. 
4.3.4 Collective-Choice Rights 
Collective-choice rights can be divided into three categories. These consist of the 
following (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:251): management rights, exclusion rights, and 
alienation rights. Management rights authorise stakeholders to participate in fishery 
management and governance. Exclusion rights allow the authority to determine who 
will access a fishery and the amount they can withdraw. Exclusion rights thus allocate 
use rights. Alienation rights authorise the transfer or sale of the other collective-choice 
rights. Both users and non-users can hold collective-choice rights, which is in contrast 
to use rights that are held only by fishers. 
Collective-choice rights determine who will receive use rights and how these use rights 
will be structured at an operational level. They are thus part of the bundle of rights that 
fishery stakeholders can have. According to Charles (2001 :283) the 
comprehensiveness of a given rights bundle depends on the extent to which a holder 
holds the five types of rights, namely access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and 
alienation. As mentioned, these five property rights are part of a bundle of rights, but 
can also occur independently of each other. As mentioned in section 4.3.2, it is 
possible to have access rights that are independent of withdrawal rights. The same 
holds for collective-choice rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
It is possible to have management rights without exclusion rights, and exclusion rights 
without alienation rights. In these cases individuals, or collectives, do not hold the full 
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set of rights defined above. In fact in most fisheries worldwide, the fishers only hold 
use rights (access and withdrawal), which they can sometimes transfer. Fishers do not 
directly participate in making the collective-choice rules that devise their own 
operational-level participation. Management rights are probably the most functional 
collective-choice right, as they allow participation in operational level decision 
making. They also lie at the heart of co-management initiatives. Co-management 
systems have become increasingly popular within many fi sheries management 
arrangements due to what many (Pinkerton, 2002; Charles, 2000; Abdullah et ai, 1998; 
Feeny et ai, 1996; and Nielsen, 1996) see as a response to the failure of top-down 
fishery management. Pinkerton (2002) argues that a co-management approach is the 
only way to mobilise enough resources to ensure an effective management system. A 
co-management system can however incur high transactions costs, which means that it 
is not always the most efficient approach (Abdullah et ai, 1998). 
An exclusion right is a collective-choice right that is also very important with regards 
to participation within a fishery. Holders of exclusive rights are mandated to allocate 
use rights that allow for participation. This can have important ramifications for the 
distribution of access rights within a fishery. Where equity considerations play an 
important part in fisheries policy, such as is the case in South Africa, holders of 
exclusion rights should account for political, social and economic circumstances. 
Lastly, alienation rights have important implications for the characteristic of 
ownership. According to Schlager & Ostrom (1992), an individual is not an owner 
unless he has the right to sell off all or part of his rights. In most case however, the 
state holds collective-choice rights and thus decides who will hold operational level 
use rights to access and harvest a fishery. In this sense the state thus ' owns' the 
resource and therefore has alienation rights. 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
Property rights can thus be used to manage natural resources. These rights are however 
informed by the rules that define how they will be exercised. Two broad categories of 
rights exist (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992); these are operational-level or use rights and 
collective-choice rights. Collective-choice rights are important as they determine the 
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structure of fishery use rights system. However, at an operationa11eve1, which is where 
most fishers operate, use rights playa crucial role. It is thus important to outline how 
these rights can be effectively structured to meet the needs of a given fishery. This 
means that the characteristics that determine a "complete", for use of a better word, 
rights system need to be outlined. In this regard Scott (2000a), Amason (2000) and 
Anderson (2000) provide some useful insights. 
4.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF OPERATIONAL LEVEL RIGHTS 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Ward (2000:4) argues that if clearly defined and enforceable property rights for fish do 
not exist, due to what he refers to as a common property externality, the efficiency of 
the market becomes impaired (there is market fai1ure)3. If this thinking is applied to 
fishery management then ill-defmed rights can potentially lead to the collapse of the 
resource stock (Anderson, 2000). In this section, the structural characteristics or 
operational rules that define user rights are discussed. Scott (2000a: 5) lists five 
important characteristics of secure use rights; these are exclusivity, duration (of term), 
security of title and transferability (tradability). Amason (2000: 19-24) uses these 
characteristics to develop a quality measure of property rights, which he applies to the 
Icelandic, New Zealand and Norwegian fisheries. In addition to Scott's characteristics, 
Anderson (2000:28-29) adds the attribute of eligibility of ownership as well as two 
transferability options. 
4.4.2 Eligibility of Ownership 
Anderson (2000:28) poses the question "should any legal entity be allowed to own [aJ 
right or should ownership be limited ... to specific groups or persons?" By defining an 
access right, authorities automatically designate a right to an individual or group. 
) If property rights for fi sh existed, then owners of fish stocks could receive a higher unit price per unit 
of fish from the producer as the stock of fish declines. As prices rise, so do the costs to the producer. 
The producer will therefore move his capital and labour into other markets, where greater profits are 
available. This will continue until each market is equal. This means that as the abundance of fish stocks 
decline. fi shermen produce less fish due to higher production costs, and inputs of production are moved 
to other markets where they receive greater returns. Market efficiency will thus be maintained. 
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Referring back to section 4.3.2 (see Figure 4.2), it can be seen that any form of use 
right that restricts access, either as a primary form or a secondary limitation, defines 
particular groups that may participate in the fishery (Mather, 2004). This right is 
defined through the collective-choice right of exclusion. And as mentioned, in 
countries where fisheries management policy has to account for equity concerns, 
authorises with exclusion rights need to be mindful of these considerations. Anderson 
(2000) suggests that restrictions on eligibility are sometimes necessary, but this can 
limit the flexibility of a rights-based management system. 
4.4.3 Exclusivity and Security 
Closely linked to Anderson's (2000) eligibility of ownership attribute, is the 
characteristic of exclusivity, as outlined by Scott (2000a). This characteristic refers to 
the ability of a property rights-holder to use and manage a resource without outside 
interference (Scott, 2000a:5). Most kinds of property rights have some exclusivity, but 
none are completely exclusive (Scott, 2000a and Amason, 2000). A low level of 
exclusivity forces a fisherman, even with a licence, to compete with other fishermen 
for a share of the catch. In addition to the characteristic of exclusivity, security of title 
also plays an important role. Security refers to the ability of an owner to withstand 
chalJenges and maintain his property right (Amason, 2000: 19). This characteristic is 
valued because it saves the rights-holder from incurring the costs of protecting and 
enforcing his rights. Most current fisheries legislation arrangements, through the use of 
the courts, ensure the characteristic of security. A low level of security can also lead to 
a low level of exclusivity. 
4.4.4 Term of Duration 
The duration of term stipUlates the length of time that a fishing right can be held by an 
individual. Amason (2000) refers to this characteristic as permanence. If a right is 
awarded for a longer period of time, this gives some degree of assurance that the right 
wiJI not be reallocated to someone else. The duration of a right is thus positively 
related to the security of a right (Mather, 2004). The longer the term for which a right 
is awarded the greater the possibility that fishers wiJI use a resource in a more 
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sustainable manner. This is because the right-holder is able to realise the pay-off of 
investments made in earlier years. If the duration of a right is short, and it is not 
necessarily renewable, then a right-holder is encouraged to exert more fishing effort to 
gain more profitable catches during that period (Scott, 2000a). 
Another issue related to the duration of term, and linked to security, is the fact that 
fishing vessels (and fishing equipment) are specific assets that are co-specialised4 with 
fishing rights. Individuals using fishing vessels can thus only earn rents when they 
have fishing rights that allow then to access a fishery. Thus with shorter-term rights, 
there is low security, and hence capital reinvestment in fishing vessels (and fishing 
equipment) might be slower than with longer-term rights. 
4.4.5 Transferability 
The final characteristic discussed is that of transferability. This refers to the ability of 
rights-holders to transfer the property right to someone else (Amason, 2000). The 
characteristic of transferability is economically important, because it allows for the 
optimal allocation of a valuable resource. It allows the right-holder to make the best 
use of his time and capital while at the same time greatly increasing the flexibility of a 
rights-based system. The argument goes that if certain vessel owners do the most 
financially with their property right, then they can buy up rights from others thus the 
most efficient vessel owners remain in the fishery. Anderson (2000:28) however 
highlights the fact that making rights transferable may not always be appropriate 
because it allows for the possibility that certain individuals will be "obtaining wealth 
from a public resource". And if markets are subject to monopolistic tendencies there 
could be an accumulation of resource rents by certain individuals. He thus argues that 
if rights are transferable, then limitations on the types of trades are justified in some 
circumstances. 
4 A specific asset is an asset that is most valuable in one specific setting or relationship. When two 
specific assets are co-specialised, then they are most productive when used together. They thus lose 
most of their value if they arc used independently (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). 
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An important feature of transferability is that of divisibility (Scott, 2000a). This is the 
ability to subdivide a property right into smaller parts for the purposes of sale or 
transfer. According to Mather (2004), tradable fishing rights must be capable of 
divisibility if these are distributed in large asset sizess However, if rights are awarded 
in economically non-viable asset sizes, then the divisible units must be capable of 
consolidation. This will ensure economic and thus allocative efficiency but will not 
ensure distributional equity (Mather, 2004: 125). 
Also linked to the transferability characteristic is the issue of inheritable rights. 
Anderson (2000:25) highlights the fact that rights can be fully transferable by sale, 
lease or inheritance. The argument for the inheritability of property rights is often 
linked to the legal nature of ownership (Scott, 2000a). Ownership of most marine 
resources however rests in the hands of the state. Unless an individual has collective-
choice alienation rights, the issue of inheritable property rights does not seem to hold. 
For this to happen there needs to be a transfer of resources from the public to private 
individuals. This might be efficiency enhancing but does not ensure an equitable 
distribution of resources. 
4.4.6 Conclusion 
Property rights within fisheries exist as a continuum in terms of their characteristics 
(Shotton, 2000). These characteristics provide a basis for designing effective use rights 
systems within fisheries . The strongest systems will be those in which the 
characteristics are least constrained (Scott, 2000a; Amason, 2000 and Shotton, 2000). 
These characteristics, however, have implications for both economic efficiency and 
distributional equity within fisheries systems. In terms of these two concepts, a 
tradeoff usually exists, so efficiency may be sacrificed for equity purposes and vice 
versa. 
S A minimum asset unit can be defined as", .. the smallest physical amount of the asset to which it is 
practicable to apply property rights, i.e., for which it is practicable to enforce exclusivity of use" (Dales. 
1968:797 in Mather, 2004:125). 
76 
4.5 IMPLEMENTING OF PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEMS: SOME ISSUES 
TO CONSIDER 
The preceding discussions have highlighted the assortment of property rights that can 
exist and the various types of characteristics that these rights can possess. This section 
deals with the fundamental issue of putting a use rights system into place. Edwards 
(2000) argues that a clear understanding is needed of how property rights assignments 
affect the way people manage and use the environment. However, because fisheries 
differ with regards to their circumstances, it is unlikely that any single use rights 
approach will produce optimal results. It is thus preferable to pursue a portfolio of 
rights - that is a combination that is most acceptable for a given context, that helps the 
fishery operate best, and to maximise benefits (Charles, 2000). To this end it is 
important to understand the structure and underlying nature of the fishery. For 
example, what are the relevant social, cultural or economic circumstances facing a 
fishery. These issues will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5 and 6 when 
discussing the South African squid fishery. For now though it is important to outline 
the underlying policy options within the design of a use rights system. 
The task of implementing a use right system is made easier if there are clear policy 
directions laid out in advance, since such policies will provide guidance in terms of 
which fishery stakeholders are to receive priority in obtaining use rights. In South 
Africa, for example, the movement from a period of apartheid into one of democracy 
means that broadening the right to access is a matter of urgency (Cochrane & Payne, 
1998). This highlights just one of the policy issues that can arise concerning the 
allocation and governance of the rights. Another key issue within the debate concerns 
the mechanisms by which the holding of rights is itself managed. This depends on the 
management institutional arrangement within which a fishery operates. These 
arrangements account for the social and economic incentives, and their 
interconnections, that can exist in the allocation and management of property rights 
systems (Pejovich, 2001a) 6 After all, as McCay (1996:60) states, "we often forget, ... , 
6 This line of thought can be traced back to Gordon (1954) who argued that rent dissipation and 
overutilisation will occur in fishing grounds that are not exclusive (see Chapter 3). 
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that human beings do not exercise their rationality in a vacuum: that they do so within 
the context of institutions." 
Three broad institutional orders exist (Edwards, 1994 and Hersoug & Holm, 2000): the 
state, the market and the community or co-operative. Traditionally fisheries 
management has been centred in the state arrangement. This has been characterised by 
"top-down centralist" fisheries management "interventions through spiralling 
regulations" (Lane & Stephenson, 2000:385). The state model corresponds to a 
centralised and bureaucratic style of management. According to Lane & Stephenson 
(2000) the performance of this management style has not been considered successful. 
Edwards (1994) also states that government failure7 in fisheries can result from rent-
seeking activities and/or the principle-agent problemS. The principle-agent problem is 
especially prevalent in situations with high transactions costs, e.g. a heterogeneous 
group of fishermen (Johnson & Libecap, 1982). Government can nevertheless affect 
the wealth of society by assigning property rights (through collect-choice rights) and 
should therefore have a supporting role in all decision-maldng processes. 
A market-based approach uses market forces, with fishery participation and the 
allocation of catch and effort determined through the buying and selling of rights. The 
reliance on market forces has become a popular approach among many governments 
and international financial institutions, as it can be implemented relatively easily 
(Charles, 2001). According to economic theory this approach is more efficient as 
more-efficient stakeholders buyout less-efficient ones9 • The implication is that if 
agents are freely allowed to trade rights, these will end up in the hands of those who 
value them the most, i.e. those who are most efficient at using them (Guyader & 
Thebaud, 2001). Market-based measures, like JTQs (individual transferable quotas)iO, 
have thus gained increased support in many countries as they attempt to redress the 
7 Government failure or non-market failure refers to the inability of government stakeholders to produce. 
regulate, manage or monitor the production of goods and services efficiently (Edwards, 1994:257). 
8 The principle agent problem occurs when interests differ among principles (Le. owners) and the agents 
for owners, who are only interested in personal gain (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). 
9 However, in situations of inequality (e.g. in terms of income), individuals with greater access to 
financial capital can also buy out individuals that are worse off. 
10 The adoption if ITQs has led to the so-called "privatisation" of rights-based fishing, as they arc able to 
generate efficiencies in resource use. 
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inefficiencies of state centred models (Hersoug & Holm, 2000). This approach 
nevertheless seems to have the same advantages and disadvantages of an open market 
mechanism. For example it may be a more cost-effective institutional structure, better 
able to deal with transactions costs (Coase, 1937 in Abdullah, Kuperan & Pomeroy, 
1998), and increase the flexibility of operations, but it fails to achieve distributional 
equity without some form of intervention. 
The third institutional arrangement is co-operative management, or better known as co-
management (McCay, 1996). Fisheries co-management is defined as the arrangement 
where responsibility, for resource management, is shared by government and the 
relevant user groups (Hauk & Sowman, 2001 and Nielsen, 1996). By ensuring greater 
participation in regulatory decisions, greater legitimacy is brought to the process, 
which in tum enhances compliance (Jentoft et ai, 1998). This type of management is 
thus a "bottom-up" approach and is more decentralised as responsibilities are 
delegated to user-groups (Jentoft et ai, 1998:423). However, the devolution of 
authority away from fisheries administrators can be a difficult task. Firstly, 
administrators may be reluctant to relinquish power (Nielsen, 1996). Secondly, if user-
groups do not have the capabilities to undertake greater responsibilities, fisheries 
management can be jeopardised. From an economic perspective, greater transactions 
cost can thus prevail as the number of decision-makers increases (Abdullah et ai, 
1998)11. 
The final issue affecting the development of a rights-based management system is that 
of distributional equity. Any form of access control, or alteration of an existing access 
control regime, entails a specific distribution of benefits advantaging some participants 
over others (Guyader & Thebaud, 200 I: I 04). This can result in conflicts that can be a 
major obstacle to effective fisheries management. Thus regardless of what institutional 
arrangement a right-based system is operating in, it is widely accepted that 
distributional issues have a strong potential to affect management, especially when 
trying to resolve overcapitalisation problem as well (Guyader & Thebaud, 200 I). At 
the national level, the distributional issues could theoretically be solved through the 
11 Abdullah, Kuperan & Pomeroy (1998:4-5) outline three major cost items: (i) information costs; (ii) 
collective fisheries decision-making costs; and (iii) collective operational costs. 
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intervention of a central authority, acting as the sole owner of resources placed under 
its sovereignty and/or jurisdiction. However, a lack of consultation with the relevant 
stakeholders to lead to further conflict in the implementation of any rights-based 
management system. In this regard it is likely that a co-management model is more 
useful as it emphasises distributional equity through the legitimacy of users. The issue 
however rests on who holds collective-choice rights. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
A well-defined and appropriate system of use rights in a fishery produces many 
essential benefits, most importantly ensuring that fishing effort is proportionate with 
the productivity of the resource. This thus provides fishers and fishing communities 
with longer-term security that enables and encourages them to view the fishery 
resources as an asset to be conserved and treated responsibly (FAO, 2003). The type 
and allocation of these rights however is subject to much debate. Scott (2000a) argues 
that for a rights system to be effective, a 'complete' set of rights needs to exist. The 
structure of these rights depends on the characteristics that they possess. These 
characteristics can be altered to achieve various policy objectives, be that social, 
economic or political. The institutional environment within which these rights are 
allocated is also important, as this can affect the efficiency of a system. A state-
centred, top-down approach is seen to be bureaucratic and inefficient. A market-based 
approach can achieve efficiency, but does not cater for distributional equity. A 
community or co-management system seems to be more effective with distributional 
issues, but can suffer from high transactions costs (Abdullah et ai, 1998). These issues 
should thus be taken into consideration when dealing with the management and 
allocation of rights within the South African commercial jig fishery. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMERCIAL SQUID FISHERY: 
INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION AND EVOLUTION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of trus chapter is to place the South African fishing industry, and in 
particular the South African chokka squid fishery, into an institutional' and 
organisational framework. The South African fishing industry has undergone a typical 
process of evolution witnessed in most common-pool resources. That is, it has 
developed from an open access resource to one that is regulated through fonnal and 
informal institutions (Pejovich, 200la and Ostrom, 1990). These institutions thus 
define rules of use and exchange with regards to resources. The more stable and 
credible these institutions become, the more benefits accrue to members of society. 
Before the formalisation of EEZs in the 1977, ocean resources along the coast of South 
Africa were essentially open access. After 1977 these resources fell under the 
jurisdiction of the South African government, converting an open access resource into 
a state property regime. This thus initiated a process of regulation, at varying degrees, 
within a11 of South Africa's fisheries. 
The South Africa squid industry, however, due to its late development 
(commercialisation in 1983), was only affected by more fonnal regulations in the mid-
1980s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, this resource was a de facto open access 
resource, which resulted in increased fishing effort during its initial development 
(Augustyn, 1986). As the squid fishery developed it was increasingly affected by 
various government regulations that evolved to deal with increased fishing activities in 
the South African fishing industry. These regulations were the result of various 
1 Institutions can either be formal or informal , and their role is to enhance "cooperation and coordination 
among interacting individuals" (Pejovich, 200 I a:xv) , These institutions can thus be equated to rules, or 
bundles of rights, that govern interactions in society. Examples of informal rules include traditions, 
customs, moral values and religious beliefs. Formal institutions include constitutions, statues, common 
law and other government regulations. (Pcjovich. 200 I a). 
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commissions (i.e. the Diemont Commission) and laws (i .e. the Sea Fisheries Act of 
1988 and the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998) that were formed to deal with 
sustainable marine resource use. This chapter discusses how these various institutional 
mechanisms helped to regulate and develop the squid industry into the mature fishery 
that it currently is. It also looks at how changes in society (i.e. the event of democracy 
in 1994) eventually led to changing management objectives for all of South Africa 
fisheries, especially with regards to issues of equitable redistribution. This effectively 
determined South Africa's "transformation" policies within the fishing industry. 
5.2 INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Although there is evidence that the living marine resources of South Africa have been 
exploited for many centuries, larger scale commercial fishing only started at the tum of 
the 20th century (RSA, 1997). Thereafter, effort escalated rapidly. The increase in 
fishing effort was largely due to increased demand, in the search for food, brought 
about during the Second World War (Payne & Crawford, 1989). This effort continued 
to increase, the net result being an increase in total landings from 71 000 tons to 422 
480 tons between 1938 and 1958 (Stuttaford, 1995: 20). Due to advances in 
technology and increases in the exploitation of different types of species, commercial 
catch continued to increase throughout the 1960s and 1970s (however slowing 
considerably in the 1970s as more formal regulations were put in place). 
5.2.2 The South African Fishing Industry: Pre 1977 
South Africa has a coastline of some 3 000 km, extending from the border with 
Nambia in the west, to Mozambique in the east. The oceanographic situation of the 
coastline is such that it provides an ideal habitat for various living marine resources. 
The western coastal shelf is especially highly productive. This is due to the upwelling 
of the cold, nutrient-rich Benguela current thus making it comparable with other 
upwelling ecosystems around the world. The temperate, relatively shallow shelf (about 
a 1 OOm deep) of the Agulhas bank also provides a good breeding area for many 
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specIes of fish . The Agulhas current along the east coast is considerably less 
productive but has high species diversity, including both common and IndoPacific 
species (Paul, 2000b). 
The South African coastline thus provides a good breeding ground for a variety of 
species, chokka squid being among these. The squid fishery however only gained 
commercial importance after 1983. Prior to this, all squid catches where trawled, 
mainly as by-catch of the popular hake and sole fisheries (Sauer, 1992). During the 
1970s most of this by-catch was sold as bait. At this time a large number of squid 
catches were made by vessels from foreign fishing fleets . These consisted mainly of 
Japanese fishers, trying to meet the increasing demand for squid back home (Roe!, 
1998). 
Although the squid fishery had not gained much importance prior to 1983, other South 
African fisheries had been in existence since the 1930s. At that stage commercial catch 
was dominated by the demersal (or trawl) fishery and the pelagic (or purse seine) 
fishery, and this trend has remained throughout the development of the South African 
fishing industry. According to Saville (1997), collectively these two fisheries 
accounted for roughly 90% of the reported annual catch up until 1996. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, both these fisheries are T AC managed, as opposed to T AE managed (like 
the squid fishery). Of the two fisheries mentioned, the demersal fishery is the most 
valuable in terms of income generated, bringing in over R500 million per year (Paul, 
2000b). The pelagic fishery however is the largest fishery in terms of volume landed. 
From 1958 landings increased from 194 000 tons to peak at 410 000 tons in 1962 
(Mather et ai, 2003b:151). 
Catch in both the demersal and pelagic fisheries thus increased dramatically until the 
1970s. In the demersal fishery, catches (by both South African and foreign vessels) 
peaked at over 300 000 tons (Mather et ai, 2003b: 143), while those in pelagic were 
well over 400 000 tons. The dramatic increases in catches were mainly due to the fact 
that fishing activities in South Africa were unregulated. The resource for all purposes 
was thus an open access resource as described in Chapter 4 section 4.2. Until 1974 no 
individual limits existed for any companies exploiting these species. This inevitably 
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resulted in the overutilisation of these species. This is exactly the outcome described 
by Gordon (1954) in Chapter 3. The pelagic fishery eventually collapsed by the late 
1960s when catch fell from 410 000 tons in 1962 to 100 000 tons by 1967 (Mather et 
ai, 2003b: 151-152). 
5.2.3 Legislative History: Pre 1977 
The legislative history of the South African fishing industry deals with the 
development of laws and rules that have been put in place by the State, and various 
other stakeholders, to aid in the conservation and management of South Africa's living 
marine resources. The conservation of living marine resources in South Africa dates 
back to 1895 when the government of Cape Colony appointed a biologist to undertake 
fish surveys. This process was however terminated at the start of the Anglo-Boer war 
in 1899. Only to be resumed part time between 1918 and 1928 (Paul, 2000b). 
Although most oceans were separated into "territorial waters" since the 17'h century, 
resulting in the control of a narrow band of ocean by coastal states, it was not until 
1930 that this was internationally recognised (pearse, 1994). Most resources during 
this period were thus open access resources. During 1930, the Hague Conference 
resulted in the creation of a three nautical mile territorial waters zone for coastal states. 
This gave the fisheries authority the right to essentially manage small-scale fisheries 
and to exclude foreign vessels from exploiting these resources. Before South Africa 
gained its independence from Britain in 1934, the only fishing authority that had been 
established was the Sea Fisheries Research Institute (SFRI). In 1929, the Department 
of Mines and Industry created a Division of Sea Fisheries and the SFRI became its 
advisory body and remained so until 1998 (Mather, 2004). 
After South Africa's independence from Britain, the first seemingly comprehensive 
legislation put into place, to protect marine resources, was the Sea Fisheries Act of 
1940 (RSA, I 986a). Paul (2000b) however contends that although the act later 
established five marine reserves (that were very limited in area and scope), it was 
aimed more at the marketing aspect of sea fisheries than conservation. In 1944 the 
Fishing Industry Development Act was passed thus leading to the establishment of the 
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Fishing Development Corporation of South Africa Limited (Van Sittert, 2002). The 
objective of this Act was to promote and develop fishing through the provision of 
credit to individual fishermen. According to Van Sittert (2002:296) the 1940s reforms 
became the foundation on which the modem fishing industry was built, facilitating and 
financing the rise of the white monopolies, whose exclusive access later reforms 
(during the mid-1990s) would seek to redistribute. 
In 1954, with the National Party in power, the Sea Fisheries Advisory Council (SFAC) 
became the new advisory body with regards to marine resource management. The 
SFRl still however provided biological and conversation advice (Mather, 2004). At the 
same time international debate around fisheries management and policy escalated. 
During the post-World War period, coastal states began to extend their jurisdiction 
over the ocean. The aim was to reduce outside pressure on marine resources and thus 
to secure more for themselves. These actions provided the momentum for the first and 
second United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) conferences, 
held in 1958 and 1960 respectively (KuIlenburg, 1999). These culminated in the 
extension of coastal territorial waters to 12 nautical miles from the shore. The National 
Party Government, in response to these proceedings, passed the Territorial Waters Act 
of 1963, which defined their territorial waters as 12 nautical miles from shore but also 
making provision for a 200 nautical mile fishing zone to protect larger vessels. The 
legitimacy of the South African government's 200 nautical mile fishing zone was 
however ignored by foreign fleets until 1977 (Mather, 2004). 
The UNCLOS conferences in 1958 and 1960 did little to resolve the problem of 
creating a governance system for managing the ocean's resources (IDGEC, 2000). 
This led to UNCLOS III, starting in 1973. Consensus soon emerged that coastal states 
should be given "sovereign rights" over all natural resources located in a zone 
stretching 200 nautical miles (about 320 kilometers) seawards (KuIlenburg, 1999). As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, these areas were caIled 'Economic Exclusive Zones' (EEZs), 
and they essentiaIly converted a formaIly open access resource into a common 
property resource managed by the State. Coastal states now had the final say with 
regards to how resources were utilised within their EEZ. They also had jurisdiction 
over scientific activities and authority to devise laws to protect their marine 
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environment. However, state authority within an EEZ is not unlimited; they still have a 
duty to ensure that the marine resources, within their EEZ, are not exploited to the 
point of extinction. When South Africa's EEZ was finally recognised in 1977, a year 
after the United States of America declared their EEZ, the reduced influence of foreign 
fleets led to a dramatic recovery of the hake and sardine stock in their waters (Paul, 
2000b). 
The above discussion shows that through the development of institutions, property 
rights regimes are converted away from open access to protect the environment and 
ultimately the long-term economic interests of fishers. This is exactly the argument 
raised in Chapter 4 and will be used to show how the South Africa chokka squid 
fishery, through a process of institutional evolution, has undergone a typical economic 
and institutional change of a common pool resource, as described by Pejovich (200Ia). 
This also demonstrates how property use rights eventually evolved to aid in the 
management of the resource. These issues will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
6. 
5.2.4 Development of the South African Commercial Squid Fishery 
As mentioned earlier, during the 1970s squid was almost exclusively exploited by 
foreign fleets, of which the majority were trawlers from the Far East. Local fishermen 
only displayed significant interest in squid in the early 1980s. This led to the formation 
of the commercial squid fishery in 1983 (Augustyn, 1986), which until the 1990s was 
the only major commercial cephalopod fishery of importance in South Africa. The 
main squid species targeted was Lo/igo vulgaris reynaudii, whose distribution is 
mainly along the Agulhas Bank2 and West Cost shelf of South Africa (Augustyn, 
1989). Large concentrations of spawning squid occur in certain inshore areas along the 
southeast cost in such places as Plettenberg Bay, Jeffery's Bay, St Francis Bay and 
Algoa Bay (see Figure 5.1 below). 
2 The Agulhas Bank extends from Cape Agulhas to East London, along the southeastern coast of South 
Africa (see Figure 5.1). 
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Interest, by local fishermen, in the commercial exploitation of squid was aroused in the 
early 1980s when calamari became a popular delicacy in Europe (Sauer, 1992). It was 
soon recognised that squid caught in South Africa was of high quality and thus 
opportunities for export became available. This fact, along with increased market 
prices internationally, highlighted the true value of the resource. Later, with the decline 
of the Rand in the mid 1980's, export opportunities became more lucrative (Augustyn, 
1984). For example, in 1989 the wholesale value of jigged squid reached a record 
RI08 million compared to R8 million for trawled squid in the late 1970's (Augustyn 
1989). 
With the squid fisheries becoming more profitable, more South African companies 
began to make requests, to government, for permission to fish squid commercially. At 
this stage very little was known about chokka squid, biologically or otherwise, and 
thus no formal fishing regulations existed (RSA, 1986a). The government therefore 
initiated research into the resource and used experimental licences for trawling, purse 
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seine netting and mechanical jigging (Roberts, 2000). Squid was initially jigged using 
hand lines and Japanese squid jigs, but as the industry progressed so did the assortment 
of jig types' (Sauer, 1992). Between 1980 and 1982, in a joint inter-government 
venture, the Far Sea Fisheries Research Laboratory Japan Fishery Agency, performed 
biomass surveys on the south coast of South Africa. These surveys estimated the squid 
biomass to be between 35 000 to 40 000 tons in summer, decreasing to about 20 000 
tons in winter (Augustyn, 1986). These figures were however subject to changes over 
time due to the huge resource fluctuations present in most squid species (Rodhouse, 
2001). At this stage government stopped the trawl method, but still no real regulations 
existed. The squid fisp-ery thus remained a de facto open access resource. 
After the initial commercialisation of the squid industry, the years 1984-1986 saw a 
dramatic increase in effort. This period was described by some as the "gold rush" 
phase (Sauer, 1992 & Roberts, 2000). The escalation in effort was due to an increased 
awareness of the value of the resource and improvements in technology. A large 
number of vessels ranging from ski-boats to trawlers descended on the southeastern 
Cape to jig for squid4. This resulted in the frenzied exploitation of the resource, with 
many fishers converging on the coastline between Jeffrey's Bay and Oyster Bay to 
exploit the "white gold" (SchOn, 2000:5). According to Roberts (2000) these vessels 
carne from as far as Natal and even Namibia. This resulted in conflict between many 
of the participants, especially the local fishermen who felt that the resource should 
accrue mostly to them. 
The influx of fishermen into areas that were predominantly used by holidaying 
families was also a major problem, especially with regard to inadequate housing for 
the fishing crews and the degradation of the local sea and land. Residents feared that 
property prices would fall with the development of a major fishery. This would 
adversely affect what was viewed as a tourist haven. Roberts (2000) states that many 
small operators from the region thus joined together to form associations like the South 
, By 1983 the most viable method of catching chokka squid was using Japanese squid jigs, but many 
local jig varieties soon appeared on the market (Sauer, 1995a). 
4 For example in 1985, it was witnessed that in a small area between Cape 8t Francis and Port Elizabeth 
some 400 fishermen were in action (RSA, 1986a:56). 
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Cape Commercial Line Fishing Association (SCCLFA) and the St Francis Bay Squid 
Catchers Association. These organisations stressed that the increased effort, caused by 
the influx of outsiders, could not be sustained. They called for government to 
intervene and to introduce some form of regulation to protect the resource. 
The increased effort witnessed during the years 1983 -1986 was largely due to the 
unregulated or open access nature of the resource. Although the resource fell within 
the EEZ of South Africa, making it a common property resource to the citizens of the 
State, and with no regulations in place it was de facto open access. And as mentioned 
open access resources usually suffer from overutilisation as fishing capacity increases. 
There is thus a need to move the resource away from an open access regime through 
some form of regulation. This was indeed the case with the South African commercial 
squid fishery. 
5.2.5 Conclusion 
It is evident that the South Africa fishing industry in general, and the squid fishery in 
particular, have both witnessed increased levels of effort within open access regimes. 
Most commercial fisheries worldwide witnessed a similar trend during the 1960s and 
1970s. This eventually led to the formation of EEZs in an effort, internationally, to 
reduce fishing effort and bring about some form of control. Although EEZs did have 
limited success (IGDEC, 2000), they did not go far enough to resolve the problem. 
This is a fact observed both worldwide (Hannesson, 1998 and Greboval, 2000) and 
within South Africa. 
5.3 THE DIEMONT COMMISSION 
5.3.1 Introduction 
On the 7 June 1985, the Diemont Commission was tasked to inquire into and make 
recommendations on the allocation of quotas for the exploitation of living marine 
resources (RSA, 1986a). This meant that the Commission had to look into the 
management and institutional structures of all of South Africa's fisheries. The body 
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was tasked to inquire about various issues, ranging from a quota allocation system 
(effectively a use rights systems), to ownership and participation issues. Those most 
pertinent to the squid industry are however highlighted. 
5.3.2 The Diemont Commission of Inquiry: Overview 
With the development of fisheries laws and regulations through the mid-1970s and 
with the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982, international law 
recognised the need for exclusive control over coastal resources. EEZs gave coastal 
states, South Africa being among these, the sovereign right to explore, exploit, 
conserve, and manage the natural resources within their area. All foreign vessels 
within an EEZ were subject to the laws of the respective coastal states and it is that 
State's responsibility to maintain a sustainable yield and utilisation of their living 
manne resources. 
Although the declaration fonnalising the EEZ, for South Africa, did aid in the recovery 
of the hake and sardine stocks, it did not nearly go far enough. This is because the 
creation of EEZs did not solve all problems related to ocean governance. For instance, 
although coastal states had de jure control in their EEZs, they still had to monitor their 
boundaries, which was a difficult and expensive undertaking. Many states did not have 
the domestic resources needed to manage their marine resources effectively (IDGEC, 
2000), which led to monitoring and compliance problems. EZZs can thus be seen as a 
necessary but insufficient step towards the efficient management and sustainable 
utilitisation of fisheries (FAO, 2000). The effectiveness of EEZs are thus subject to 
much debate, however, the South African government clearly saw them as a necessary 
but inadequate step towards regulation. 
In the period before 1982, the Minister responsibles granted quotas set as a means of 
regulating catch within the demersal and pelagic fisheries. This converted these 
fisheries from pure open access resources into regulated open access resources 
S For the previous 30 years Sea Fisheries resided under the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Industries, 
Agriculture, and since 1983 under the Ministry of Environmental Affairs (and from the 1980s in alliance 
with the Department of Tourism, but in earlier years in alliance with other departments). 
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(Homans & Wilen, 1997). The quotas were set acting on the advice of officials 
stationed mainly in Pretoria. These officials were not solely dedicated to fisheries 
matters and dealt with problems on an ad hoc basis. This obvious inadequacy led to 
severe criticism of management authorities by successive commissions of enquiry, 
notably Du Plessis in 1971 and Treurnicht in 1980 (RSA, 1997). In 1982 the control 
post in Cape Town was upgraded to Chief Director and the local establishment was 
henceforth regarded as a component of the head office in Pretoria. On the 7 June 1985, 
the State President tasked the Diemont Commission with the duty to inquire into and to 
make recommendations concerning the exploitation of living marine resources within 
South Africa (RSA, 1986b). It was the duty of the Diemont Commission to provide 
fundamental guidelines for the effective management of these resources. 
During 1986 the Diemont Commission gave considerable thought to many different 
matters. However, the issues that are perceived as being most pertinent, are those 
dealing with ownership and control, the right of participation, the type of right granted 
and the distribution of these rights. The first issue dealt with by the Commission 
related to the ownership and control of living marine resources. Regarding the 
ownership of the resource, it was established that according to Roman Dutch Law the 
sea is classified as res extra commercium (RSA, 1986a: I) . This means that it cannot be 
subject to ownership. The sea and its resources are common to all inhabitants (i.e. it is 
de facto open access). Nonetheless, the formation of EEZs gave the State 
custodianship of all marine resources within their zone6• The State thus has a duty to 
control and regulate the exploitation of the resource "for the benefit of all people" 
(RSA, 1986a:3). According to the Commission the most widely accepted way of 
protecting the resource is through the imposition of a system of quotas and access 
rights (RSA, 1986a:2-3). 
The second major issue of concern is whether participation should be based on past 
performance; should the fishery be closed to new participants or not? In this regard the 
6 On the high seas beyond the 200 mile zone the Republic can only exercise control over its own fishing 
boats and lishennen. Although a Code of Conduct was tabled at the 27" session of the F AO Conference 
in 1993, regarding international management measures on the high seas, this Code is to be applied on a 
voluntary basis and is not as yet binding (Garcia, Cochrane, Van Santen & Christy, 1999). 
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Commission seemed unclear (they seem to be both for and against) . Issues of equity, 
capital investment and experience all played a role. The process of rights allocation 
therefore needed to be looked at in more detail. The Commission did however note 
that the annual task of distributing individual quotas places a heavy burden on the 
Minster subjecting himlher to political pressures, which are not strictly relevant to the 
advancement of the fishing industry. It was thus recommended that the task of 
distributing and redistributing quota shares should be taken out of the political arena 
(RSA, 1986a:4). It was also noted by the Commission that to grant initial participants 
exclusive rights, based on catch or processing performance, was flawed (RSA, 
1986a:6).The plight of coastal communities dependent on the sea for their livelihood 
should be given an option to any increase in quota shares (RSA, 1986a:4). 
The third issue that the Commission dealt with related to the type of right that should 
be allocated to participants wishing to engage in fishing activities. In this regard the 
Commission mainly focused on TAC measures that could be divided in individual 
quota shares (RSA, 1986a). The reason why the Commission predominantly focused 
on quota distribution system is because most of South Africa's major fisheries were 
managed by output controls at the time. Individual quota shares (along with vessel 
licences) thus represented use rights to participants in the fishing industry (Charles, 
2000). The Diemont Commission also had a look at non-quota species, chokka squid 
being among these. With regards to squid, very little research existed on species, at the 
time the Commission was tasked. Fishers exploiting squid operated under a semi-
commercial 'B' licence, but no real regulations existed (RSA, 1986a:S6). The 
Commission thus recommended that further research be conducted and the imposition 
of a quota system may be justified (RSA, 1986a:S6). Although expensive research has 
since been carried out in the squid fishery, the quota system never materialised. 
In dealing with the allocation of rights (through individual quotas), the Commission 
also explored the term and tradability characteristics of these rights. The Commission 
opposed the practice of issuing rights on a year-by-year basis, and recommended that 
long-term rights be issued (RSA, 1986a:8). Their reasoning was that with large capital 
outlays, a long time was needed to recover the initial investment and secure a 
reasonable return to capital and this required a longer term than a single year. With 
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regards to the tradability of rights, the Commission made the following 
recommendations (RSA, 1986a:9): i) a quota share must be held for a minimum period 
of three years before it can be traded, ii) a quota must be linked to a productive asset 
such as a fishing vessel or a processing factory, so that it does not become a paper 
quota, iii) the transferee must be a South African citizen, and iv) that person or legal 
persona, or otherwise, may accumulate no more than 30% of the TAC, and finally, v) 
the details of all allocations and transfers must be kept in a register. The transfer of 
rights (quotas) was thus subject to certain restrictions that attempted to prevent abuse 
of the characteristic. 
The final pertinent issue that the Diemont Commission dealt with relates to the 
distribution of rights. This refers to paragraph (3)(h) of RSA (1986:ii), which deals 
with "the degree to which the different population groups . .. should be allowed as 
entrepreneurs in the Industry." The Commission felt that there are "no bars against any 
population group [from] becoming entrepreneurs." However it was quite clear that 
most of the quota shares (withdrawal rights) where in the hands of majority white-
owned corporations. It was felt that corporations should be allowed to prosper, so that 
they can be efficiently managed and provide the public with fish at reasonable prices 
(RSA, 1986a:84). This resulted in a monopsonistic market, where fishers 
(predominantly non-white) had to sell they catch at lower prices to large corporations. 
The Commission thus recommended an increased proportion of the TAC for the 
community and larger asset sizes for the fishers - a recommendation rejected by the 
Government (RSA, 1986b:26). 
5.3.3 Intervention and Regulation 
By the mid-1980s the number of participants fishing for squid had increased 
dramatically. This prompted calls, by the local fishing associations, to the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs for increased regulation. This occurred around the same time 
that the Diemont Commission was making recommendations about the management 
and regulation of the South African fishing industry in general. With regards to the 
squid fishery, the Commission felt that there was insufficient research within the 
industry and thus any measures introduced should be precautionary (RSA, 1986a). The 
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primary goal was to ensure the protection of the resource from overexploitation, and 
secondly to protect the interests of the local fishing communities and residents. The 
Department of Environmental Affairs took the initiative, at the end of 1986, to 
promote orderly development around the resource (Sauer, 1992). Initial regulations 
imposed were aimed at protecting the interests of the 'small man' and were to ensure 
that big companies did not dominate the fishery. This was in line with the 
recommendations of the Diemont Commission. 
The first control measures introduced included a closed season of six weeks from 
December to January, which were imposed during the peak squid spawning period. 
According to Sauer (1995a) these regulations did not apply to boats registered in the 
Agulhas Bank area. Trawlers that caught squid as by-catch were also not affected. 
This selective squid catching period effectively stopped many of the large vessels, 
from outside areas, from fishing for six weeks, but allowed local boats to continue 
their operations (Roel & Maharaj, 1999). This inevitably caused friction between the 
local and 'foreign' participants in the industry. 
Soon after the initial regulations were put in place a squid licensing system was 
introduced. The allocation oflicences was on the basis of historical performance up to 
1985. In terms of the Diemont Commission, an Interim Quota Board (IQB) was 
appointed to oversee the allocation procedure in January 1987 (Augustyn e/ ai, 1992). 
This control measure reduced the number of vessels participating in the squid fishery. 
After the allocation process was closed, a 3-year moratorium was placed on the sale 
and transfer of licences, and no person or company was allowed to monopolise more 
than 10% of the industry (Roberts, 2000). By early 1987, the industry had thus begun 
to enter into a stabilising phase. Most of the participants interested in short-term 
returns had now left the industry. However, total effort in the fishery still increased as 
smaller boat licence-holders merged to purchase larger deck boats (which could fish 
greater quantities and for longer periods). Roberts (2000) states that the estimated 
stock of squid had decreased from about 36 000 tons in 1981 to II 500 tons in 1987, 
with by-catch in the trawl industry steadily decreasing. In 1988 the government voiced 
concern about the resource and the effort levels. 
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5.3.4 Conclusion 
The main role of the Diemont Commission was to make recommendations about the 
allocation of quotas for South Africa' TAC fisheries. It did however playa useful role 
in initiating further research in the squid industry, which ultimately led to the 
imposition of regulations within the fishery. It also raised some very important issues 
relating to the rights allocation process in South Africa's fishing industry in general. 
These issues include the removal of political interference in the rights allocation 
process, the 'right of participation' , which resulted in the removal of foreigners from 
the squid fishery, and the distribution of rights which largely limited the role of big 
companies in the industry (RSA, 1986a). Further recommendations also played a part, 
i.e. through the formation of the Interim Quota Board, which led to the development of 
a squid licensing system in 1987. 
5.4 THE SEA FISHERIES ACT OF 1988 
Based on the recommendations of the Diemont Commission, the Sea Fisheries Act of 
1988 was introduced. The Sea Fisheries Act (12 of 1988) represented a marked change 
from previous legislation. Its main purpose was to provide for the conservation of the 
marine ecosystem. This entailed the orderly exploitation, utilisation, and protection of 
resources within the EEZ (Paul, 2000b). The managerial aspect of the act was a new 
and important feature of national policy for marine resources. It incorporated such 
ideals as sustainability through conservation and regulatory measures. According to 
Paul (2000b) the Act granted power of fisheries management (e .g., the determining of 
the optimal tonnage for each species, granting licenses for vessels and factories, 
specifying regulations for fishing gear, and establishing marine reserves) to the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs. The Act also led to the establishment, as 
recommended by the Diemont Commission, of a Sea Fisheries Advisory Committee 
(SFAC) that could advise the Minister when dealing with marine resource matters. The 
SF AC was assisted by the SFRI, which remained independent, and which was 
comprised of scientists and research officers from the various sectors of the industry. 
The most significant provision of the Act was the creation of a Quota Board whose 
primary function was the granting of rights for marine resource exploitation. 
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Although the Quota Board was only fully implemented in July 1990, an Interim Quota 
Board was in existence since 1987. It is this Board that handled the development of a 
squid licensing system. The Minister appointed and determined the number of 
members on the Board and the quorum7, just as is the case with the SFAC. The 
Board's two main functions are: i) to recommend guidelines for the determination of 
quota shares, ii) to allocate quota shares within these guidelines (Mather, 2004). The 
Board may attach conditions to its quota allocations and no quota may be transferred 
without the Board's approval. The Board currently exerts control over access rights in 
all of South Africa's fisheries. 
Within the squid industry, the Sea Fisheries Act of 1988, through the provision the 
SF AC, led to the establishment of industry representative bodies. The first body 
introduced was the South Cape Commercial Line Fishing Association (SCCLFA). The 
SCCLF A suggested to government that a squid management sub-committee Iiase 
between fishermen and SF AC to oversee renewal of squid licences. This can probably 
to seen as one of the first steps towards co-management initiatives in the chokka squid 
industry. By the end of 1988 SCCLFA was transformed into a new representative body 
known as the South African Squid and Line Industrial Association (SASLIA). This 
association's aim was to improve communication between all stakeholders. By 1990, 
SASLIA was again transformed into SASMIA (South African Squid Management and 
Industrial Association). This organisation consists of factory owners, vessel owners, 
fishermen and scientists and its objectives are to represent the squid industry as an 
industrial body that can make recommendations about the resource's management. 
SASMIA has since contributed a great deal to the management of the squid fishery and 
continues to do so. This has thus fostered a relationship of co-management within the 
industry. 
7 The chainnan of the Board must meet certain requirements, mostly notably that of a legal background, 
and must have no interests in the fishing industry. The Act also stipulates that na person in the 
employment of the State" may not serve on the Board (RSA, 1997). The appointment of politicians 
would also be contrary to the aims of the Board. which was "to remove quota allocation from the 
political arena" (RSA, 1986.:4). 
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To further limit any increase effort it became mandatory for all squid vessels to display 
their licence type in 1989. The moratorium on sales and transfer of licences also 
remained in place. However, in 1990, the licensing system was restructured to cater for 
the creation of system of permit control (this system will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6). Permits stipulated the number of fishermen that were allowed to be on 
each vessel. It was thought that by limiting the number for fishermen on a vessel, 
authorities could thus regulate effort. This strategy was for the most part successful 
into the mid-1990s. 
5.5 POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE FISHERIES POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE 
In April 1994 democratic elections were held for the first time in South Africa. This 
marked the end of white minority rule and the beginning of a new democratic 
dispensation. This meant that all laws and policies would now be under review to grant 
greater access, to economic resources, to all peoples of South Africa. In fact all sectors 
of society were to undergo a process of restructuring and redistribution where 
necessary (Hauk & Sowman, 2001). The South African fishing industry was no 
different in this regard. Poor subsistence fishermen (mostly non-white), previously 
denied access to marine resources, now had to be considered. The then Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Dawie de Villiers, initiated the process of 
developing a national marine fisheries policy on 27 October 1994 (Cochrane & Payne, 
1998) under the auspices of the Fisheries Policy Development Committee (FPDC). 
One of the first problems encountered with the establishment of the FPDC was that of 
membership. Previously, government officials dealt with most decisions, concerning 
South Africa's living marine resources, in Cape Town. However, various 
stakeholders, including the other coastal provinces (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal and 
Northern Cape), conservation organisations, the formal and informal fishing 
community and organised labour, felt that they also needed to be represented 
(Cochrane & Payne, 1998). The issue of representation was finally agreed upon in 
1995, giving greater access to these various sectors. This achievement in itself had 
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been a major shift of fisheries policy, as 'grassroots' inputs had never been a feature of 
previous fisheries management or policy (Cochrane & Payne, 1998:88). 
Apart from the initial problem relating to the dissatisfaction with central or top-down 
control, the other important issue that surfaced was that of granting access to people 
who had been denied access to the resources they felt they had a legitimate claim to. 
This frame of thought was embodied in the new democratic Constitution that was 
being developed at the time. To aid the FPDC in the above process, a Fishing Policy 
Development Working Committee (FPDWC) and Technical Subcommittees were 
created (RSA, 1997). It was the task of these committees to coordinate and integrate 
inputs from the range of relevant interest groups, institutional structures and 
individuals. 
Taking into account the issues mentioned above, the main objective of the FPDC was 
to develop a new fisheries policy with the participation of all the sectors of the fishing 
industry. The FPDC thus identified the need to develop a mechanism that would 
ensure a fair allocation of rights and grant greater access to resources. An initial 
measure would be to restructure or completely dissolve the Quota Board. The previous 
system, of the Quota Board, was heavily weighted in favour of the large-scale 
commercial enterprises, and created "a privileged elite who alone benefited from the 
resource" (Paul, 2000b: 15). The Board, initially established to remove quota decisions 
from the political arena, was in fact viewed by many as a complete failure (Mather, 
2004 and Paul, 2000b). A long-term proposal by the FPDC included creating a system 
that would enable fishermen to purchase valuable long-term rights (i.e., long-term 
assets that are transferable, inheritable, and divisible) . These rights could be obtained 
through a competitive bidding process, designed to ensure transparency and fairness 
(RSA, 1997). 
The squid industry was in no way immune to the tides of change within a post-
apartheid society. The FPDC asked various stakeholders for their input on how 
marine resources should be managed. This culminated in a White Paper on Marine 
Policy in 1997. However, the first draft submitted to the Minister, by the FPDC, did 
not address the broad factors of how access rights should be restructured or allocated 
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within the squid fishery (Roel, 1998). At the end of 1997, a Task Group, consisting of 
members of the Directorate of Sea Fisheries (later replaced by Marine and Coastal 
Management in 1998) and the squid industry, was created to address issues of 
redistribution and equitable access (SASMIA, 2001 and Roel, 1998). A proportion of 
licences was to be removed from existing licence holders and were to be reallocated to 
fishermen from disadvantaged backgrounds. However, this process was not very 
successful, as will be elaborated on in Chapter 7. The years 1994 to 1998 can thus be 
seen as years of redirection and gradually changing of rules for the fishing industry as 
a whole, and the squid industry alike. 
5.6 THE MARINE LIVING RESOURCES ACT (MLRA) OF 1998 
5.6.1 Introduction 
The formation of the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 is a process that took four 
years, from 1994-1998. The Act was largely based on work done by the FPDC, which 
firstly led to the development of a Green Paper in 1996 and then a White Paper in 
1997. These largely formed the basis for the MLRA (of 1998). The Act represented a 
marked change from past policy in that it attempted to encompass of holistic view of 
the South African fishing. This included issues of sustainable resource use, and the all-
important issue of equitable redistribution. The Act currently remains the central 
policy prescription for all policy objectives in the South African fishing industry in 
general and thus the squid industry specifically. 
5.6.2 Development of the MLRA of 1998 
The process of formulating the Marine Living Resources Act (of 1998) took four years 
(\994-1998). The activities of those four years included the development of the FPDC, 
the establishment of forums for stakeholders to exchange ideas, and the publishing of 
papers to address various issues facing the exploitation of South Africa' s living marine 
resources. Such papers included a Green Paper in 1996, a White Paper on Marine 
Policy in 1997, and a White Paper on Biodiversity in 1997. All of these, however, 
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encompassed the work done by the FPDC, which provided the framework for the 
establishment of the Act through a bill introduced in March of 1998 (RSA, 1998). 
All of this finally culminated in the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998. This Act 
was a significant departure from past legislation because it recognised that fisheries 
restructuring and management needed a comprehensive approach. The Act can 
basically be summarised in the following statement (RSA, 1998:2): 
To provide for the conservation of the marine ecosystem, the long-term sustainable 
utilisation of marine living resources and the orderly access to exploitation, utilisation 
and protection of certain marine living resources; and for these purposes to provide 
for the exercise of control over marine living resources in a fair and equitable manner 
to the benefit of all the citizens of South Africa; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith. 
This statement reflects the three major objectives or cornerstones of the Act (RSA, 
I 998:section 2), which are the sustainable use of marine living resources (paragraphs 
a, b, c, e, f, g), stability and growth (paragraph d and h) and the need to "restructure the 
fishing industry to address historical imbalances and achieve equity within all branches 
of the fishing industry" (RSA, 1998: paragraphj). 
With regards to the first objective, the responsibility of managing marine living 
resources ultimately rests with the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. 
The Minister determines the total allowable catch (TAC), the total applied effort 
(TAE), and the quota allocation to subsistence, recreational, commercial, and foreign 
sectors (RSA, 1998: section 14). And with regards to effort-controlled fisheries, the 
Minister determines who is given permits (e.g. for squid and linefish). It is also the 
Minister's duty to suspend any or all fishing activities if an emergency arises that may 
endanger the viability of stocks or species of marine living resources (RSA, 
1998:section 16). 
The Consultative Advisory Forum (CAF), an independent body composed of members 
from the various fishing sectors, was established to advise the Minister on matters 
regarding the management and development of fisheries. CAF effectively replaced the 
Sea Fisheries Advisory Committee and thus its duties are not fundamentally different. 
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Along with the establishment of CAF, In October 1998 the Sea Fisheries Chief 
Directorate was renamed Marine and Coastal Management (MCM)8, a Chief 
Directorate of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (Stuttaford, 
1999). 
The second cornerstone of the MLRA deals with issue of growth and stability. The 
need for stability and growth can in part be related to the objective of achieving market 
stability. Market stability can be viewed both on the supply side (the fishing activities) 
and on the demand side (local and international markets). Although the supply side 
does depend on the variability of the resource, it also depends on the ability of fishers 
to catch fish (specifically the right of access and the ability to exploit the resource). 
The Act [RSA, 1998: section 18 (I)l states "no person shall undertake commercial 
fishing or ... operate a fish processing establishment unless a right to undertake or 
engage in such an activity... has been granted to such a person by the Minister". The 
right of access, to a fishing ground, is specified in section 21(1) of the Act (RSA, 
1998). However a quota (or harvest right) can only be activated through the issuing of 
a fishing vessel licence (RSA, 1998:section 13). Stability is supposed to be achieved 
through the market exchange of long-term quota shares, which are tradable and 
divisible (Mather, 2004). 
The final cornerstone of the MRLA Act deals with issues of distributional equity. To 
help with this the Act (RSA, 1998: chapter 2 (part five)) created the Fisheries 
Transformation Council (FTC)9, which was tasked with the function of restructuring 
the fishing industry to address historical inequities. The primary function of the 
Council is to " ... facilitate fair and equitable access to ... rights" (RSA, 1998:section 
30). The FTC is responsible for leasing rights to the "previously disadvantaged sectors 
of the industry and to small scale/medium sized enterprises" (RSA, 1998: section 
8 Marine and Coastal Management became the primary government authority responsible for the coastal 
zones in South Africa. In addition, the SFRI. along with non-fishing research and coastal management, 
was formally included into the structures of MeM. This meant that both management and research 
activities could now be co-ordinated through the same organisational structure. This organisational 
structure thus provides a framework that embraces the functions of management, research, control and 
enforcement, and development. All of these contribute to the sustainable utilisation of marine resources. 
9 The Fisheries Transfonnation Council's function is intended to only be temporary -- until previously 
disadvantaged companies and individuals are successfully able to compete. 
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31(2)). The Council is also responsible for deciding how much previously 
disadvantaged fishers must pay for their rights, taking into account their relative 
economic circumstances. 
5.6.3 The Effect on the Squid Industry 
With the development of the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998, the entire South 
African fishing industry began the process of restructuring in earnest. For the squid 
industry, the MLRA (Act 18 of 1998:section 8) meant that SASMIA was finally 
recognised as an industrial body in 1999. This formalised the co-management lO 
structures within the fishery and thus allowed for greater participation by all 
stakeholders. Effective consultation with SASMIA however only initiated after the 
government failed at trying to go it only. This will be made evident when discussing 
the initial attempts at redistribution in Chapter 7. 
Through this new institutional framework government recognised that redistribution 
can only be achieved by means of greater industry participation. This resulted in the 
formation of the South African Squid Fishing Task Group (SASFTG), which was 
tasked with the duty of compiling a 'rule book' defining management and access 
issues for the industry. The 'rule book' is a "binding agreement defining all aspects of 
the management of the fishery, including the process and procedure for allocating 
rights, transformation and means to achieve stability" (Mather et ai, 2000:4). 
According to the SASFTG, policy reform in the squid fishery should focus on three 
concerns: achieving stability, viability and equitable "transformation!!" 
(redistribution). 
Stability relates to both the biological and economic concerns of the squid fishery. 
From a biological viewpoint, the resource needs to be managed on a basis that ensures 
10 The type of co-management present in the commercial squid fishery still gave DEAT the majority of 
~owers to manage the fishery; decisions were however made on a co-operative basis (Nielsen, 1996). 
I "Transformation" within the context of fisheries, refers to the achievement of social and economic 
equity through the redistribution of fishing rights and the promotion of historically disadvantaged 
individuals. The objective is to have a normalised industry that reflects the demographics of the country 
and achieves equitable access to employment and income creation. 
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long-tenn sustainability. From an economic viewpoint, there is a need to reduce 
possible adverse effects on those directly and indirectly affected by changes in the 
management of the resource. This includes the reduction of business risk to the 
fluctuations of the resource (SASMIA, 2001). The concept of viability seems to refer 
specifically to the needs of business, ensuring that they are built on sound foundations 
in tenns of assets, access to finance and the ability to be profitable (SASMIA, 
2001: 12). The last concern outlined by the SASFTG relates to 'transfonnation'. This is 
the granting of equitable access to groups that have previously been discriminated 
against under the apartheid regime. In economic tenns this refers to redistribution, 
which according to the State should be achieved through the reallocation of access 
rights (RSA, 1998). 
To aid in the equitable reallocation of rights, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism decided to establish a Rights Verification Unit (DEAT, 2000). The RVU 
consisted of independently contracted individuals and companies, with the necessary 
experience and skills. In addition to the RVU, a Rights Allocation Unit (RAU) was 
also established. It is the job of the RVU, along with the CAF, to oversee the rights 
application process through the scanning of all applications, the creation of a 
comprehensive database and to further support the RAU. Within the squid industry the 
RAU dealt with the redistribution of access rights, the tenure of access rights and 
restitution (defined as an issue of internal redistribution and vessel ownership). All of 
these concerns were identified with the aim of achieving the objectives encompassed 
within the MLRA Act of 1998. 
5.6.4 Conclusion 
The MLRA of 1998 has become the foundation for all fisheries policies in South 
Africa to date. It has played, and continues to play, a vital role in this regard. The Act 
provided the guiding principles for redistribution issues within the squid industry. And 
through the fonnation of the Fisheries Transfonnation Council it has attempted to put 
those principles into practice. It also fonnalised co-management structures within the 
squid industry through its recognition of SASMIA. With regards to current 
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redistribution issues, it has provided the institutional framework for the formation of 
various task groups and committees to aide in the 'transformation' process. 
5.7 POST MLRA: 1998-2001 
With the creation of the Rights Verification Unit and the Rights Allocation Unit in July 
2001 (DEAT, 2003a), Marine and Coastal Management adopted a rights-based 
management system for the squid industry. Although this seemed to be a move in the 
right direction, the management system was ill defined and initial attempts at 
redistribution failed. According to Paul (2000b) the same elite circle of companies and 
individuals still dominated the industry. SASMIA (2001:6) also concluded that the 
years 1998 - 2000 were years of "turmoil and insecurity" largely caused by a "botched 
process of false restructuring". This process will however be elaborated on in Chapter 
7. 
At the beginning of the 1999/2000 fishing season the Minister sought to achieve a 20% 
redistribution of access rights and a 10% reduction in effort. However, rights that were 
allocated were not in viable units. This did not conform to the principle of "viability" 
as set out by the SASFTG and was one of the major problems associated with the 
initial restructuring process. The attempts at redistribution were also marked by 
conflict, lawsuits and discontent among almost most participants and stakeholders 
(Hersoug, 2002). The process had occurred without effective consultation or 
endorsement from SASMIA, the industry representative body. 
In 2001, to further aid with the fishing rights allocation process within the squid 
industry, the Deputy Director-General12 (DDG) of MCM, Mr Horst Kleinschmidt, 
established an Advisory Committee to assist with the assessment of applications by the 
Right Allocation Unit. The Advisory Committee consisted of legal and financial 
experts to ensure that applicants could not dispute futures allocations. This body, along 
with the Rights Verification and Rights Allocation Units, are currently still in place 
and their duties are centred around the rights allocation process for the 2002 to 2005 
12 In terms of section 18 of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, the Minister delegated his 
powers to the Deputy Director-General (RSA, 1998). 
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seasons. Their role in the redistribution process, specifically with regards to rights 
redistribution, will be dealt with further in Chapter 7. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
The South African fishing industry, and the squid industry in particular, has undergone 
a process of institutional evolution. With the international recognition of EZZs in 
1977, fisheries management authorities were able to impose more formalised 
regulations. However, initial management measures were largely through a central 
top-down approach based on advice from government scientists. This was the type of 
management approach adopted as the squid fishery developed through the 1980s. 
Various institutional structures gradually allowed for a change in the South Africa's 
fisheries management approach. The first major institutional arrangement that affected 
the squid was that of the Diemont Commission. This laid the policy groundwork for 
research and regulations within the industry. 
As the squid industry developed it was further affected by the Sea Fisheries Act of 
1988, which led to the creation of the Quota Board and thus a squid vessel licensing 
system and permit system. After 1994, a new political dispensation resulted in a 
change in policy objectives within South African society. These changes were also 
reflected in fishing industry, and culminated in the Marine Living Resources Act of 
1998. This has become the foundation for all fisheries management objectives to date. 
Within the squid industry this brought about an era of redistribution and restructuring, 
through a reallocation of rights - a process that was supported by the creation of 
Rights Verification and Rights Allocation Unit (DEAT, 2001a). 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMERCIAL SQIDD FISHERY: 
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to structure the dynamics of the chokka squid fishery as based on 
historical and current trends. Firstly, the squid fleet dynamics are shown in order to 
establish how the change in vessel type could possibly affect the levels of catch and 
effort within the fishery. Next, focus is shifted to actual catch levels and effort levels. 
These levels thus highlight whether the current management measures within the fishery 
are in fact effective. These measures are based on effort limitation, through fisher 
permits, a closed season and gear restrictions. As Jackson (2002) will highlight, effort 
limitation seems to be the preferred method of regulation in most squid fisheries 
worldwide. This is because the resource is short-lived and subject to major fluctuations, 
a fact highlighted in Chapter 2. This obviously has seriously implications for the 
management of the resource. This fact is further constrained because of the 
redistribution policies that the South African government wants to pursue, an issue that 
will be dealt with in Chapter 7. 
For now though, an attempt is made to underline the motivations behind Government's 
"transformation" policies. According to Hauk & Sowman (2001: 174), the fisheries' 
sector is one example where the distribution of resources is heavily skewed in favour of 
White large-scale operators. An attempt is thus made to highlight the social and 
economic aspects of the fishery. These, along with data on the racial distribution, are 
then used to stress the need for redistribution within the squid fishery. In dealing with 
the social and economic aspects of the fishery extensive use is made of data collected 
for the Economic and Sectoral Study (ESS). 
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6.2 BRIEF OVERVIEW 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the squid jigging industry started in 1983. Prior to this most 
squid catches resulted from trawling, largely by foreigners (Roel, 1998). From 1984, the 
industry developed quickly due to high demand and relatively good catches. The highest 
recorded catch was in 1989 when 9 800 tons was landed (Mather et ai, 2003b). During 
that year the wholesale value of jigged squid reached a record RI08 million (Augustyn 
1989). In an attempt to regulate effort within the fishery, a closed season (currently 
imposed for four weeks) was introduced in 1988. This was soon followed by a licensing 
system, developed between 1986 and 1988, and a permit system introduced in 1990. 
The years 1989 - 1994 were years of consolidation and stability within the fishery. 
In 1994, with the emergence of a democratic South Africa, a new Constitution was 
adopted. Through the Constitution and supporting legislation, the government aimed to 
promote equity to all areas of society. This was also reflected in the fishing industry as 
new policies were thus developed (as outlined in Chapter 5). These policies culminated 
in the development of the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998. By then, an average 
of 6000 tons of squid where caught per annum, generating foreign exchange of around 
RI80 million and providing employment for about 2500 fishermen and 300 fish factory 
workers (SASMIA, 2001). The fishery thus provided an important livelihood for many 
individuals, but was still perceived to be controlled by one racial grouping (majority 
White-owned capital). Initial attempts to enforce an equitable redistribution in the 
industry however failed (Hersoug, 2002; SASMIA, 200 I; Mather et ai, 2000 and Paul, 
2000b). The years 1998 - 2000 were thus marked by turmoil, insecurity and conflict. 
From a resource management perspective, although the squid catches in the 1980's were 
relatively good; there was very little scientific information about the species. In fact, a 
direct biomass estimate of the South African squid resource had not been possible by 
1999 (Roel & Maharaj, 1999). This situation, with regards to research, however 
changed in 1986, as research was encouraged based on the recommendations of the 
Diemont Commission. Although no direct estimate is possible, scientific research 
within the industry currently compares favourably with that elsewhere in the world 
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(Jackson, 2002 and Sauer et ai, 2000). Research was initiated between 1980 and 1982, 
in a joint inter-government venture with the Japan Fishery Agency (Augustyn, 1986). 
The need for research was largely fuelled by the concerns from initial participants about 
the status of the resource. This was especially pertinent during the "gold rush" phase of 
exploitation (Sauer, 1992), when effort increased dramatically and no real regulations 
existed within the industry. At that time, based on limited techniques, scientific 
indicators did show a gradual decline in the resource. However, this is very difficult to 
establish since the resource is subject to major fluctuations in catch that appear to result 
from varying environmental conditions (Schiin, 2000). Recent studies (Roel & 
Butterworth, 2000) have however also stated that spawning biomass is falling and thus 
effort needs to be reduced. 
Although reducing effort seems like a simple matter of reducing the number of 
individuals fishing, this is view is naIve. Firstly, the resource is subject to fluctuations 
making an accurate biomass estimate impossible. In addition to this the South Africa 
situation is further constrained by the need to 'transform' the industry in order to 
achieve equitable access for all members of society. This is further constrained by the 
possible adverse social and economic effects that prevail from failed redistribution 
attempts (or any restructuring for that matter). For any attempts, at reducing effort, to be 
successful an understanding of the structure and dynamics of the industry is needed. 
6.3 SQUID FLEET STRUCTURE 
The squid fishing fleet, like in most fisheries, is dynamic in its nature as gear on vessels 
can be changed, vessel conversions can occur and new vessels can enter the fishery 
(Roel, 1998). Data on vessels is however available from Marine and Coastal 
Management (formerly Sea Fisheries) as information about vessel length, date of 
construction and number of crew are a condition for registration. This information is 
available annually within the Fishing Industry Handbook, which was introduced in 
1986. 
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In addition to this, further information can obtained from questionnaires complied to 
obtain more detailed information about squid activities. The first of these questionnaires 
was introduced in 1989 with the aim of gaining information about vessel specifications 
and other related data, such as crew and permits held. This was the first attempt, by 
authorities, to acquire a more comprehensive look at the squid fishery. A second 
questionnaire was thus issued for the 1995/1996 season with the aim of updating 
existing information because as technology changed, new vessels joined the fishery and 
some old ones were rebuilt. The process was again repeated for the 1999/2000 season. 
Whereas in the previous cases the information gathered was necessary to assess permit 
renewal for the following season, this questionnaire was needed to determine the current 
situation of the squid industry to aid with its restructuring. Based on the data obtained 
from these three sets of questionnaires, a distribution, based on vessel length can be 
determined. 
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Figure 6.1: Trend distribution of Vessels according to Length for the years of 1989, 
1995 and 1999 
Source: Linefish database, MCM and Stuttaford (1995, 1999) 
The distribution of vessels, by length, in Figure 6.1 is based on 72 responses from the 
1989 squid questionnaires, 165 responses from 1995/1996 questionnaires and 106 
responses from 199912000 questionnaires respectively. From Figure 6.1 it can be 
established that over a ten-year period the squid fleet has evolved to a situation where it 
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is comprised of a greater percentage of larger vessels. This is one possible measure of 
an increase in capitalisation (in terms of a conventional definition of capital) and thus a 
potential increase in effort. 
The higher number of smaller boats in 1989 can be due to the fact that by 1986 it was 
realised that large vessels were not suitable for squid fishing because they experienced 
difficulties with manoeuvrability and anchorage in fishing the concentrated inshore 
shoals of squid (Roel, 1998). Some of the large boats were thus converted to processing 
or freezer-type 'mother ships' (Roberts, 2000). These 'mother ships' (also known as 
factory boats) were used as storage vessels that freeze squid supplied by smaller boats. 
Many small, open deck ski boats thus surrounded these freezer vessels, jigging for 
squid. This meant that the small crafts could provide the freezer vessels with a constant 
supply of chokka, which significantly improved efficiency. However, as can be seen 
from Figure 6.1 there has been a gradual move from small ski boats to larger medium 
size vessels over time. The movement to more bigger freezer type vessels is largely due 
to market forces and improvements in technology. According to Roberts (2000), there 
has been increased pressure to produce a better quality product. This necessitated the 
installation of onboard blast freezers, only possible on larger vessels. Bigger vessels 
were also better equipped with advanced technologies like GPS, echo sounders and 
lights (Sauer, 1995a)' . 
The squid fleet is indeed dynamic. Changes in the structure of vessel types can be aided 
by ordering vessels into different categories. Boats can be classified into four basic 
categories according to vessel length and the number of crew allowed on each vessel. 
This classification of squid vessels can be seen in Table 6.1 below. The categories 
outlined are based on the classifications within the 'squid rule book', which was 
complied in conjunction with industry participants (DEAT, 2001b). 
I According to Sauer (1995a), it was soon realised that chokka squid were attracted to lights aboard 
vessels. This meant that with more lights (open bulbs and spot lights), larger volumes of squid could be 
jigged at night. 
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Table 6.1: Classification of Squid Fishing Vessels according to Length and Crew 
Vessel Category Length Number of Crew 
Ski-boats < 8m ± 7 fishers 
Small vessels 8mt013m 12 to 16 fishers 
Medium vessels >13mto 18m 14 to 20 fishers 
Large vessels >18m to 27m 18 to 30 fishers 
Source: DEA T (200 I b) 
Table 6.1 thus classifies vessels into four basic categories. The first category consists of 
small ski-boats, which are non-freezer type vessels. The second category consists of 
small vessels that can either be deckboats, which use ice in the storage of catch, or small 
freezer type vessels. The last two categories consist of medium and large vessels 
respectively, the majority of which have freezing capabilities. Based on the categories 
highlighted, it would be useful to get an idea of the changes, in vessels, within each 
category. This is illustrated in Table 6.2 below (see Appendix I for mean data for the 
various categories) . 
Table 6.2: Percentage of Vessels within the various Categories (1993-2001) 
Fishing Season 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Ski-boats 40.2% 39.6% 38.6% 40.1% 36.8% 26.4% 25.2% 29.2% 24.8% 
Small vessels 24.1% 24.7% 23.4% 21.3% 21.7% 24.3% 22.4% 25.1% 19.3% 
Medium vessels 23.4% 23.3% 24.2% 26.0% 30.2% 34.0% 37.8% 32.9% 39.3% 
Large vessels 12.2% 13.1% 12.8% 12.3% 11.2% 15.3% 14.7% 12.8% 16.6% 
Source: Stultaford (1993 - 2001) 
Table 6.2 above shows the percentage of vessels within each category (based on the 
classification in Table 6.1). It is quite clear that the percentage of ski-boats has 
dramatically decreased over time. In fact between the 1993 season and the 2001 season, 
there has been a decrease 15.4-percentage points (subject to fluctuations over time) in 
these types of vessels. At the same time there has been an increase in medium and large 
vessels. Between 1993 and 2001, there has been an increase of 15.9 percentage points in 
medium vessel and an increase of 4.4 percentage points in large vessels. These figures 
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thus support the views of Roberts (2000), Roel & Maharaj (1999) and Sauer (1995a), 
that bigger vessels can be better equipped with new technologies (such as blast 
freezers). The composition of small vessels has however not changed dramatically over 
time, as these boats are probably better at exploiting inshore concentrations of squid. 
Vessel length and the number of crew are however not the only means of highlighting 
the change in fishing ability over time. Other measures such as the vessel's age, its 
gross registered tonnage (GRT) and the engine capacity of the vessel, measured in 
Kilowatts (Kwt), can also be used. Averaged values for these measures are shown in 
Table 6.3 below (see Appendix I). 
Table 6.3: Characteristics of Fishing Fleet based on Averaged Values (1993 to 2002) 
Fishing Season 
1993 11994 11995 11996 11997 11998 11999 12000 1 2001 1 2002 
Average length 11 11 11 11 12 13 13 12 13 13 
Average crew 12 12 12 13 13 14 15 15 16 16 
Average age 19 13 13 13 11 12 12 14 14 15 
Average GRT 40 42 43 46 44 45 48 44 48 47 
Average Kwt 178 178 184 186 181 194 191 186 192 205 
Source: Stultaford (1993 - 2001), Spencer Jones (2002) 
Most of the averaged values in Table 6.3 only show marginal increases over time. 
However, characteristics that are worth mentioning are the GRT and engine power 
(Kwt) of the fleet. Both of these displayed substantial changes over time. This is 
possibly an indication of the fact that larger vessels have been introduced into the 
fishery. These should be highlighted through a marked increase in fishing effort (as 
vessels can get to fishing grounds quicker), an issue that will be discussed in more detail 
in section 6.4.3. 
All characteristics highlighted above show some form of increase. This can basically to 
attributed to increases in the vessel size and various other characteristics like engine size 
and power. The increases in vessel size (as measured through the categories in Table 
6.2) can signify increased capitalisation in terms of the fleet. The increase in the other 
characteristics could also result from capitalisation, probably through input substitution. 
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6.4 CATCH AND EFFORT TRENDS 
6.4 Introduction 
The commercial jig fisher/ has caught the majority of chokka squid within South 
African waters since the early 1980s. After initial exploitation trends continued to 
increase, regulation measures were instituted. Despite these measures being put in place, 
in the later half of the 1980s, there has been a steady increase in effort (Roberts, 2000). 
The increase in effort will be highlighted, both in terms of increased caches and as 
measured by the number of hours fished. Together with these increases, there has also 
been an expansion of fishing grounds to areas further offshore where more adult squid 
are found (Roel et ai, 1998). 
In the analysis, catch levels are based on data extracted from the Marine and Coastal 
Management (MCM) Linefish database. Compulsory submissions of daily chokka squid 
jig catch statistics are required of all licensed fishermen and fishing companies, and are 
thus captured in the database. In addition to this, data from the Fishing Industry 
Handbook is also used. 
6.4.2 Historic Catch Trends 
The South African squid fishery primarily targets spawnmg aggregations off the 
country's southeastern coast (Augustyn, 1989). Catch within the fishery is however 
subject to much variability (Roel, 1998 and Roberts, 1998). One of the major reasons 
for these fluctuations is the variability of environmental conditions (SchOn, 2000 and 
Roberts, 1998). In addition to environmental conditions, other factors that playa role in 
variability, and thus catch, are the abundance of active spawning sites and the size of the 
spawning biomass (Roberts, 1998:267). The size of the spawning biomass, in part, 
depends on the level of effort exerted in the previous season. And because most squid 
species are short-lived (Jackson, 2002), a big catch in one year can reduce the 
recruitment for the next (O'Dor, 1998). In addition to annual fluctuations Roel (1998) 
2 The bottom trawl fishery, which targets Cape hake and Agulhas sole, also exploits squid as by-catch. 
However, squid caught as by-catch has continuously declined since the late 1980s. (Roel, Cochrane & 
Field, 2000). 
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also noted that chokka squid are subject to fluctuations within a given season. To view 
the variability in squid catch, it is useful to plot historic data, on both an annual and 
seasonal basis. Viewing time series data, on catch, gives a good indication of changes in 
catch over the medium to long term. Nevertheless this will smooth the trend generally 
witnessed on a season basis. 
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Figure 6.2: Annual Catch data for the Squid Jig Fishery (1985-2001) 
Source: Linefish database, MCM (see Appendix II) 
Figure 6.2 highlights the change in jig squid catch on an annual basis. It is quite clear 
that jig catch does suffer from fluctuations over this sixteen-year period. The highest 
recorded catch was in 1989, which was around 9 800 tons with a wholesale value of 
R108 million at the time. In recent years catch has however firstly stabilised (from 1998 
to 2000), then begun to decline (in 200 I). Possible reasons for the decline could be 
linked to increased effort (as stated in section 6.3) or a reduction in the number of 
participants due to redistribution attempts the industry, a factor that will be discussed 
further in Chapter 7. 
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Although the fishery does suffer from fluctuations in catch on an annual basis, there are 
fluctuations within a given seasons as well (Roberts, 2000 and Roel, 1998). It is thus 
possible to highlight this variability by plotting the monthly averages for the years 1995 
- 2002. 
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Figure 6.3; Average Monthly Squid Catch (1995 -2002) 
Source: Roel (1998) and Linefish database, MCM 
Figure 6.3 shows the average monthly squid catches for the years 1995 - 2002. As can 
be seen a seasonal trend exists. The lowest catches observed are between February and 
April. This is comparable with data collected by Roberts (2000), which highlights 
average monthly catches for the years 1989 to 1999. As with Roberts (2000), peak catch 
is also observed in December. The decrease in catch in November is due to the closed 
season imposed, currently for four weeks, during October-November, the peak 
spawning period for squid. 
Variability within the chokka squid biomass is in part due to the abundance of spawning 
sites (Roberts, 1998). This means that catch within different areas is thus affected by the 
abundance of squid within those areas. It is therefore useful to view catch data from the 
main fishing areas to determine which of these are associated good or bad catch levels. 
These are highlighted in Table 6.4 below. 
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Table 6.4: Catch data associated with the main Fishing Areas of Squid as a Percentage 
of Total Catch obtained (1995 - 2002) 
Fishing Season 
Area 1995 11996 11997 11998 11999 12000 12001 12002 
Port Alfred 6% 4% 21% 9% 9% 6% 6% 11 % 
Algoa Bay 17% 15% 12% 17% 14% 16% 17% 16% 
Port Elizabeth 25% 23% 22% 15% 17% 18% 12% 18% 
Jeffery's Bay 21% 18% 12% 15% 22% 13% 3% 3% 
Tsitiskamma 13% 15% 12% 15% 16% 17% 17% 21% 
Plettenberg Bay 13% 20% 14% 18% 16% 16% 0.4% 0.3% 
Elsewhere 6% 6% 8% 6% 7% 14% 44% 31% 
Source: Linefish database, MCM (see Appendix III) 
Table 6.4 highlights the fact that good squid catches, between 1995 and 2002, are 
associated with locations that have traditionally been viewed as the primary spawning 
grounds of squid, which are along the southeastern coast of South Africa (as displayed 
in Figure 5.1 of Chapter 5). The largest catches occur between Algoa Bay and 
Tsitiskama (on average more than 70%). Because the largest catches occur within these 
spawning grounds, changes in monthly squid catches, as shown in Figure 6.3, thus 
reflect the changing abundance of squid within spawning grounds for a given season. 
Based on this, apart from the closed season, the biggest concentrates of spawning squid 
occur in December. This is a view further supported by Augustyn (1990) and Augustyn 
et al (1994) who states that immigration to spawning grounds takes place in early 
summer. 
6.4.3 Effort trends 
Changes in effort over time can either be measured on an input or output basis. The 
traditional approach used by fisheries managers, focuses on output measures such as 
catch at MSY or MEY. Kirkley & Squires (1999), however argue that it is vital to 
include the input characteristics of a fishery as well. This is because any capacity-
reduction programmes attempting to reduce output need to consider the inputs within 
that production process. However, where inputs are considered, fishing effort is usually 
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viewed as a composite inpue within a two-stage production process. This conforms to 
the traditional static equilibrium notion of effort (Anderson, 1986). Kirkley & Squires 
(1999) however argue that the input bundle should be disaggregated to some degree to 
distinguish between the stocks of short-run fixed, and quasi-fixed, inputs and their flow 
of services. 
Measures of effort based exclusively on an output basis primarily look at changes in 
catch over time. To view this for the squid fishery, reference can be made to Figure 6.2 
above. Figure 6.2 shows that the level of catch has fluctuated dramatically since 1985. 
As mentioned, the highest rate of exploitation, and one would thus assume fishing 
effort, was exerted in 1989. After this period, tighter regulations, in the form of a 
licensing system and then a permit system, were in introduced in 1990. This definitely 
seemed to reduce catch levels. However, as mentioned in section 6.4.2, catch depends 
on many different factors such environmental conditions and the existing biomass of the 
stock. These factors are however difficult to estimate. One factor, that can be 
determined, is the number of vessels participating within the fishery on an annual basis. 
Table 6.5: Number of Vessels participating in the Squid Fishery (1994 - 2001) 
Fishing season 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
I Number of vessels 275 273 277 258 235 147 243 145 
Source: Stuttaford (1994-2001) 
From Table 6.5 it is clear that the number of vessels, between the years 1994-1996, 
remained reasonably constant. Catch during this period seemed to remain fairly constant 
as well. However, after 1996, although the number of vessels remained fairly constant 
(a marginal decline) until 1999 there was a decrease in catch levels. In the years 1999 
and 2001, there were was a decrease in vessel participation. This was probably due to 
redistribution attempts initiated by the State. Fluctuations in catch after 1998 however 
seemed to correlate to vessel participation. Although a relationship between catch and 
) The idea of a composite input can be expressed by the following production function (as outlined by 
Kirkley & Squires (1999): Y ~ I(K. L, E, M. X. 1) where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour, E is energy, 
M is materials, X represents other inputs used and T is the state of technology. 
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the number of vessels seems evident during certain periods, it should be remembered 
that this relationship is affected by other factors. Firstly, catch is subject to factors such 
as weather conditions and biomass recruitment. Secondly, the number of participants on 
a vessel is a better measure of effort as they are more closely linked the level of fishing 
activity. Finally, the data does not take into account such factors like inaccurate 
declaration of catch levels, "over-crewing" of vessels and changes in vessel 
specifications. Measuring effort purely on an output basis is thus flawed. 
According to Cunningham & Greboval (200 I), an increase in fishing effort is more 
generally associated with an increase in fishing capacity (an input measure). Excess 
fishing capacity, however, is largely a result of overcapitalisation. And as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, a major signal of overcapitalisation, is increased investment in the world's 
fishing fleets (World Bank, 1994). The result is an increase in the capacity ofa vessel or 
fleet, as its ability to generate fishing effort per period of time increases. This can occur 
through improvements in the size of the vessel, its technical efficiency (i.e. through gear 
improvements or input substitution) and the potential time that a vessel can spend 
fishing (Greboval & Munro, 1999). Measuring capacity on this basis is clearly an input 
measure. Excess capacity in this sense means that the capacity of a given fleet is higher 
than that required to ensure a target level of sustainable exploitation. 
To determine the possible effect that the squid fleet has on fishing effort, reference in 
made to section 6.3 above. Firstly, it has been determined that the squid fleet has 
evolved from smaller ski-boats (less than 8m) to predominantly medium-size freezer 
type vessels (between 13m and 18m). According to SchOn (2000) medium size vessels 
have recently proved most effective. This is because they are better equipped (i.e. better 
lighting for fishing at night, GPS systems, and fishing finding equipment) and with the 
expansion of fishing areas, these vessels are able to exploit deeper spawning grounds 
(Roberts, 2000 and SchOn, 2000) . There have also been changes in engine size and 
power (see Table 6.3). Although changes in engine size have been gradual, a definite 
upward trend exists. A possible reason for the gradual change is because vessel engines 
can probably be classed as a quasi-fixed capital input (it is cheaper and easier to change 
the vessel's power than it is to buy a new vessel or rebuild one). 
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A measure that encompasses both output and input factors, of fishing effort, is catch per 
unit effort (CPUE). Catch per unit effort is the most commonly and routinely used index 
of abundance in fishery studies (King, 1995 in SchOn, 2000), and is often used as a 
proxy measure of squid abundance. CPUE is useful because it gives the amount of fish 
caught when an additional unit of effort is applied to a fishery. In terms of this thesis, 
CPUE calculations are based on annual records of catch and effort, expressed as the 
number of men on board a vessel multiplied by the hours spent at sea. This is consistent 
with the measures used in other studies of the squid fishery (namely, Roel & 
Butterworth, 2000; SchOn, 2000 & Roel e/ ai, 1998). Data on annual CPUE levels, 
between 1985 and 2001, is expressed in Figure 6.4 . 
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Figure 6.4: Annual CPUE trend ofthe Chokka Squid Jig Fishery (1985-2001) 
Source: Linefish database, MCM (see Appendix II) 
Figure 6.5 makes it quite clear that over a 16-year period, 1985-2001, CPUE has on 
average gradually declined, a view supported by Booth & Hecht (2000). Taking into 
account the catch fluctuations in Figure 6.2, it is clear that effort has steadily increased 
as the squid fishery has developed. To better highlight this fact, effort in terms of man-
hours (men on board a vessel multiplied by time spent at sea) can be determined. Since 
squid are predominantly caught by hand using jigs, the men on board a vessel should be 
a reliable measure of fishing activity and thus fishing effort. 
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Figure 6.5: Annual Effort data for the Chokka Squid Jig Fishery (1985-2001) 
Source: Linefish database, MCM 
Figure 6.5 highlights the fact the effort has, on average, continuously increased over the 
years 1985 to 2001. Roel e/ at (1998) uses data over the period 1985-1996, to determine 
effort (in man-hours), which provides supporting evidence of the earlier trend displayed 
in Figure 6.5. Roel & Butterworth (2000) also conclude that effort has increased as the 
fishery has developed. This has meant that by the late 1990's the squid resource was "at 
a high risk of severe biomass reduction" (Roel & Butterworth, 2000:224). The squid 
resource is in fact currently considered to be fully utilised with no room for further 
expansion (DEAT, 2003a; Roel & Butterworth, 2000; Booth & Hecht, 2000; Paul, 
2000b and Friedel, 2000). This means that, unless effort is reduced, "the stock is likely 
to be driven to low levels at which future recruitment will most likely be jeopardised" 
(Roel & Butterworth, 2000:224). 
6.4.4 Conclnsion 
According to the data above, the chokka squid fishery has witnessed changes in both 
catch levels and effort levels over time. Firstly, in terms of catch, these levels have 
fluctuated throughout the industry's existence. There was however a dramatic increase 
in the late 1980s, decreasing into the 1990s, only stabilizing for brief periods (i.e. 1994-
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1996). In terms of monthly fluctuations, on average the highest catch levels are 
recording in the summer months, close to the traditional spawning period (Roberts, 
1998). Although catch has been variable, there has been a definite increase in effort over 
time (Roel & Butterworth, 2000). Figure 6.5 best displays this, where effort is measured 
in man-hours. This dramatic increase in effort has necessitated the imposition of 
controls to maintain stock levels. 
6.5 MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION MEASURES 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The squid fishery is currently regulated through the setting of a TAE. This consists of 
limits to the number of fisher permits allocated to participants. In addition regulations 
on fishing gear and the imposition of a closed season are used. In order to gain 
comparative knowledge on fisheries management it is useful to look at other squid 
fisheries around the world. According to Pierce & Guerra (1994), the squid fishery in 
the Falkland is one of the best regulated in the world. On comparison with the chokka 
squid fishery, it is clear that management measures used are similar. Nevertheless it is 
still important to emphasize the effectiveness of this system. These controls can also be 
related to a property rights management system as described by Charles (2000). This 
aspect will thus also be highlighted. 
6.5.2 Resource Management Measures: A Comparison 
After its formation, the squid jig fishery developed quickly into the mid-1980s and it 
was soon realised that some form of regulations will be required to control effort. 
Initially the absence of high-quality information on stock levels threatened the 
implementation of control measures in the fishery. Scientific advice was, nevertheless, 
soon provided by the Sea Fisheries Research Institute (SFRI) and focussed primarily on 
controlling effort. Effort control seems to be the preferred method of regulation in most 
of the world's squid fisheries (Jackson, 2002). 
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Effort limitation in squid fisheries is the preferred method because of the inherent 
characteristics of the squid species (as outlined in Chapter 2). Basically all squid have 
short life spans and rapid continuous growth (Jackson & O'Dor, 2001). Policymakers 
and managers in different squid fisheries are thus faced with similar challenges. 
Furthermore, because of their short life spans, each season is essentially fishing a new 
generation of squid. According to Roel (1998), a key factor for management 
implications is the stock-recruitment relationship. Each year's spawning success is thus 
crucial to the fishery in the following year since a low reserve in year-classes can result 
poor stock recruitment (Brodziak & Rosenberg, 1993). The earlier in a given season the 
recruitment level is estimated the more effectively the stock can be managed -
recruitment overfishing can thus be prevented. In addition to this, squid populations, 
due to their life history, can also face stock collapse due to natural conditions (SchOn, 
2000). And while a population collapse can occur naturally, recovery in the stock is 
aggravated by increased fishing pressure (O'Dor, 1998). 
In order to provide a comparative example of management measures, reference is made 
to the squid fisheries in the Falklands Islands. These islands support two species of 
squid and a variety of fish species in their trawl and jig fisheries. Jackson (2002:5) 
states that the two most important fisheries are the squid fisheries, which are the 
myopsid, loliginid squid Loligo gahi fishery (a trawl fishery) and the oegopsid, 
ommastrephid squid mex argentinus fishery4 (a mainly jig fishery, further offshore). 
The Illex argefltinus fishery started around the 1970s (Basson et ai, 1996), while Loligo 
gahi fishery has been the subject of a major trawl fishery since the early 1980s (Agnew 
et ai, 1998). These fisheries have been managed together, as part of a mUlti-species 
fishery along the Patagonian Shelf, for over 13 years and are the main source of 
government revenue in the Falklands (Jackson, 2002). The main management authority 
during this time has been the Falkland Island Government Fisheries Department 
(Jackson, 2002). 
, This fishery is probably the most successfully regulated cephalopod fishery in the world resulting it 
being the most valuable fishery in the Falklands, both in terms of value and volume (Jackson, 2002). 
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The fishery is managed based on effort limitation, by limiting the number of licences 
issued and the duration ofthe fishing season. The fishing season is divided into two six-
month periods. Illex argentinus is fished during February-June of the first season only 
(Jackson, 2002), while Loligo gahi is fished for 4 months in the first season and 3 
months in the second season (Agnew et ai, 1998). Specific features of the fishery for 
Loligo gahi have also been to restrict the area where the fishery can target this species. 
In terms of the issuing ofiicences, the status of the stocks is reviewed during the start of 
each season. This allows effort to be adjusted every six months (Jackson, 2002). Prior to 
the start of each season, when population abundance is unknown, fishing effort is based 
on a historic estimate (Basson et ai, 1996). Effort limitation is seen as the most 
appropriate method for managing the limited resource of the Falklands. A TAC and 
quota system has been attempted, but would be difficult to maintain with conditions of 
stock variabilitl; catches of Illex argentinus have ranged from 64 000 tons to 266 000 
tons (Jackson, 2002). In addition to this, it is important to realise that population size 
can only be determined once fishing has begun, it is thus impractical to use a T AC as a 
management tool (Basson et ai, 1996). Mirman & Spulber (\ 985) also argue that if 
fisheries are faced with harvest uncertainty, then it is likely that optimal harvest limits 
will be exceeded6• 
Most squid fisheries around the world are managed through the use of input controls. 
These include, but are not limited to, the Todarodes pacificus fishery off the coast of 
Taiwan, the New Zealand arrow squid (Nototodarus sloallii) fishery, and the California 
market squid (Loligo opalescens) fishery (Jackson, 2002). Some squid fisheries are 
however managed through the use of a TAC. The fishery for Loligo pealei off the 
northeastern coats of North America is one of the few squid fisheries based on T AC 
rather than predominantly on effort control (Jackson, 2002). The TAC is based on 
calculations from pre-recruit surveys in combination with effort limitation. Thus III 
addition to catch limits, the fishery is still regulated by limited entry restrictions. 
s Danielsson (2002:29), in his paper dealing with the efficiency of catch ys. effort quotas, concludes that 
when the "variability in the growth of stock is great .. " management with effort quotas is superior to 
management with catch quotas." 
6 PontecoTva (2001) also contends that if there is supply-side uncertainty within fisheries, it is best to 
impose input restrictions that limit the fishery to a more efficient size. 
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From the above it is clear that most of the world's squid fisheries are managed through 
effort (TAE) limitation. The South Africa chokka squid fishery is no different. One of 
the first regulations introduced was a six-week closed season in 1988. During this 
period (1986-1988) a licensing system was also developed. This system however had 
limited effectiveness and was further enhanced by the introduction of a pennit control 
system in 1990. 
The squid jigging fishery is still currently regulated through the setting of a T AE level. 
The T AE is reviewed and set on an annual basis. It is set based on scientific research 
conducted by DEA T scientists and other research organisations, which together fonn a 
Scientific Working Group (Mather et ai, 2003b). This research group attempts to 
determine the status of the stock and its relationship to current levels of TAE. The 
results of the research are then discussed and recommendations, about the new level of 
effort that can be sustained in future seasons, are made to Consultative Advisory Forum 
(CAF). Finally, based on this information, the Minister, or his representative, sets the 
new level ofTAE. 
The TAE is comprised of effort restrictions in the fonn of limits on the number of 
vessels (through a licensing system) and the number of men on board a vessel. The 
number of fishing pennits allocated to a vessel detennines the number of fishers on 
board that vessel. Pennits thus detennine the intensity of fishing on a vessel, and hence 
the viability of fishing endeavours. The fishery is still also regulated by means of a 
closed season (of variable length). Furthermore, it is forbidden to catch squid in the 
Tsitsikamma National Park, where intensive spawning has been observed in the past 
(Roel et ai, 1998). The use of a closed season is very valuable from a biological 
viewpoint, because it can be imposed during the critical stage in the life cycle of a 
specific resource (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, if it is instituted alone, a fishery can still 
suffer from overcapitalisation as the race-for-fish prevails. The development of a marine 
protected area, like the Tsitsikamma National Park, plays a similar role to closed 
season. However, from an ecological viewpoint it is perceived to be more effective (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.4.2). 
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In additional to the above regulations, restrictions on the type and power of lights used 
on a vessel have also been considered (Mather et ai, 2003b). Vessels exploiting squid 
use lights to attract the resource to shallower depths, where they can be more effectively 
caught using handlines7 This is especially effective when fishing at night. SchOn 
(2000:8) states that there has been a dramatic increase in the light power of vessels since 
the introduction of Korean-type hanging light bulbs in 1997. An earlier study by Sauer 
(1992) also outlines the role that lights play in exploiting squid stocks. 
6.5.3 Use Rights System 
Of all the regulations introduced in the squid jig fishery, the one that probably plays the 
most important role is the use rights system. This is because it determines who will 
access the fishery and thus determines the primary level of effort to be exerted. It also 
has important implications for the redistribution agenda of the new Government 
policies. For redistribution to occur the State will have to reallocate rights to 
individuals who were previously denied access. However before this issue can be 
addressed it is imperative that resource managers have an idea of the development of the 
rights system, its current effectiveness, and possible consequences of its restructuring. 
Prior to 1984, access to chokka squid resource was not restricted in any way (Augustyn, 
1986). Apart from covering their costs of fishing, individuals were "free" to exploit the 
resource. Although the resource fell within South Africa's EEZ, it was a de facto open 
access resource. Initially, with the development of a commercial squid jig fishery 
between 1983-1978, the only requirement for participation was a valid "A" or "S" 
licence (SASMIA, 2001 :6). An "A" licence was a commercial licence granted to all 
participants in the linefishery, whereas a "S" licence was a semi-commercial licence 
granted to respective participants within the South African fishing industry. They were 
thus not linked to a specific fishery or species. The lack of specificity with licences 
meant that a large number of participants could exploit a particular species, but 
maintaining control, over increasing effort, was very difficult. During the period of 
1987, specific access rights were granted for the squid fishery with the inception of the 
new "e" licence, which still exists today. This effectively put an end to the "gold rush" 
7 According to Schon (2000), the effectiveness of hand lines decreases at depths of greater than 60m. 
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phase (described in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4), and resulted in a reduction of the number 
of active boats from 560 to 235 by 1988 (Augustyn et ai, 1992). In 1989, to further 
support control, it became mandatory for all squid vessels to display their licence type 
when fishing (Roberts 2000). 
The development of fishing licences reduces the number of people that are allowed to 
enter a fishery - as did occur in the squid fishery in 1988 after the inception of a squid 
specific licence. According to Eggert (1999), a licence scheme is easy to implement and 
is thus a widespread regulation used in many fisheries worldwide. This was probably a 
factor that encouraged its introduction in the chokka squid fishery . Although a licence 
scheme is definitely a necessary step towards effective management, it does not prevent 
active participants from increasing their landings. This can occur through capital 
stuffing, which increases vessel's productivity. Within the squid fishery, even with the 
adoption of licence limitations in 1987, effort continued to increase. In fact, the highest 
catch levels in the fishery were recorded in 1989. Other forms of regulations are needed 
to further manage effort. 
In 1990, in a bid to further enhance the squid management system, a permit control 
system was introduced. These permits stipulated the number of fishermen allowed on 
each vessel and depending on its type also restricted the area of operation (similar to a 
TURF). The imposition of a permit acted as a further input control, in conjunction with 
licences, to limit the fishing capacity of a vessel. It thus deals with the rational incentive 
to increase the efficiency of a licensed unit. When the T AE is set in the squid fishery, 
the total number of individuals participating in fishing activities is determined. Permits 
are then attached to these individuals and are subsequently allocated to participants 
fishing in the squid fishery (supposedly to rights holders with successful vessel 
licences). Three different categories of squid fishing permits emerged over the years. 
Firstly, there are unrestricted permits, which allow squid fishing in all South African 
waters, except the former Ciskei. Secondly, there is a restricted permit, which allows 
fishing in a designated area within South African waters. Lastly, there is a Ciskei 
permit, which allows squid fishing in the waters of the former Ciskei. 
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Charles (2000) would regard the system of licences and fishing permits, within the 
squid fishery, as use rights (as defined in Chapter 4). Use rights determine who can 
access a fishery and how much fishing activity can take place. These two functions 
mean that use rights are divided into two categories, access rights and withdrawal rights 
(see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). Access rights determine who can enter a fishery and 
withdrawal rights determine how much fishing activity can take place. Within the 
context of the chokka squid fishery, a vessel licence can be seen as an access right and a 
squid-fishing permit can be seen as a withdrawal right. Although access rights and 
withdrawal rights are the primary categories of use rights, they can act as limitations if 
used jointly (Mather, 2004). This refers to the fact that an access right can be limited by 
a withdrawal right and vice versa. In the squid fishery, before a vessel can participate 
within the fishery it needs to get a licence that will grant it access. However, no actual 
fishing can take place until fishing permits, in the form of withdrawal rights, are 
allocated to that vessel. 
According to Mather (2004) use rights have four levels of restrictions. These restrictions 
have been outlined in the decision tree represented in Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4. The 
decision path applicable to the squid fishery is an access right, in the form of a licence, 
limited by a withdrawal right, in the form of an effort restriction (in this case a the 
number of permits on a vessel). The evolution of this decision path can thus be 
represented for the squid jig fishery. 
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Access Right Withdrawal Right 
I I 
Vessel Licence Effort Permit 
I I 
No withd rawal right No access right 
TAE share is only activated with a combination of the above 
I 
SquKJ Fishing 
Figure 6.6: The Dual Form of Use Rights applied to the South African Commercial 
Squid Fishery 
Source: Adapted from Mather (2004) and Charles (2002) 
The system of use rights in the squid fishery thus appears to be a dual system 
determining access and withdrawal. However, in most literature surveyed the distinction 
does not appear be to expressly stated. For example in DEAT (2002), SASMIA (2001) 
and DEAT (200Ia), reference is merely made to 'squid rights' or 'rights holders'. It 
does however seem to be implicitly stated in the application procedure that a dual 
system does in fact exist as vessel-licensed applicants are given preference. In addition, 
within the MLRA of 1998, the right of access, to a fishing ground, is specified in 
section 21(1) of the Act (RSA, 1998), which states that a harvest right (referred to as a 
quota) can only be activated through the issuing of a fishing vessel licence (RSA, 
1998:section 13). Nowhere in the Act, however, does it stipulate that an individual 
needs to have access to a fishing vessel to be granted a harvesting right. This opens up 
a number of possibilities. At the one extreme, quota holders can transfer their right at a 
negotiated price to a vessel owner with access to the fishing grounds. This is called a 
'paper quota'. At the other extreme, a vessel owner with access to the fishing grounds 
but no harvesting right leases a quota share, at a negotiated price, from the 'paper quota 
holders,. Regulations thus do not stipulate a link between the right to withdraw and the 
right of access. 
• DEAT (2002:4) defines a 'paper quota holder ' as an applicant that applies "for a right with the intention 
of selling it or transferring it, Le. it does not appear to be a bone fide applicant.,," 
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Access rights are determined through a licence attached to a vessel. In terms of this, 
vessel participation can thus be equated to access rights (since no vessel is allowed to 
fish without a licence). Table 6.5 therefore represents an approximation of access rights. 
From this it can be seen that the number of access rights allocated has remained fairly 
constant between 1994 and 1998. Beyond 1998, vessel participation (and thus access 
rights) decreased in 1999 and 200 I. The decreases are linked to initial rights 
redistribution attempts within the squid fishery and attempts to reduce effort. However, 
without comparable permit data (withdrawal rights) it is difficult to determine the true 
nature of rights allocated. 
Nevertheless for an effective use rights system to prevail within the squid fishery, the 
operational characteristics of these rights also need to be defined, otherwise inherent 
problems will arise with any attempt at restructuring. The viability of a dual rights 
system is however also questionable as a long-term solution. Some of these problems, 
and their implications for the system, will be highlighted in Chapter 7 when discussing 
the first attempts at redistribution (between 1999 and 200 I). 
6.5.4 Conclusion 
Most management measures for squid fisheries, worldwide, are based on effort 
limitation. This is largely due to the erratic nature of the resource, which makes accurate 
biomass estimates impossible. It is thus preferable to limit effort, which can be adjusted 
if necessary. The South African squid is no different in this regard. It is regulated 
through T AE primarily consisting of limitations on permits per participant. These 
permits represent a component of the use rights system. In theory this consists of a dual 
system of access and withdrawal rights. However, the lack of clear guidelines, in terms 
of vessel ownership, mean that permits can be allocated on an ad hoc basis. This system 
can result in a 'paper quotas' (referred as 'paper permits' in the squid fishery). 
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6.6 ECONOMIC AND SECTORAL STUDY: SOME KEY INDICATORS 
6.6.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, the structure of the chokka squid fishery has been outlined. 
Thus far it has however neglected to focus on the people behind the fishing activities, 
whose either directly involved or indirectly affected. According to DEAT (2003b), the 
squid fishery provides employment for approximately 2500 people, with thousands 
more indirectly affected. It is thus imperative to highlight any possible effects that 
restructuring can have on the livelihood of individuals. To provide a socio-economic 
baseline for the squid fishery reference is made to the Economic and Sectoral Study 
(ESS) Report. The EES is a sectoral study commissioned by DEAT in 2000 to provide 
baseline information for all South African commercial fisheries. Although the study is 
not yet complete, two draft reports have been presented to Marine and Coastal 
Management, the directorate of DEA T responsible for the management of all South 
African marine resources. According to the EES report, the study has completed 85% 
coverage of the squid jig fishery. To further aid analysis, data from the ESS is compared 
with data independently extracted from the questionnaire survey conducted by MCM, 
for the squid fishery, in the 1999/2000 season. Data from this survey consists of 106 
responses. 
6.6.2 Background and Methodology to the ESS 
The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism commissioned the ESS in 2000. 
The need for such a study arose from the lack of basic information about the economics 
and socio-economics of the South African fishing industry. Under the leadership of 
Valli Moosa, the Minister at that stage, the Department saw it as a critical step towards 
achieving the new policy objectives outlined in the MLRA of 1998. Before any 
decision-making around rights allocations or industry restructuring could take place, 
realistic baseline information would be required. 
The main objectives of the ESS was: i) to describe the South African commercial 
fishing industry as a micro-economy, ii) to provide baseline economic and socio-
economic data, iii) to provide a measurable estimate of the level of "transformation" 
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(redistribution), including the distribution of the wage bill to previously disadvantaged 
individuals (Mather et ai, 2003a:2). Infonnation obtained from these objectives would 
infonn future rights allocation processes and establish a database that could be updated 
on an ongoing basis. Although the ESS seemed to have an economic bias, it also 
included a legal analysis and accounted for biological considerations. The legal analysis 
was aimed at examining the constitutional compatibility of the policy and management 
systems with respect to fisheries. 
Data used in the ESS was complied from questionnaires tailored for each fishing sector 
in South Africa. In additional to this, representative data was obtained from various 
companies and individuals with in-depth knowledge of specific fishing operations. Data 
was further supplemented with historic data available in the MCM databases, however 
Mather et al (2003a) argue that this data was of little value as databases were poorly 
maintained. Datasheets complied for the chokka squid fishery, and summarised in the 
ESS and represent 160 rights holders. 
6.6.3 Ownership Distribution 
This section deals with the ownership distribution of companies exploiting squid and 
that of the squid fleet, according to race. It also looks at the racial distribution of rights 
holders, as specified by the ESS. The ownership distribution of the squid fishery is vital 
for determining the division of capital assets among racial groups. Most capital assets in 
fisheries (i .e. fishing vessels) are co-specialised (see section 4.4.4 in Chapter 4), which 
means that even if rights are reallocated to historically disadvantaged individuals 
(HDIs), they will not be able to make use of them without a vessel. Taking into account 
the cost of vessels9, and the fact that the majority of HDIs fall within lower income 
brackets, it is unlikely that they will be able to afford a vessel. Allocating fishing 
pennits to these individuals can thus create adverse incentives, as will be highlighted in 
Chapter 7. 
9 Mather et al (2003: 111 ) estimates that a medium sized vessel currently has an approximate market 
value of RIA million and a replacement value of about R4 million, 
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To begin, the ownership distribution of the chokka squid fleet will be outlined. This 
distribution will be based on race, where formerly repressed individuals (i.e . Blacks, 
Coloureds and Indians) will be classed as historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) 
and these will be compared with the White racial grouping. This system of classification 
is consistent with that of the ESS and is thus used to ensure comparisons with 
independently complied data. 
Unspecified 
48% 
Fleet Ownership 
HDI 
15% 
Figure 6.7: Percentage of Fleet Ownership in the Chokka Squid Fishery in 2000 
Source: Mather el at (2003 b: 206) 
According to Figure 6.7, about 15% of vessels were HDI-owned and 37% were White-
owned. However, a rather large portion of vessel ownership seems to be Unspecified 
(about 48%). Although vessel ownership seems to be in favour of Whites, the large 
unspecified component ultimately makes comparisons indeterminate. In the hope of 
getting a better resultant distribution, data from the 199912000 squid questionnaire was 
independently extracted and also used. Instead of using the seemly narrow categories of 
the ESS, categories were determined through majority ownership, where majority is 
50% or greater for a given racial category. About 26% of all vessels were sole-owned in 
2000 (DEAT, 2003b). The results are displayed in Figure 6.8 below. 
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Majority Fleet Ownership 
Unspecified 
Majority 
White 
69% 
Majority 
HOI 
Figure 6.8: Percentage of Majority Ownership in the Chokka Squid Fishery in 2000 
Source: Squid questionnaires for the 1999/2000 seasons 
Using majority ownership as a measure seems to gIve a better indication of the 
breakdown in fleet ownership among racial groupings. According to Figure 6.8, about 
69% of vessel ownership rests in majority White hands. These results thus reflect the 
sentiment that the majority of assets, within the fishing industry, rest in the hands of 
Whites (Friedel, 2000). 
48% 
Company Ownership 
HOI 
14% 
Figure 6.9: Percentage of Company Ownership in the Chokka Squid Fishery in 2000 
Source: Mather et al (2003b: 206) 
In terms of company ownership, the level of White ownership is a lot higher (38% as 
opposed to 14% for HDIs). However, yet again there is a large unspecified portion of 
ownership. It is thus again useful to compare these results with data extracted from the 
squid questionnaires. However, majority ownership will be used as a comparison. 
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Majority Company Ownership 
Unspecified 
10% 
57% 
Majority HDI 
33% 
Figure 6.10: Percentage of Majority Company Ownership in the Chokka Squid 
Fishery in 2000 
Source: Squid questionnaires for the 1999/2000 seasons 
Percentage of majority ownership gives a slightly better result. About 33% of HOIs are 
majority owners of companies that exploit squid. Ownership, as will be shown in 
Chapter 7, plays an important part in the "transfonnation" agenda of government. This 
is because one of the major barriers to gaining access to the commercial fisheries was 
access to capital and equipment (Hauk & Sowman, 2001). For equitable participation to 
be a reality, HOIs need to have a meaningful stake in the ownership of fishing 
companies. Without such an involvement there can be no real redistribution of wealth. 
Rights Distribution 
47% 
Unspecified ~ 
HDI 
16% 
P=......,.,:=~ 
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37% 
Figure 6.11: Percentage of Fishing Rights, by Racial Group, in the Chokka Squid 
Fishery in 2000 
Source: Mather et al (2003) 
It is still unclear whether the right distribution, as specified by the ESS, relates to vessel 
licences or squid fisher pennits. However, based on the supposed rights allocation 
process, these should refer to the distribution of pennits among participants. It should 
however be evident that the majority of rights rest in the hands of the White racial 
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grouping as vessel owners are usually given preference in the rights allocation process 
and these are predominantly white-owned. This view is confirmed by DEAT (2002:24) 
who states that 30% of rights holders, as measured through the TAE, are HDI 
participants. In all categories shown above, White "control" is apparent. Van Sittert 
(2002: 1) in fact argues that "the gross inequalities in the fisheries are the product of 
capitalism," in the form of White monopoly capital. 
6.6.4 Employment, Income and Skills Levels 
On average about 6000 tons of squid are caught per annum, providing employment for 
about 2000 fishermen and 500 shore-based factory workers (SASMIA, 2001). 
Considering families, it is estimated that as many as 25 000 people are directly 
dependent on the performance of the fishery (DEAT, 2003b). The chokka squid fishery 
thus supports a large number of people, but is of particularly important in the Eastern 
Cape province. This is because the main squid fishing grounds are located on the 
southern Eastern Cape coastline, which means that a number of processing activities 
also occur in this region. As can been seen in Figure 6.12, the percentage of fishery 
employment is the largest in the Eastern Cape, which is about 82%. 
Employment Per Region 
Western 
Cape 
Unknown 11% 
7% 
Cape 
82% 
Figure 6.12:Percentage of Employment, per Region, provided by the Chokka Squid 
Fishing Industry in 2000 
Source: Mather et at (2003b: 210) 
The percentage of employment provided by the chokka squid fishery is extremely 
significant for the Eastern Cape as it has one of the highest levels of unemployment in 
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South Africa. According to the ESS the level of unemployment, in terms of its 
conventional measureJO, stands at 34% in the Eastern Cape, with HDls making up about 
43% of that figure and 24% being unspecified. Determining the actual division of 
employment within the chokka squid fishery is thus vital. The ESS received 
employment data for 87.5% of the vessels active in the commercial squid fishing 
industry in 2000, and 12 squid processing facilities (Mather et ai, 2003b). From this 
sample, Figure 6.13 was constructed. 
Employment by Race 
White 
9% 
HDI 
91% 
Figure 6.13: Percentage of Employment, by Racial Grouping, in the Chokka Squid 
Fishery in 2000 
Source: Mather et al (2003b: 207) 
According to Figure 6. \3, of the total number of people employed in the squid fishery, 
about 91 % of these were HDIs. It is useful to establish the breakdown of employment 
figures among the various sectors of the squid fishing industry. This provides an 
indication of the importance that the various sectors have. Essentially the fishery can be 
divided into three sectors, which include the primary sector, the secondary sector and 
the tertiary sector (Mather et ai, 2003). The primary sector deals with harvesting 
activities and their support services. The secondary sector deals with processing. Lastly, 
the tertiary sector encompasses marketing and management services. In terms of the 
available data (for the 199912000 season), the secondary and tertiary sectors are not 
always distinguishable and have thus been lumped together. 
10 Conventional unemployment refers to people actively searching for work, but who have not found 
employment. 
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Table 6.6: Total Sector Employment for the Chokka Sqnid Fishery in 2000 
Full-time Part-time Total 
Fishery Sectors HOI White HOI White Total 
Primary Sector 224 51 1629 134 2058 
Secondary & Tertiary Sector 593 70 100 19 782 
Source: Squid questionnaires for the 1999/2000 seasons 
Based on employment alone, it would be assumed that HDIs, which make up a large 
percentage of the employment, would be better off in terms of earnings as well. If 
reference is made to income data from the ESS, approximately 80% of employment 
income earned goes to HDIs. Although this seems like a large proportion, the 
distribution of average income, and capital assets (as stated in section 6.6.3) is still 
skewed in favour of the White racial group. In order to get a better perspective, data on 
income and skills levels thus needs to be included as well. These not only indicate the 
level of importance that the fi shery has on individuals, but also give an indication of the 
degree of "social transformation" (Mather e/ ai, 2003a:89). This refers to the degree to 
which the fishery has integrated the historically repressed racial groupings. In doing so 
a separation will be made between the primary sector, vessels only, and the primary 
sector, including on-shore support activities. This is because the market generally fails 
in the primary sector with regards to harvesting (Mather e/ ai, 2003a:89-90). Thereafter 
the secondary and tertiary sectors, together, can be examined. 
Table 6.7: Primary Sector (Vessels only) Employment number and Income (in '000 
Rands), by Race and Skills group, for the Chokka Squid Fishery 
Professional Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled 
HOI White HOI While HOI While HOI White 
Employment Income 9 9 5,679 14,466 49,974 1,071 960 0 
% of Total Income 0.01% 0.01 % 7.9% 20% 69.3% 1.2% 1.3% 0.0% 
Employment Numbers 3 1 103 143 1672 39 95 0 
Source: Linefish database, MCM 
From Table 6.7 it is clear that the largest percentage of employment income goes to 
HDIs. In terms of total employment income, roughly 78.5% (or R 56.6 million) is 
earned by HDIs through harvesting activities on squid vessels. A large portion of this is 
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however mainly earned by semi-skilled labour (69.3%), who on average earn around 
R30 000 per annum. White individuals earn more in the skilled category (approximately 
20% of total income) with an average income of RIOI 160 compared to an average 
income of R55 130 for HDls in the same category. It should however be noted that 
employment figures include both full-time and part-time employment. Nevertheless, 
there is still a lack of absorption of HDls into the skilled category, which can probably 
be related to the fact that skills take time to acquire or that non-discriminatory work 
practices are still in the process of being implemented. Including shore-based support 
activities into the primary sector supports this view. 
Table 6.8: Primary Sector (including On-shore support) Employment and Income (in 
'000 Rands), by Race and Skills group, for the Chokka Squid Fishery in 2000 
Professional Skilled Middle Semi-skilled Unskilled 
services 
HOI White HOI White HOI White HOI White HOI White 
Income 540 2298 5316 12888 120 378 47382 1110 1326 0 
% Total 0.8% 3.2% 7.5% 18% 0.8% 0.5% 66% 1.6% 1.9% 0.0% 
Income 
Employment 5 24 103 143 4 6 1672 41 48 0 
Source: Mather et al (2003a: 100) 
When looking at the primary sector, including on-shore support activities, an additional 
skill's category arises. The middle services skill category includes customer service 
clerks and other salesperson related activities. These skills are thus not present in 
harvesting which focuses primarily on fi shing activities. Comparing Table's 6.7 and 6.8, 
it can yet again be seen that White individuals makeup a bigger portion of the 
professional and skilled categories. A comparison of the HOI and White racial groups in 
these two categories combined, suggests that HDI's on average earn R55 771 per 
annum while White's on average earn R94 913 per annum. Whites within the 
professional and skilled categories combined, thus on average earn 26% more than 
HOIs. 
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Table 6.9: Secondary and Tertiary Sector represented in terms of Total and Average 
Employment Income (in '000 Rands), by Race and Skills group, for the Chokka Squid 
Fishery in 2000 
Professional Skilled Middle Semi-skilled Unskilled 
services 
HOI White HOI White HOI White HOI White HOI White 
Income 180 126 36 36 18 0 1080 144 444 0 
% Total 8.7% 6.1% 1.7% 1.7% 0.9% 0.0% 52.3% 7% 22% 0.0% 
Income 
Average 25.7 63 36 36 18 0 16 20.6 15.9 0 
Income 
Source: Mather el al (2003b: 102-103) 
Data from the secondary and tertiary sectors, merely confirms the trend witnessed in the 
primary sector (vessels and on-shore support activities). Although employment figures 
in absolute terms are lower, suggesting that the core business of the squid fishery is 
linked to harvesting activities, the trend with regards to average income earned is still in 
favour of the White racial group. Again the highest discrepancy in average income 
earned is within the professional skill category. If any equitable redistribution is to 
occur within the chokka squid fishery this is definitely an issue that needs to be 
addressed. This issue, and others associated with equitable redistribution, will be dealt 
with in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
6.6.5 Conclusion 
Although the ESS does not provide a 100% sample of the squid fishery, and in some 
case there are large amounts of unspecified data, it does provide a "picture" of the 
chokka squid fishery in terms of economic and socio-economic data. This is important 
as none of this data previously existed for the fishing industry. Using this data in 
conjunction with independently extracted data, gives valuable indicators of the social 
and economic factors. This also sets a baseline from which to determine a redistribution 
agenda (Chapter 7). Firstly, with reference to ownership within the fishery, assets 
(capital and fishing assets) are skewed in favour of the White racial grouping. Secondly, 
in terms of employment, income and skills, in relative terms these are again in favour of 
Whites. Although absolute figures for employment and income do favour HDIs, but 
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these are largely due to larger numbers in lower skills categories. All in all it is clear 
that any redistribution attempts must account for all the above factors. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
The squid industry as an industry has a developed and changed a great deal since its 
inception. This is evident from the dynamic nature of the fishing fleet used to harvest 
chokka squid. In terms of the composition of the fleet, there has been a gradual 
movement towards larger vessels that a better equipped with new technologies. 
According to most fisheries' authorities this should result in an increase in the level of 
effort exerted on the squid resource (Greboval & Munro, 1999). However because of 
the erratic nature of most squid resources (Jackson & O'Dor, 2001), it would be 
difficult to determine increased effort levels from catch alone. It is thus useful to use 
CPUE as a proxy for stock abundance. From this one can determine the level of effort 
for given levels of catch. Effort data (in terms of man-hours) reveals a distinctly upward 
trend as the fishery has developed. In fact the fi shery is currently fully utilised with no 
further room for expansion (Roel & Butterworth, 2000). This means that the 
management measures used control the resource need to be reviewed. 
The fishery is managed through effort limitations, the preferred method for most squid 
fisheries worldwide (Jackson, 2002). The main component of effort control can be 
translated in a dual use rights system. This system, although largely successful, is 
nevertheless unclearly specified. This obviously has implications for resource 
management and the redistribution agenda, as will be highlighted in Chapter 7. Another 
issue that partly informs the redistribution agenda of government is the ownership 
structure of the fishery (in terms of vessels, companies and rights) . Linked to these are 
the employment and income opportunities afforded to historically disadvantaged 
individuals. It is clear that in terms of most of these factors, resources are skewed in 
favour of the White racial grouping (Hauk & Sowman, 2001 and Hersoug & Holm, 
2000). This thus creates a motivation for equitable redistribution within the fishery. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REDISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
COMMERCIAL SQUID FISHERY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
All marine resources within a country's EEZ are public property controlled by the 
State. All inhabitants of a country are allowed access to these resources until access is 
regulated by the State; they hence become common property resources. It is therefore 
the duty of the State to ensure equitable access and participation in terms of the 
exploitation of these resources. This is the fundamental premise enshrined in the 
Constitution! of a democratic South Africa. This is a fact that holds for all sectors of 
South African society, and the chokka squid industry is no different in this regard. To 
achieve the principles set out in the Constitution, the State adopted a strategy of 
"transformation" (equitable redistribution). Initially, with the shedding of the infamous 
apartheid regime, expectations for a rapid "transformation" were high. However the 
demographics of pre-1998 participants in the squid industry, in terms access and 
participation, did not reflect those of society (Mather et ai, 2003). With regards to 
ownership, access rights and employment income earned, resources were skewed in 
favour of the White racial group (see Chapter 6). Government thus adopted of strategy 
of reallocating fisher rights in the squid industry with the hope of allowing greater 
access of HDIs. This process however was subject to some major problems, as will be 
outlined in section 7.3. In order to deal with some of these problems, proposals are 
made to change both government procedures and the rights-based system to be 
implemented. These issues are taken up in the latter half of the chapter. 
I Equitable access to natural resources, access to information, involvement of the public in decisions 
and management were key principles embraced in the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 as well as many of 
the new policies and legislation relevant to natural resource management (Hauk & Sowman, 2001 : 175) 
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7.2 THE "TRANSFORMATION" AGENDA 
7.2.1 Introduction 
In terms of Government policy, all sectors of society need to reflect the demographics 
of society. If this is to hold true for the squid industry, then in terms of access rights, 
then at least 65% of rights need to be reallocated to HDIs according to the ESS. 
However, based on the preliminary strategy outlined by Marine and Coastal 
Management, a more modest reallocation, between 40% and 60%, is required (Mather, 
2003). However, equitable redistribution should not be based on the reallocation of 
fisher rights alone. In terms of the MLRA of 1998, redistribution should ensure 
meaningful participation, by HDIs, within squid industry. This thus relates to both 
social and economic normalisation, with regards to race. A sound definition of 
"transformation" (referred to as an equitable redistribution in the context ofthis thesis) 
thus needs to be established, so that various measures can be determined as benchmark 
against this. The EES report provides some useful indicators in this regard. 
7.2.2 Defining Redistribution 
The MLRA of 1998 can be used to distinguish between three types of redistribution 
(Mather et ai, 2003a: 145): (i) social "transformation,,2, (ii) structural "transformation") 
and (iii) economic "transformation''''. Social transformation refers to changes is the 
social well being of individuals in terms of employment opportunities, skills 
development and access to income (and within a broader context the creation of 
wealth). Structural transformation refers to changes in the composition of business 
within the industry, specifically as to whether it is better suited for bigger companies 
or small, micro and medium enterprises (SMMEs). Both types of "transformation" 
playa vital part in the restructuring of the industry. 
2 Section 2 U) of the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 
3 Structural transformation is viewed as a subwobjective of economic transformation, specifically 
encouraging small, micro and medium enterprises. 
4 Section 2 (d) of the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 
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Within the context of the MLRA of 1998, economic "transformation" refers to 
achieving economic growth, capacity building and employment creation. However, 
from a purely economic perspective, "economic transformation" refers to the 
transformation of inputs (e.g. from labour intensive techniques to capital intensive 
techniques, or vice versa) in the production process with the objective of achieving 
economic efficiency. Although the attainment of economic efficiency is indeed a 
valuable long-term objective of the fishery, it largely does not serve the purposes of 
equity and thus the objectives of redistribution. However, if the concept of economic 
transformation is amended to reflect the "economic objective" (Amason, 2000) 
outlined in Chapter 2, then society should allocate scarce resources with the aim the 
maximising social welfare. This thus encompasses both equity and efficiency criteria, 
with the former playing a more immediate role within the context of the squid fishery. 
In terms of the three types of "transformation" mentioned, social transformation 
probably most closely reflects the redistribution attempts of the State. This is because 
it not only deals with such issues as employment equity and access to income, but also 
looks at issues around racial and gender equality. Improvements in economic welfare 
however, are reflected in issues of employment and income creation, as well as other 
social enhancements. Economic issues should thus not be excluded. Although the 
different aspects of redistribution can be treated separately, they should not occur 
exclusively from each other. Within the context of the fishing industry, the process of 
redistribution can occur in different sectors, i.e. the primary sector vs. the secondary or 
tertiary sectors. Redistribution attempts within the sectors may thus progress at 
different levels. For example, the priority within the squid industry, and most South 
African fishing industries for that matter, seems to be linked to the redistribution of 
access rights. Although, this has repercussions for all sectors, the major effect will be 
witnessed in the primary sector, as this is where most harvesting activities occur. 
Nevertheless to be able to gauge that process of redistribution, the process needs to be 
measured against some baseline or criteria. 
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7.2.3 Strong vs. Weak Redistribution 
Mather (2004: 195) makes reference to a distinction between a strong redistribution 
and a weak redistribution. A strong redistribution includes the redistribution of 
resource rent (through permit rights), fishing capital (vessels and access rights), as well 
as the transfer of skills and creation of employment opportunities. This thus 
encompasses most of the objectives laid out under social "transformation" in terms of 
the MLRA (section 2, j) of 1998. A weak redistribution however only includes the 
transfer of resource rents through the reallocation of permit rights. Since initial 
redistribution attempts (see section 7.3 below) seemed only to include the reallocation 
of permit rights, the important question thus is; Can a weak redistribution have strong 
redistribution consequences? Based on initial results the answer seems to be no. 
Redistribution measures or indicators are thus vital as they allow policymakers, and 
other authority figures, to track redistribution attempts. Since social "transformation" 
seems to be the accepted equivalent of strong redistribution, it is worthwhile to 
highlight the components of this measure as defined by the ESS. In terms of measuring 
social redistribution, Mather et af (2003: 151) provide three areas that affected. These 
relate to: (i) human skills, employment and income, (ii) access rights and (iii) 
ownership. In terms of all these areas, data from Chapter 6 shows that the White racial 
grouping is favoured (apart from absolute figures like total employment and total 
income earned). It is important to however note that permit rights are not included in 
the above measures. These rights can however be classed under capital ownership, if 
they are issued on a long-term basis. 
7.2.4 Redistribution Options 
Having highlighted the various indicators of redistribution it is important to outline the 
functional options that firms and new entrants face. A number of options exist, 
however for practical purposes only a few important ones will be outlined. It should be 
borne in mind that any attempt at redistribution needs to ensure that a more equitable 
and fair distribution of power and wealth be achieved without destroying the economic 
basis of the industry. Existing participants and new entrants thus need each other to 
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survive. That is, the new entrants will tend to capture and retain more of the permits, 
and the established interests have the expertise and the infrastructure to exploit the 
squid stock. Redistribution options thus need to reflect this. 
Option1: Internal transformation 
Companies in the squid industry can internally "transform" by transferring, or 
selling at market value, a minimum predetermined proportion of their 
shareholding to individuals from previously disadvantaged groups. In many 
instances this is a very favourable option. Existing companies can select the 
method and membership for internal redistribution; for example, they may seek 
partnerships with specifically identified individuals or with new entrant 
companies. These individuals can thus include the HDI employees of a given 
firm, who gain shares through "employee share option plans" (Van Sittert, 2002: 
2). Companies can thus negotiate payment, for example, in the form of deferred 
profits. This option does, however, have some drawbacks. Certain potentially 
important new entrants may become excluded, but this remains the case with all 
options. 
Option 2: Joint ventures 
Existing compames may establish joint ventures with permit holding new 
entrants. The exact relationship of these joint ventures must be carefully 
established if this option is to be adopted. This option can however lead to 
opportunism by established interests (through price setting) and by new entrants 
(through a "paper market", as described in section 7.3 .3) and should be very 
carefully considered before it could be classed as an equity criterion. This is 
however the dominant form of institutional coalitions at the moment (DEAT, 
2003b). 
Option 3: Buy-outs 
Existing companies can negotiate buy-outs with new entrants and potential new 
entrants. This option is very similar to internal transformation, but ownership 
rests entirely with individuals from previously disadvantaged groups. Issues of 
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access to capital however limit this option, especially if this option is applied to 
potential entrants who are currently fishers. 
Option 4: New entrants establish new companies 
This may not provide a smooth and rapid transformation path. The practice of 
awarding sub-economic licensing packages and the subsequent establishment of 
a 'paper' permit market and the lack of human skills, retards the ability for new 
entrants to establish new companies (all these issues are discussed below in 
section 7.3). In addition to the above, this option will result in the closing down 
of existing fishing companies and the squeezing out of others. This means that 
existing skills and valuable expertise will not be utilised, and business viability 
is challenged. It does however provide a realistic option for "transformation", 
but should not be considered as the only option (Mather, 2003). 
Option 5: Release of a certain proportion of permits to new entrants 
This option allows individuals or companies to release a further stipulated 
proportion of their effort permits (harvesting rights) to new entrants. If they so 
wish, established interests can in this way retain autonomy, but only at the 
expense of losing a proportion of their resource rights. This method of 
redistribution is in essence the current way of implementing policy, except that 
there is no voluntary action by squid fishing businesses (DEAT, 2003a). 
The selection of options above depends to a large extent on the nature of the right to be 
granted and the specific fishery in question. The nature of rights depends on the 
operational-level characteristics that structure them. Rights can be short term or long 
term fisher licences or permits; that are transferable or non-transferable. The adoption 
of a given option also depends on the ease with which its implementation is perceived 
to be. Given the constraints facing both government (i.e. lack of capacity and a need to 
a quick redistribution) and potential new entrants (i.e. lack of financial capital and 
experience), options 2 and 5 seemed the most appropriate. However as will be made 
clear, no reforms can be implemented without problems of their own. 
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7.2.5 Conclusion 
For the purposes of this thesis, redistribution is defined as social "transfonnation" that 
incorporates various economic aspects. This is encompassed through the tenn strong 
redistribution, which deals with all equity criteria, i.e . fishing rights, employment, 
income and ownership. There are however many redistribution options available for 
government refonns. The one that seems to cause the least disruption (especially to 
existing participants) is redistribution through the reallocation of fisher rights. This is 
the option adopted when government attempted its initial redistribution attempts. 
These will now be discussed in more detail below. 
7.3 INITIAL ATTEMPTS AT REDISTRIBUTION 
7.3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned, in Chapter 5, the South African fishing industry has undergone, and is 
still in, a process of redistribution and restructuring. After political nonnalisation in 
1994, South Africa began its journey into the era of democracy. The institutions of the 
apartheid government and other sectors of society had to undergo a process of 
"transfonnation". The process of developing a national marine fisheries policy began 
on the 27 October 1994 under the auspices of the Fisheries Policy Development 
Committee (Cochrane & Payne, 1998) and finally culminated in the Marine Living 
Resources Act of 1998. The MLRA of 1998 has since provided the guiding principles 
for all policy shaping the process of redistribution within the South African fishery 
industry, and in dealing with the utilisation of all marine resources within its 
jurisdiction. The Act is essentially rests on three pillars: equity, sustainable resource 
use and industrial stability (Mather et ai, 2000) . 
Equitable "transfonnation" implies that there should not just be a short-tenn 
redistribution of income (from resource rents), but there also needs to be a 
redistribution of wealth (i .e. capital assets). This will ensure equitable participation 
that has the potential to be sustainable and long tenn. Sustainable utilisation of the 
resource implies that there should be organised exploitation of the resource enforced 
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legally through the new legislation. Industrial stability needs to be ensured to minimise 
business risk and guarantee viable business operations. The MLRA seeks to ensure all 
of these. 
7.3.2 Initial Redistribution: 1998 - 2000 
The implementation of the MLRA in the squid industry (during the 1998/1999 season), 
and its transition, has proved problematic. The new era started with delays by 
government in issuing new licences and permits. This prevented vessels from going to 
sea and cost the industry dearly. This is because there were no sound economic 
policies andlor strategies in place for "transforming" the fishing industry. Capacity was 
also lacking within the Chief Directorate: Marine and Coastal Management, and a top 
down style of implementation was adopted (Mather et ai, 2000 and Friedel, 2000). 
Reforms focussed exclusively on fisher rights and effort control. This attempt at 
redistribution can best be referred to as a "command and control attempt at 
redistribution" (Mather et ai, 2000:2), a view is also supported by Hersoug & Holm 
(2000). 
To begin, at the start of the redistribution process, during 1999, it was deemed 
undesirable to increase effort in the squid fishery, and according to DEAT a 10% 
reduction in effort was required (Mather, 1999). When looking at catch and effort data 
from Chapter 6 (section 6.4.2 and 6.4.3), this position was understandable as both 
catch and fishing effort were on the increase in 1998. The reduction in effort was to be 
achieved by reducing the number of fisher permits on each vessel by an average of 
30% (Mather et ai, 2000). Along with the reduction in effort, a 20% redistribution of 
fishing rights5 was sought by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. All 
in all, a 30% across-the-board decline in TAE was enforced on the industry6 (Mather, 
2003). 
5 It is unclear whether these referred to access rights in the form of vessel licences or withdrawal rights 
in the form of permits; however, it is implicitly assumed that it is the latter. 
6 In addition, reductions in non-fishing crew placed stress on the ability to ensure safety on vessels at sea 
and to monitor specialised equipment. This has led to certain estimates that the total reduction in effort 
was actually around 40% (Mather, 2003 and SASMIA, 2001). 
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According SASMIA (200 I), most "new" rights were reallocated to historically 
disadvantaged entities. However, these rights were allocated in sub-economic TAE 
units that were mostly short-tem1 (one year) fishing permits. In terms of the 
operational characteristics (Scott, 2000a and Mather, 2004), these rights were allocated 
in economically non-viable assets sizes (see Chapter 4, section 4.4). They were also 
short teml in duration, which meant that they were negatively related to the security 
characteristic. All these factors meant that these rights were incomplete and would be 
subject to adverse incentives, as will be highlighted below. 
The sub-economic units meant that some rights-holders ended up with less than a full 
vessel crew. The immediate result, of the attempted redistribution process, was socio-
economic disruption in the form of crew lay-offs and under crewed vessels, which 
were unable to operate on a profitable basis. Roberts (2000) states that fishing vessels 
were no longer viable as they were only left with about 70% of their original crews in 
operation. In addition to endangering the viability of new entrants, he states that 
reductions in crew also placed strain on the ability to ensure vessel safety at sea. The 
reduction in effort together with the uncertainty in policy implementation resulted in 
tumloil and insecurity within the squid industry. This situation forced both the existing 
participants and the new entrants to react in adverse ways. 
Firstly, existing participants could either buy or lease fishing permits from the new 
entrants (who were predominantly HDIs). This seemed like a feasible option to both 
groups as most new incumbents did not have access to sufficient capital1 (Hauk & 
Sowman, 200 I) and therefore could not acquire or gain access to a fishing vessel. This 
effectively denied them access rights to participate in the fishery and in effect classed 
new entrants as "paper permits .. holders (to be discussed below in section 7.2.3). New 
entrants also lacked the necessary human capital (e.g. skills and experience), which 
further hindered their successful participation. If reference is made to section 6.6.4 in 
Chapter 6, it is clear that existing HDis participating the in squid industry before the 
7 The permits could not be used as collateral as they were not long teon and were not strictly 
transferable. Financial institutions would therefore not recognise them as "assets". 
8 A "paper permit" is a permit that is leased or so ld back to industry participants, and thus it does not 
fulfil the aims for which it was issued (e.g. to cnsure a reallocation of rights within the squid fishing 
industry). 
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redistribution process, consisted predominantly of semi-skilled and unskilled labour 
(i.e. more than 70% of HDls fell into these two categories in the primary sector), who 
may have had the necessary fishing skills, but lacked business acumen. 
Secondly, because of the uncertainty, and the possible reduction in future profits, there 
were strong incentives to cheat (especially because the existing chaos in the industry 
made effective policing difficult). Some vessels simply went to sea with a full crew 
and risked legal action by the state (Mather et ai, 2000). This placed strain on the fully 
exploited chokka squid stock through what Roberts (2000) effectively states was a 
30% increase in effort. Self-policing also in effect becomes a myth, because if one 
fisherman cheats this establishes incentives for all too cheat, with everyone attempting 
to maximise their present value from the stock (Scott, 1955). 
7.3.3 The "Paper Permit" Market 
The motivation behind the restructuring of the squid industry and subsequent 
redistribution of rights was to allow equitable access, to the resource, for all racial 
groups. However, the false process of "redistribution" through new rights allocations 
was based on inappropriate and ill-conceived criteria. This resulted in damage to both 
the well being of the industry (due to increased effort) and new incumbents. 
According to Mather et al (2000:2), the process of selecting new rights holders was 
"deeply flawed", as there had been no controls in place to determine whether, or not, 
new entrants had previous experience within the squid fishery. This, along with the 
lack of other seemly relevant criteria, meant that almost anyone could apply for fishing 
rights. This highlights that fact that no clear guidelines existed in terms of the dual 
rights system mentioned in Chapter 6. Although section 21 of the MLRA of 1998 did 
imply a dual system existed (RSA, 1998), this was not enforced through 
implementation policies. This links to the eligibility of ownership characteristic, which 
essentially specifies that rules need to exist to determine the right of participation 
(Anderson, 2000a). 
The lack of proper verification procedures (in terms of selecting participants) and the 
subsequent allocation of sub-economic units of short-term permits to new entrants 
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opened the fishery up to adverse selection (pre-contractual opportunism) and moral 
hazard problems (post-contractual opportunism)9 Firstly, with regards to the lack of 
allocation procedures, certain individuals could apply for fishing rights, with no 
intention to engage in fi shing activities, knowing that once they were allocated rights 
they could sell these off at a profit. This is an example of adverse selection. Secondly, 
in terms of sub-economic allocations, on average new entrants were issued with five 
permits; this is too small to operate a workable boat especially considering that an 
average ski boat needs about seven men to ensure a viable operation, and in addition 
these vessels were not considered economically viable to qualify for finance anyway 
(Mather et ai, 2000). This meant that new permit holders were unable to establish 
viable enterprises and created a strong incentive to lease or sell permits to established 
firms, as they were unable to access financial capital effectively. This type of 
behaviour led to moral hazard problems. The presence of both adverse selection and 
moral hazard, in the permit allocation process, led to a trade in "paper permits" as new 
rights holders could not viably participate in fishing activities. 
7.3.4 Consequences of Initial Redistribution 
The flawed process of redistribution, through attempted effort reductions and rights 
reallocations, disrupted the squid industry immensely. Firstly, problems of racial 
tension arose between new entrants and established participants. This is to be expected 
in any event as rights are taken from one group and given to another (Hersoug & 
Holm, 2000). In addition to this, some existing participants were forced into 
partnerships (i.e. joint ventures) with new entrants from disadvantaged groups, which 
could add to the tension (Mather et ai, 2000). New entrants could not establish 
independent enterprises and were forced into joint ventures with existing participants 
who more often-than-not wanted to pursue their own established interests. Meaningful 
participation by new permit holders was thus not achieved. 
9 Adverse selection refers the kind of pre-contractual opportunism that arises when one party to a 
bargain (contract) has private information, before the contract is concluded, that can benefit himlher. 
Moral hazard, however, refers to self-interested misbehaviour by individuals who have private 
information about their actions after a contract has been concluded (Milgram & Roberts, 1992). Both of 
these are present when asymmetric information ex ists. 
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Secondly, there was a resultant increase in fishing effort, which threatened the 
sustainability of an already fully utilised resource (Roberts, 2000). Vessels that were 
under-crewed were forced to "cheat", by employing more fishers than allocated 
permits. This resulted in an increase in effort as any expectation of self-policing fell 
away. Thirdly, industrial instability resulted from policy uncertainty and a botched 
rights reallocation process. The buying back of "paper permits" also increased the 
costs of existing participants. As Mather et al (2000:2) stated, the "redistribution 
process could be viewed as a revenue tax on established companies". 
Fourthly, the restructuring process resulted in much conflict and litigation, as 
companies challenged Government's policies in court (Hersoug, 2002). From an 
economic viewpoint, this resulted in further waste as resources were reallocated to 
unnecessary processes. Lastly, from a socio-economic perspective, the well being of 
many fishermen and their families were affected due to crew layoffs. According to 
Mather (1999), a 10% reduction in effort leads to approximately 240 fi shers losing 
their livelihoods, which directly affects about a 1000 people through family ties. 
7.3.5 Conclusion 
The initial redistribution process was an ill-conceived attempt to "transform" the 
chokka squid industry. Firstly, the right-based system that was to be implemented was 
ill defined, with incomplete rights being reallocated to new entrants. In addition to this 
the rights allocation procedure was also flawed. All of these factors led to problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. These problems were reflected through the 
formation of a "paper permit" market. Both existing and new entrants within the squid 
industry were thus severely damaged. In addition, the families of fishermen were also 
directly affected. 
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7.4 PROPOSED REFORMS SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL 
REDISTRIBUTION 
7.4.1 Introduction 
The command and control attempt at "transfonnation", within the squid fishery, had 
some distressing consequences for resource management, the equitable reallocation of 
rights and the fishermen concerned. In order to deal with this, an incentive based 
redistribution is proposed by Mather el al (2000). This new arrangement recommends 
that the rights based management system be altered to reflect a more complete 
property rights scheme. This can be achieved through the use of the operational-level 
rules specified by Scott (2000a), Anderson (2000) and Amason (2000). To further 
reduce adverse incentives; a new rights allocation procedure is also highlighted. This 
process attempts to introduce more guidelines to prevent any possible misbehaviour on 
the part of rights applicants. 
7.4.1 Incentive Based Redistributiou 
The initial redistribution process can be referred to as a command and control attempt 
at redistribution. One implicit problem associated with this type of coercive action is 
that it undermines any future redistribution attempts by Government, because 
stakeholders concerned become sceptical about Government's ability to deliver. In an 
effort to remedy some of the problems associated with these initial attempts, Mather el 
al (2000:2) proposed an incentive based approach to "transfonnation" within the squid 
industry. This approach primarily sets out to deal with the adverse effects of the paper 
pennit market, but also offers some useful insights into other social issues (such as the 
redistribution of ownership and wealth). 
With regards to the paper permit market, two of the major reasons that resulted in its 
formation were the lack of verification procedures in dealing with new entrants and the 
ill defined rights to be reallocated. Firstly, in dealing with the rights application 
procedure, it was suggested that a unit be set-up to specifically deal the verification of 
all squid applicants. These applicants will be checked to establish whether they have 
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any past involvement in the squid industry and whether this involvement is legitimate 
(DEA T, 2003a). Guidelines describing this process and its requirements must also be 
made available to all concerned. Any applications that are found to be deficient will be 
eliminated from the process IO (SASMIA, 2001). This thus acts as a disincentive to 
those applicants attempting to exploit the process for personal gain. 
In dealing with the problems around the allocations of incomplete rights, it was 
suggested that the structure and term of rights be altered (Mather et ai, 2000). The 
initial reallocation of rights to HDIs, in the 1999/2000 season, where in the form of 
short-term fisher permits (a form of withdrawal right). The tenure of the rights, namely 
being short-term, meant that it was difficult for entrants to use these rights as collateral 
to gain finance I I (i.e. to buy or lease a vessel). Because of their duration, financial 
institutions, refused to recognise these rights as an asset. Longer-term rights will thus 
be required to avert this problem I2 . Long-term rights also aid with the compliance 
problems faced in the fishery. This sets up the necessary incentives for the squid 
industry to police itself; participants have a strong incentive to look after their long-
term interests by protecting the stock of squid (Mather, 2003). Stability is thus also 
achieved. In order to gain long-term economic efficiency, permits should also be 
transferable in the sense that those who are most efficient will inevitably be the ones 
who operate in the industry; the inefficient operators drop out by selling their rights to 
the more efficient ones (Amason, 2000). Anderson (2000) however highlights the fact 
rules may need to be set up to initially limit transferability if equity criteria are 
pursued. 
Long-term transferable rights clearly have benefits for both new entrants and for the 
lasting sustainability of the resource (as is reflected by the exclusivity and security 
characteristics); they can however act as a hindrance to the achievement of equity in 
10 Eliminated applicants will be informed and will be allowed to re-submit within a limited time frame 
upon the payment of an additional application fee. This is merely to avoid litigation with regards to 
technical omissions. 
11 The need for finance arose due a deficiency in capital funds. This because people of African, Asian 
and mixed origin were to a large extent excluded from accessing capital during the era of the apartheid 
government. This can also be seen as a direct result of the lack of development and promotion of these 
groups, who were suppressed under the apartheid regime. 
12 Both the White Paper of 1997 and the MLRA of 1998 prescribed a system of long-term rights. 
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the short term. Although economic efficiency is desirable outcome in the long term, it 
is in direct opposition to the objectives of equity. Currently, the majority of economic 
power rests in the hands of the established companies; they are thus more likely to 
succeed in the event of uncertainty. Any failure by new entrants can thus result in 
fishing rights being re-concentrated in the hands of established firms. In the short term, 
economic efficiency thus needs to be scarified until equity is achieved. According to 
Mather et al (2000), longer-term rights can also be used as an additional incentive tool 
to realise equity objectives. Govemment can use the allocation of long-term rights as 
an incentive for vessel owners who activity pursue redistribution attempts, and a 
removal of these rights as a disincentive for "bad behaviour" (Mather et ai, 2000:3). 
In addition to a change in the duration ofrights, the system of permit rights needs to be 
changed. A system of attaching permits to vessels is proposed (Mather et ai, 2000). 
The vessel thus becomes the effort unit within the squid fishery, with gear restrictions 
and the closed season being used as additional measures to limit effort. A vessel 
licence should thus be allocated that reflects the number of men that can viably operate 
it. This means that the vessel should be sufficiently crewed to ensure that it is has the 
potential to operate profitably. The number of men, on a vessel , should also be 
reflected in terms of its safety certificateD This thus ensures that there is no sub-
allocation of permits that could possibly compromise safety on a vessel. Effort within 
the fishery is still determined on a scientific basis, however the vessel acts as the unit 
of effort. This thus ensures that no sub-economic permit allocations occur and thus 
eradicates any moral hazard effects - the paper permit market is thus eliminated. This 
will also improve compliance measures, as vessel owners should not have an incentive 
to over-crew vessels, and even if they do it is easier to monitor vessels than it is 
individual fishers. 
The use of vessel licences as a means to detemline effort and as a means of granting 
access to a fishery should however be longer-term objective. This is because fisheries 
managers need time to adjust to the new unit of effort in terms of setting a TAE. In the 
13 Should the vessel's Safety Certificate reflect a manning level that is less than its complement of 
permits, the manning of that vessel shall remain at that level until its viability is determined (SASMIA, 
2001). 
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medium term the dual use rights system should still prevail until the necessary 
adjustments are made. This system should however be properly designed, in that it 
should account for the operational-level rules described above. Because of this is a 
transitional solution rights should be issued on a medium-term basis. This improves 
the exclusivity and security of these rights, but allows for the issue of longer-term 
rights as well. Limitations on transferability should remain in place until an equitable 
redistribution is achieved. This approach allows DEA T the opportunity to establish 
effective criteria for their redistribution strategy. After all redistribution cannot be 
achieved overnight and should thus be a gradual process. This also reduces instability 
caused by a rushed approach. The granting of vessel licences, as the ultimate goal, as is 
nevertheless preferable from a redistribution perspective as this system eliminates the 
adverse effects mentioned above. 
7.4.2 A New Rights Application Procedure: 2001-2002 
The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism has to an extent heeded the 
advice offered to them by implementing changes in their rights allocation process. 
Firstly, in terms of the application procedure, a Rights Verification Unit was 
established in 2001 (see Chapter 5, section 5.6.3). It is the job of the RVU to oversee 
the rights application process through the scanning of applications and the creation of a 
database l4 In addition to the RVU, a Rights Allocation Unit was also established. The 
RAU is an independent body appointed to assist with the official apportionment of the 
TAE and thus determines effort units. The duties of the RAU were to be supported by 
the information collected by the RVU. As part of Government's structures, the Deputy 
Director-General 15 ofMCM also appointed an Advisory Committee l6 to assist with the 
assessment of applications in accordance with his instructions (DEAT, 2003a). Upon 
completing their assessments of all application forms, the Advisory Committee 
presented their findings to the DDG for consideration. The DDG considers all 
applications, based on both information from the Advisory Committee and the RAU, 
14 The RVU database contains information about the data submitted by applicants in terms of vessel, 
company and personal information. This information is complied to help determine the degree of paper 
p,ermit risk (DEAT. 2003.). 
S Mr Horst Kleinschmidt 
16 This Committee consisted of financial and legal professionals. 
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but still has the ultimate say on the units of T AE to be allocated to each successful 
applicant. 
In tenns of the duties of the Advisory Committee, the DDG outlines the underlying 
purpose and principles with reference to assessment criteria. These assessment criteria 
were based on six broad objectives detennined by DEA T. These are (DEAT, 2003a:6): 
(i) the need to transfonn the squid fishery, (ii) the need for stability within the industry, 
(iii) the detennination of past perfonnance in tenns of harvesting and marketing, (iv) a 
commitment to new entrants, (v) the need for local economic development and lastly, 
(vi) the reduction of paper pennit risk. These objectives clearly have areas that overlap, 
and some lead on from others. It is thus useful to outline how these objectives helped 
to infonn the rights application procedure for the 200112002 season. 
At the end of 2001, 164 applications were received from candidates wishing to acquire 
squid fishing rights for the 2002 season (DEAT, 2003a). Of these 127 were rights 
holders17 from the previous season (potential new entrants thus made up 22.6% of 
applicants). The Advisory Committee, in tenns of the objectives set out in the above 
paragraph, evaluated all applications received lS. The evaluation procedure for 2001 
rights holders can thus be described. Firstly, these applicants were evaluated in tenns 
of their "degree of transfonnation" (DEAT, 2003a:9) . This criterion objective looked 
at the percentage of HDI participation in temlS of the degree of ownership, the 
percentage of management (skills levels) and future "transfonnation" plans l9 
Applicants who display a higher "degree of transfonnation" receive a higher weighting 
in tenns of the assessment process. 
The second object evaluated deals with past perfonnance and involvement in the 
fishery (DEA T, 2003a: I 0-11). The detemlination of past perfonnance is significant 
because it distinguishes the level of experience that candidates possess. Greater levels 
17 Six applicants, from the 2001 rights holders, were however disqualified for issues ranging from 
improper lodging to not meeting essential requirements. 
18 These objectives are assigned a series of weight ings that help determine a score for applicants. 
Applicants who have met these objectives favourably will thus have a higher score and thus be allocated 
fishing rights. 
19 No points were awarded if applicants failed to provide sufficient details in respect of its 
transformation plan. 
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of experience ensure that potential rights holders are more likely to succeed, thus 
enhancing stability within the industry (an aim of the MLRA). Involvement in the 
fishery can be linked to harvesting, marketing or processing activities. With respect to 
harvesting, access to (or investment in) a vessel, greatly improves an applicant's 
chance of obtaining a right. This will in fact have to become an essential requirement if 
an effective vessel licensing system is adopted. This also reduces the risk of potential 
paper permit applicants, which leads into objective (vi). All the above objectives 
inform this last objective, which aims to reduce the risk of paper permit holders. If a 
candidate has scored well in all previously evaluated objectives, it means that they 
have some form of meaningful participation in, and commitment to, the industry; their 
paper permit risk should thus be low. 
Of the 37 applications received from potential new entrants, 7 were found to be 
improperly lodged or defective, and 1 did not meet the essential requirements (as 
determined by the Rights Verification Unit). All defective applications were thus 
rejected. In addition to the criteria discussed above, potential new entrants were also 
evaluated in terms of their "degree of business acumen" and legislative compliance 
(DEAT, 2003a: 12). Both these criteria, along with those mentioned previously, attempt 
to establish whether new entrants will be able maintain viable operates within the 
squid industry. As to how the Advisory Committee is able to establish the degree of 
financial capability of entrants is however still debateable. A new rights allocation 
procedure will thus be a great improvement. This process is outlined in Figure 7.1 
below. 
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I Appeal process begins 
I 
Figure 7_1: The New Fishing Rights Application process for the Squid Industry as 
outlined by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
Source: Adapted from DEAT (2002) 
7.4-3 ANew Rights Allocatiou System 
Previously, a permit right was granted to successful candidates to use a specified 
number of fishers on board a vessel to catch squid. However, with the reallocation of 
rights to new entrants (mostly as short-teml, sub-economic units), the system suffered 
from adverse incentives that, among other things, resulted in a paper permit market. It 
was thus suggested (see Mather et ai, 2000) that vessels be used as the unit of effort 
and that permits be attached to vessels in accordance with their capacity. In the long-
term vessel licences will thus determine access rights, which can be redistributed. It 
was also suggested that the duration of rights be extended once equity considerations 
have been taken into account. The obvious advantages of these changes have been 
highlighted in section 7.4.1. In their rights allocation process for 200112002, DEAT 
decided to implement these suggestions with the hope of improving the redistribution 
process. 
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In the 2000/2001 fishing season, 145 vessels participated in the squid fishery 
(Stuttaford, 2001). These vessels predominantly consisted of medium to large boats 
ranging between 13m and 25m. The TAE at the time was determined to be a maximum 
of two thousand three hundred and eighty-six (2386) fishers aboard various vessels 
(DEAT, 2003a). Because of overcapacity within the squid industry (see Chapter 6), 
and the limited nature of the resource, the Minister decided to keep the same TAE 
level for the 2002 season. In line with the procedure described in section 7.4.2, fishing 
rights were allocated to successful applicants, Applicants were awarded the right to use 
a number of "sites" on a specified vessel to catch squid. Vessels were divided in 
accordance with the vessel categories (as displayed in Table 6.1 of Chapter 6) 
specified in the squid rulebook (DEAT, 200Ib). Each vessel category specified the 
maximum carrying capacity for vessels within that category. Rights were thus 
allocated in accordance with a vessel's category as sites on that vessel. In addition to 
this, vessels are required to obtain a valid safety certificate (issued by the South 
African Maritime Safety Authority, SAMSA) placing vessels into the proposed 
categories20 (DEAT, 2003b). 
The new approach adopted by DEAT significantly reduced the risk of a paper permit 
market from developing. It also improves DEAT's ability to enforce compliance 
measures, as vessels are easier to monitor than are individuals. In terms of increases in 
effort, this however means that the number of vessels will have to be reduced to limit 
fishing effort. It is as yet not clear whether DEA T will be willing to do this as a 
reduction in vessels means that fishers will be without jobs. Nevertheless within the 
framework of use rights explained by Charles (2000) in Chapter 4, a dual form of use 
rights will effectively be applied to the squid fishery as a medium term goal. This dual 
form uses a combination of access and withdrawal rights (see Figure 6.6 in Chapter 6) 
to determine harvesting within the fishery. DEAT has currently decided to grant rights 
to one hundred and six (106) of the 2001 rights-holder applicants and fourteen (14) 
new entrants. The TAE was set at 2266 persons with 120 permits set aside for appeals 
(DEA T, 2003a). 
20 Ifa right holder is allocated a different number of persons than specified by the SAMSA certificate, 
the right holder will be given three months to have the safety certificate altered to ensure that the 
maximum number of persons permitted is equal to persons allocated. 
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In tenns of the duration of rights, it was decided in 200 I that all fishing sectors, with 
the exception of abalone, will be granted four-year commercial fishing rights. These 
medium-tenn rights will be replaced with long-tenn rights in 2005 (DEA T, 2003c:2). 
These longer-tenn rights should be based solely on vessel licences as opposed to 
penn it rights . The initial allocation of medium tenn rights will help stabilise the squid 
fishery. It also means that it is easier for new entrants to access capital as these rights 
should act as collateral due to their duration of tenn. Longer-tenn rights should also 
increase the sustainabiJity of the fishery as participants now have an incentive to 
conserve the squid stock. 
7.4.4 Conclusion 
To combat the problem associated with the initial redistribution of rights an incentive-
based strategy has partially been adopted. This system can be enhanced by using the 
operational-level characteristics of property rights to define a more complete rights 
system, as defined by Scott (2000a). However, because not all problems related to the 
structure of rights, the application procedure for the allocation of rights had to be 
adjusted as well. A new procedure better describes the criteria needed by candidates in 
applying to fisher rights. In tenns of the rights system, it is suggested that a vessel 
licensing system be adopted with fisher pennits attached to vessels. This reduces the 
incentive to over-crew a vessel as well as the allocation of sub-economic units of 
effort. 
7.5 INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, refonns in most fishery policies worldwide are centred in 
one of three broad institutional orders (Hersoug & Holm, 2000). These are state 
control, community and the market. The state, however, is often characterised by a 
hierarchical order, hindered by a bureaucratic structure and one-dimensional 
relationships. Policy within South Africa has thus far been detennined and managed 
within a state institutional structure. This seemed to be the approach initially adopted 
by government authorities when attempting refonns within the squid fishery. The first 
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attempt at "transformation" was implemented and controlled by the State, without 
much participation from user-groups concerned (Mather et ai, 2000). This fact was 
partly to blame for the initial failed attempt at redistribution. There were, however, 
other problems associated with the state centred attempt at redistribution. 
Friedel (2000) states that there was a lack of political will on the part of government to 
implement the necessary redistribution strategies. This can be linked to the ideas of a 
strong vs . a weak redistribution mentioned in section 7.2.3 above. In terms of these 
concepts it seems that Government rather attempted to pursue a weak redistribution 
strategy in order to move the process along hastily. However, it is still debateable 
whether redistribution strategies based solely on the reallocation of access rights will 
have the desired effect. In terms of the redistribution options available (section 7.2.4), 
options I, 3 and 4 seem like those that are most likely to achieve a strong 
redistribution. This is because there is not only a transfer of fisher rights, but also 
transfers in capital ownership. However, redistribution attempts thus far have primarily 
been based on option 5, and to a lesser extent option 2. The reason why a weak 
redistribution was probably also preferred is because it seemed like an easier option for 
a government that lacked capacity to realise multiple objectives (Friedel, 2000 and 
Hersoug & Holm, 2000). However, significant structural and policy changes have 
currently been proposed, as outlined by DEAT (2003a). 
As a possible alternative to the state-centred approach to redistribution, a market-based 
approach has been proposed in many fisheries worldwide, largely through ITQ systems 
(Scott, 2000c). Within a market-based approach strategic decisions about who will 
participant in a fishery and who is to receive allocations of catch or effort are 
determined through the buying and selling of rights in the market place (Charles, 
200 I). However, in South Africa, where access to capital and information is highly 
skewed in favour of the rich white population, it seems unlikely that the market 
principle will work in favour of the previously disadvantaged groups (Hersoug & 
Holm, 2000). The MLRA of 1998 has however incorporated some desirable aspects of 
market-based principles into its objectives. In terms of fishing rights, the Act makes 
provision for long-term tradable rights (RSA, 1998). These aspects are indeed 
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desirable for the long-term interests in the squid fishery, but owners should be 
prevented from transferring rights until the redistribution period is over to ensure 
equity. 
The state-centred approach seems to suffer from issues related to government failure, 
in terms of implementation, while the market-based approach seems to fail in terms of 
equity objectives. The final management approach is that of co-management. Broadly 
speaking, co-management covers a variety of partnership arrangements between 
government, resource users and other stakeholders in which responsibilities and 
decision-making powers are shared in order to manage a resource (Hauk & Sowman, 
2001: 174). This approach seems relevant to the squid industrY, which already has an 
established industrial body, in the form of SASMIA, to represent it. Although 
SASMIA has been around since 1990, Hauk & Sowman (2001) argue that co-
management arrangements are still in their infancy in South Africa. SASMIA did 
however gain prominence after 1998, when the MLRA made provision for the formal 
recognition of industrial bodies. Government however failed to effectively consult 
SASMIA before the initial attempt at redistribution of fisher rights (Mather et ai, 
2000). The results of this process quite clearly indicate that the government, by itself, 
cannot develop and implement reforms to fi sheries property rights systems alone - the 
direct involvement of the rights holders is essential (Craig, 2000). This means that 
collective-choice rights (as defined in Chapter 4) need exist for user groups as well. 
The extent to which these rights are devolved to user groups or rights holders, however 
depends on the power sharing arrangements and management responsibilities present. 
7. 6 CONCLUSION 
From Chapter 6 it was clear that squid industry needed to undergo a process of 
redistribution. The final goal of this "transformation" is a normal society where the 
distinct between race, based on economic and socio-economic characteristics, are not 
distinguishable. In terms of a strollg redistributioll this means that fishing rights, 
employment, income and ownership criteria should reflect the racial demographics of 
South Africa (Mather, 2004). Initial attempts at redistribution were however primarily 
based on the redistribution of fisher rights. And because of inherent problems in both 
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government structures and the structure of the rights system, attempted redistribution 
of rights resulted in adverse consequences. One of these was the development of a 
"paper permit" market (Mather et ai, 2000). To deal with these problems, there was a 
change in the rights allocation procedure as well as the adoption of a new incentive 
based rights redistribution process. This meant that the operational-level characteristics 
of rights needed to be altered (i.e. the allocation of long-term rights to begin). 
However, it was further suggested that government adopt co-management approach is 
terms of any future reforms within the squid industry. This will reduce the 
ineffectiveness of policies, which have resulted from the enormous gap that currently 
exists between policy objectives and implementation (Hauk & Sowman, 200 I: 176). 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the conclusion reached with regards to the effective management 
of and equity redistribution in the chokka squid resource off the coast of South Africa. 
The conclusion is thus informed through the discussion in previous chapters. To begin, 
the central concern for most economists is the optimal utilisation, management and 
allocation of scarce resource with the objective of maximising social welfare. Within 
the framework of neoclassical economics, economists have tended focus primarily on 
the efficiency gains from resource allocations. However, with the evolution of 
economics as a discipline, it has also been recognised that the distribution of resources 
can have important implications for progress (Cructhfield, 1956). The notion of 
equitable resource allocation is however by no means a new one. This belief, in fact, 
has its roots in social philosophy through theories of social contract prescribed by 
Locke and Rawls (Amason, 2000). These ideas are also at the heart of classical 
economic thought and are now again reflected in the fields of resource and 
development economics. This thesis has thus described such views as the achievement 
of a "social objective". 
When dealing with resource allocation, classical economists tended to focus primarily 
on non-renewable resource use. However non-renewable resource use has serious 
implications for long-term sustainable economic growth and development. The 
prominence of renewable resource use has thus gained increased importance. As long 
as these resources are harvested at a rate that do not exceed their natural regeneration 
rate, their continued availability seems guaranteed. Investment in renewable natural 
capital, as stated in Chapter 2, is thus of vital importance. 
The above principles have been used to analyse redistribution initiatives in the South 
Africa squid industry. These principles are broadly enshrined in the Marine Living 
Resources Act of 1998, whose policy prescription is the sustainable utilisation of 
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resource while granting trying to address inequalities of the past. Based on this 
objective, Chapter 8 concludes on the discussions from previous chapters in terms of 
defining a strategy for the squid industry. The fina l part of the chapter makes 
recommendations on this. 
8.2 THE NEED FOR MANAGEMENT MEASURES 
The South African chokka squid fishery is a common-pool resource that is subject to 
commercial exploitation (Cochrane & Payne, 1998). As a common-pool resource it has 
the public good characteristic of non-excludability (Cullis & Jones, 1992). This means 
that it is very difficult to exclude "non-owners" of the resource from its use. The 
resource however also suffers from the characteristic of subtractability (Jensen, 
2000b). This means that if one individual uses the resources, there is less available for 
others to use. These two inherent characteristics mean that participants will usually 
attempt to exploit as much of a resource, in the quickest time possible, to maximise 
present value. The chokka squid fishery is however also a renewable resource. This 
means that if the resource is utilised within sustainable levels (i.e. at levels below its 
natural renewal rate), it can regenerate (Conrad, 1999). Individuals and communities 
can thus enjoy long-term benefits from such a resource (e.g. through the accumulation 
of resource rents or for subsistence purposes). 
Nevertheless, if the resource is open for all to use it is more than likely that it will be 
unduly overexploited (Gordon, 1954). This will result in the dissipation of resource 
rents as the resource is depleted. This is the so-called Class I common property 
problem outlined by Munro & Scott (1985:631) . The main prescription to dealing with 
this problem is to move the resource away from an open access regime through some 
for of regulation. At an international this process has gradually evolved to result in the 
establishment of EEZs. These converted open access resources into a state property 
regime, which is effectively common property to the citizens of a given nation. The 
South African squid fishery, due to inshore nature, thus falls within the South African 
EEZ. It is thus a common-pool resource governed by the state, exploited by the 
citizens of the country (the presence of foreign participants decreased as the fishery 
developed). Although resources fall within a country 's EEZ, they are still de facto 
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open access if no regulation limiting access is possible. Even if output controls are 
established, a situation of regulated open access still prevails (Homans & Wilen, 
1997). Fishing capacity (through bigger fl eets and better technologies) can thus still 
build-up within a fi shery, a situation similar to the Class II common property problem 
outlined by Munro & Scott (1985:631) . Various management measures therefore have 
to be used together to effectively regulate any given fi shery. 
Throughout its development the chokka squid fishery has suffered from problems 
similar to the one described above. Firstly, when the fishery was formalised in 1983, it 
was for all purposes an open access resource to the pUblic. This is because no 
regulations existed and squid were only transformed into private property once they 
had actually been caught. The resource was thus subject to the rule-of-capture. Effort 
within the fishery therefore continued to increase, as its perceived commercial value 
improved - as witnessed by the "gold msh" phase between 1984-86. Even when 
licensing and permit control systems were adopted, apart from initial reductions, effort 
continued to increase throughout the 1990s. Increases in effort can largely be attributed 
to the presence of larger vessels and improved technology, such as more powerful 
lights (Roberts, 2000 and Sauer, 1995a). This thus highlights the fact that failure to 
abide by a priori input constraints in the form of a TAE may, in the extreme case, 
result in the entire fishery collapsing. Although the squid fishery has not as yet 
collapsed, the resource is currently fully utili sed (Roel & Butterworth, 2000). 
In addition to the usual problems of capacity and effort management, fisheries 
authorities are further hindered by the biological characteristics of squid. Squid species 
are generally short-lived species that as subject to much variability in stock abundance 
(Rodhouse, 200 I and Roel, 1998). This adds a degree of uncertainty in the 
management of these stocks, as accurate biomass estimates can as yet not be 
determined. Effort limitations are thus the preferred method of control. These 
measures can also be adjusted, within a given fi shing season, if effort is perceived to 
be too great. The chokka squid fi shery is therefore also controlled by effort (input) 
limitations, in the form of aT AE. The primary lInit of TAE are fi sher permits allocated 
as fishers on board a vessel. These are supported by a closed season imposed during 
the peak spawning period of squid, usually in the months of October and November. 
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These measures worked relatively well until reforms, outlining the need for equitable 
redistribution, were initiated in the industry. 
8.3 EQUITABLE REDISTRIBUTION 
In line with the rest of South Africa, the squid industry has had to undergo a process of 
redistribution. The need for redistribution arose from the need to grant greater access 
to formally disadvantaged individuals. These individuals, because of the apartheid 
regime, had been denied access, or where effectively excluded (e.g. due to a lack of 
capital), from participating in the South African fishing industry. As Van Sittert (2002) 
states, the fishing industry was controlled by White-owned monopoly capital. 
Although the squid fi shery was not entirely dominated by big business, access and 
participation still favoured the White racial grouping. This is evident when viewing the 
racial distribution of capital assets (i.e. vessels, companies and rights) outlined in 
Chapter 6. 
Other factors to consider, in telms of the distribution of resources, relate to 
employment! and income opporhmities. With regards to employment, the majority of 
individuals employed are within the HDI group ing. In absolute terms this bodes well 
for the fishery as it provides a valuable source of employment in a region (the Eastern 
Cape) where it is sorely needed. However, the majority of HDI employment is at the 
lower skills levels. In fact about 94% of HOI employment in the primary sector either 
consists of semi-skilled or unskilled labour. This situation thus reflects the lack of 
HDI absorption into the professional and ski lled categories. This also means that on 
average, within most skills categories, HOIs earn less. This is especially prevalent in 
the primary sector (including on-shore support), where Whites within the professional 
and skilled categories, combined, on average earn 26% more than HOIs. All of these 
factors indicate that redistribution needs to encompass both social and economic 
factors. It is for this reason that a strollg redistribution should be the preferred 
objective of "transformation". 
I With regards to employment it is al so important to note that the type of employment offered in the 
fishing industry, of South Africa, is largely of a part ti me (or commission based) nature. This does thus 
not guarantee a pem1anent source of income. 
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A strong redistribution includes the redistribution of resource rents (through permit 
rights), fishing capital (vessels and access rights), as well as the transfer of skills and 
creation of employment opportunities. From Chapter 7 it is however clear that initial 
attempts at redistribution were not based on a strong redistribution. Because the State 
attempted to hastily proceed with redistribution policies, it was thought that the easiest 
way would be to merely redistribute fishing rights (harvesting rights). It was felt that 
by allowing HDls greater access, other areas that needed redistribution would follow 
automatically. This process was however ill conceived, and can probably best be 
described as institutional failure. Firstly, it was not possible for the market to reallocate 
individual rights, and thus government intervention was necessary (Hersoug & Holm, 
2000). Secondly, when government did intervene, by reallocating rights, this process 
failed as well (Mather et ai, 2000). Both institutional structures thus failed to achieve 
the desired outcome. The result was that the squid industry was forced into a state of 
turmoil as, among other things, a "paper permit" market formed. 
8.4 THE USE RIGHTS SYSTEM 
One of the reasons for the disruption and turnlo il in the squid fishery, after the initial 
redistribution attempt, was an "incomplete" property rights system. This was one of 
the factors that led to the formation of the "paper permit" market. As outlined in 
Chapter 6, the squid fi shery is implicitly managed by a dual use rights system. This 
means that ilie fishery uses a combination of access and withdrawal rights together to 
determine fishing activities. Access rights are detelmined through the issuing of vessel 
licences, which in essence grant the holder entry into the fishery. Withdrawal rights are 
determined by the granting of fisher permits, which give ilie holder the right to harvest 
squid. These two forms of use rights should thus act as limitations on each other and 
fishing activities can only commence once a participant has both forms. This dual 
system has been outlined in Figure 6.6 of Chapter 6. 
Aliliough the dual system seems to hold in theory (Charles, 2000) , it is not explicitly 
stated in the rights granting procedure for the squid industry. Section 21 of the MLRA 
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of 1998 however states that a harvesting righ t can only be activated through the issuing 
of a fishing vessel licence (RSA, 1998). In the initial reallocation of permit rights, 
DEAT did not however strictly adhere to th is. Permit rights where allocated to new 
entrants regardless of whether they owned a vcssel or were holders of vessel licences. 
This probably seemed like the reasonable thing do given the fact that some new 
entrants, who did not have access to capital, could not afford fishing vessels. The 
process however opened the system up to problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, which effectively resulted in a "pap" r pelmit" market. The problem of adverse 
selection, which is the opportunistic behaviour from an individual who transfers their 
right at a negotiated price to vessel owner, was however also due to the lack of clear 
rights application procedures. 
Directly related to the moral hazard problem, was the ill-defined structure of permit 
rights allocated to new entrants. Firstly, rights were issued in economically non-viable 
asset sizes. This meant that rights were not of any operational value, as they could not 
be used to run a viable fishing operation. Secondly, these rights were issued on a short-
term basis (i.e, one year), which meant they lacked security, This meant that financial 
institutions could not use then as collateral. As a medium-term (or transitional period) 
solution to deal with these problems, and t hose mentioned above, it is suggested that 
permit rights be attached to a vessel (accord ing to the vessel 's operational category, as 
defined in Table 6.1 of Chapter 6). This will ensure that no sub-economic permit 
rights are allocated. These rights must however be structured according to the 
operational characteristics illustrated in Figure 8.1 below. 
PO 
Access Rig ht 
I 
Withdrawal Right 
I 
Vessel licence 
I 
Effort Permit 
Form of use right (attached to Vessel) 
--I-
Duration of term One year renewable Medium-term 
- Trbable - -- -1---
Transferability (with limitations) Non-rdable 
- ------~----...~ /"'~-S-iz-e-r-eq-U-i-re-d--
Attached effort permit (harvest right) 
activated by vessel licence (access right) 
I 
Squid Fishing 
Figure 8.1: The Dual Use Right System including Operational Characteristics 
Source: Adapted from Figure 6.6 in Chapter () 
Figure 8.1 outlines the dual use rights system that incorporates the operational-level 
rules. Effort permits (harvest rights) are thus attached to vessels (which determine 
access). With regards to the duration of tcnll. medium-term rights should be issued to 
improve the security of the right; longer-term right should only be issued once an 
equitable redistribution is achieved. These will be in the form of a vessel licence that 
grants both access and withdrawal rights. The aspect of tradability also needs 
restrictions. World experience illustrates that tradable rights will concentrate in the 
hands of efficient fishers and with long term rights these will thus be entrenched in the 
hands of a few. The issuing of medium-krill rights (a term of four years) is thus a 
positive move by DEAT, but it is still doubtful whether inequity can be wiped out 
during this term. 
As a long-term solution vessels should be l","] as the primary unit of effort. The right 
of participation is therefore solely determ i lled by the issuing of vessel licences. This 
means that no sub-economic rights can be issued . The dual rights system will therefore 
not exist. A medium term solution however provides fisheries management authorities 
with the opportunity to adjust to this nell· unit of effort limitation. The new rights 
issued to entrants should be long term in nature, as this will improve security aspects 
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of the system. Users have an incentive to invest in the resource, as it will serve their 
long-term interests. Compliance is therefore improved and the sustainability of the 
resource is guaranteed. Long-term rights should also be transferable, as this improves 
the efficiency of the system. 
8.5 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Fisheries management within South Africa has historically been governed by the State. 
All enforcement and major research initiatives have been controlled through 
bureaucratic government structures that have sort exclusion rather than inclusion in 
their policies (Van Sittert, 2003). This tOI,-down approach is what determined initial 
redistribution attempts within the squid industry (Mather et ai, 2000). Although an 
established industrial body did exist at th~ time, policies were implemented without 
much consultation. Inevitably this led to distrust, confusion and conflict within the 
industry as government pursued its "com l1land-and-control" attempt at redistribution. 
This fact was made clear in the aftennath of the redistribution process. As mentioned 
in Chapter 7, there was conflict between new and existing participants as well as 
litigation against Government as companies challenged its policies. 
The first approach of reallocating rights could almost be viewed as a passive approach 
at redistribution - hence the perceptions of a weak redistribution. This is because 
DEAT merely allocated rights and left the racial distribution of capital and fishing 
skills to the market. A possible reason for this approach can be linked to what Friedel 
(2000) states was a lack of political will on the part of government to implement the 
necessary redistribution strategies. A lack of capacity, other than in the scientific 
research fields, can also be related to thi s approach. The problem of adverse selection 
can be attributed to this fact. Because of the lack of capacity and expertise, application 
procedures were ill conceived, this led to opportunistic behaviour through the selling 
be "paper pennits". The state -centred approach therefore highlights fact government 
failure was evident in certain aspects of the redistribution process. 
Given the fact that government failure was present, proposals for a market-based 
approach had been prescribed as an alternative since the White Paper on Marine was 
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drawn up in 1997 (RSA, 1997). Hersoug & Holm (2000) however argue that given the 
highly skewed nature of capital and information, it is unlikely that this approach will 
work. If one considers the fact that government intervention was originally 
necessitated because of market failure in the finance sectors, then this argument seems 
to hold ground. However, as will be highlighted below, aspects of the market approach 
can be efficiency enhancing and should therefore not be totally discarded. 
8.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In terms of the rights-based management system it is recommended that an incentive-
based rights system be implemented within the squid industry as a medium-term 
solution. This system should be based on permit rights (withdrawal rights) that are 
attached to vessels, which in tum determine the right of access (as illustrated by Figure 
8.1). This use right system should be tailored to ensure that the operational-level rules 
result in a 'complete ' set of rights. The system should also be clearly defined, so that 
appropriate and enforceable rules outline responsibilities for all users. This is because 
property rights are created by rules that govern them (Jensen, 2000a). However, as a 
long-term solution \'essels should be used as the primary unit of effort control, 
obviously using gear restrictions and a closed season as secondary effort controls. 
Vessel licences will therefore determine the right of access and the right to harvest 
squid. This simplifies the conditions for the 'right of participation' while reducing the 
adverse effects of the old system. Rights should also be issued on a longer-term basis, 
as this encourages investment in the maintenance of natural capital stocks (Scott, 
2000a). Making the rights transferable improves the flexibility and efficiency of the 
system (Anderson, 2000a). These are both desirable in the long ternl. 
In terms of the management structures, the roles of Government should be clearly 
defined. These should be linked to the core functions of enforcing compliance and 
distributing access rights. However, due to the government failure highlighted above, it 
is also suggested that a co-management approach be adopted in the squid industry. 
This approach seems likely within the industry, as an established industrial body in the 
form of SASMIA already exists. There is thus a need to separate the roles of the 
government as sustainability manager from the roles of rights holders (through 
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SASMIA) as fisheries managers. Giving greater autonomy to users will therefore mean 
that collective-choice rights will have to be devolved down to fishers. Since DEA T's 
core function is still to allocate rights, alienation rights should remain with them. 
Nevertheless participants should still be consulted ifrights allocation procedures are to 
be changed. In tenns of collective-choice rights, it is thus most appropriate to grant 
users management rights. A co-management approach will therefore reduce the "top-
down" state-centred approach traditionally utilised in South Africa's fisheries 
management. As Craig (2000) states, successful property rights management can only 
be achieved through a "bottom up" approach. This is because co-management gives 
resource users a sense of "ownership" over a resource (Hauk & Sowman, 2001: 178), 
which fosters a culture of sustainable uti lisation. 
Lastly, in tenns of the functions of the market, incentives need to be created to allow 
financial institutions the opportunity for providing finance to potential HDI entrants. 
The issuing oflong-tenn rights would be an example of this. Another way in which the 
market can aid redistribution initiatives is through the selling of shares within 
established fishing companies. This is in line with the view of internal transfonnation 
programmes; where new entrants or employees gain participation by buy shares in 
existing companies. After all for the squid industry to remain viable, the expertise and 
specialised knowledge of existing participants will be invaluable. The industry must 
maintain some of these skills if it is to remain economically viable. 
All of the above recommendations are tailored to achieve a strong redistribution. This 
means that, along with fishing rights, there will also be a long-tenn transfer of wealth 
to new entrants. In line with this perspective, existing firms should be encouraged to 
"transfonn" internally by providing opportunities for HDIs to improve their skills and 
thus gain greater access to income and management positions. A possible disincentive, 
for existing finns , if this approach is not adopted could be the withdrawal of long-tenn 
rights. All the policy options mentioned above illustrate that redistribution attempts 
require a multi-faceted approach that no one institutional mechanism can achieve 
alone. 
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8.7 CONCLUSION 
This thesis thus proposes that a strong redistribution approach be adopted as opposed 
to the passive weak approach initially instituted. This requires a strategic approach that 
deals with multiple objectives. To accomplish this it is therefore recommended that a 
co-management approach be adopted - as this attempts to involve all stakeholders. As 
far as the role of government goes, it should maintain the role of allocating rights, 
however these should be based on access rights in the fornl of vessel licences. The role 
of the market and existing fiffilS should also not be sidelined. These can both be used 
as valuable mechanisms that enhance the achievement of redistribution attempts. This 
thesis thus provill0s some options for redistribution plans within the squid fishery; the 
implementation of these plans in however beyond the scope of this study. 
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Appendix I 
Fleet Characteristics of the South M rican commercial Squid Fishery 
Category 1993 1994 1995 1996 I 1997 1998 I 1999 2000 I 2001 2002 
Ski-boats 
Avg Length 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 
Avg GRT - - - - - - - - - -
Avg Age 23.0 8. 1 8.3 8.6 8.1 8.8 11.0 11.9 13.2 13.5 
Avg Kwt 122.4 118.4 11 9.3 120.3 121 .5 110.8 99.8 103.3 100.0 88.5 
Avg Crew 7.1 7.1 7.0 6.8 6.9 6.5 6.9 6.9 7.2 7.0 
Small Vessels 
Avg Length 9.8 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.8 10.9 10.9 11 .1 11.0 
Avg GRT 9.0 9.2 10.1 11 .1 11.5 13.2 17.4 13.7 18.3 18.0 
Avg Age 16.5 16.5 17.2 16.0 14.5 14.7 9.6 15.5 12.9 15.0 
Avg Kwt 139.3 13.1 135.6 128.2 132.4 130.5 131.6 139.1 183.9 190.8 
Avg Crew 10.3 10.8 10.8 11.3 11 .2 11.9 12.6 13.7 12.6 12.3 
Medium Vessels 
Avg Length 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.3 15.2 15.4 15.2 15.3 15.3 15.4 
Avg GRT 33.3 33.1 34.0 39.6 39.8 41.6 41.4 41 .7 42.4 42.0 
Avg Age 13.4 12.7 11 .9 13.6 11 .3 10.4 10.0 11.9 11 .7 12.1 
Avg Kwt 207.6 218.4 227.6 219.8 205. 1 228.4 215.1 220.3 208.9 216.3 
Avg Crew 16.2 16.8 17.4 18.5 18.9 19. 1 19.6 19.7 20 20.4 
Large Vessels 
Avg Length 19.8 20.1 20.1 20.3 20.0 20.0 19.6 20 20.2 20.4 
Avg GRT 72.8 76.2 75.7 75.3 74.0 74.2 77.4 75.2 75.7 77.2 
Avg Age 22.4 22 22.9 21.9 18.6 20.2 20.4 21 .5 22.5 23.8 
Avg Kwt 249.4 256.8 259.8 260 235.6 239.2 244.1 243.8 231 .7 238.5 
Avg Crew 20.1 20.4 21 21.4 23.6 22.8 24.3 24.3 25.3 25.4 
Total Vessels 
Avg Length 11 .1 11.3 11.3 11.4 11.5 12.6 12.7 12.2 12.9 13.3 
Avg GRT 40 41.5 42.8 46 43.7 44.5 48.3 43.6 48 47.4 
Avg Age 19 12.8 12.8 12.9 11.4 12.4 11.7 13.9 14 15 
Avg Kwt 178 178 184 185.7 181 194.1 190.6 186.4 192.2 205.4 
Avg Crew 12 11.9 12.1 12.5 13.2 14.4 15.3 14.7 15.7 16.2 
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Appendix II 
Catch (in tons) per period for the Squid Jig Fishery: 1985-2002 
Year Catches 
1985 3100 
1986 3400 
1987 2796 
1988 4826 
1989 9791.7 
1990 3282 
1991 6700 
1992 2588 
1993 6308 
1994 6441 
1995 6850 
1996 6900 
1997 3891 
1998 6526 
1999 6933 
2000 6424.6 
2001 3076 
2002 4229 
Annual Jig standardised CPUE data (kg/man/hr) for the Squid Fishery: 1985-2001 
Year Total 
1985 2.152 5.376 7.528 
1986 2.93 2.825 5.755 
1987 2.324 3.484 5.808 
1988 3.075 3.597 6.672 
1989 4.283 4.863 9.1 46 
1990 3.527 2.453 5.98 
1991 1.738 3.396 5.134 
1992 2.459 2.149 4.608 
1993 2.375 3.658 6.033 
1994 5.382 2.808 8.19 
1995 2.979 2.363 5.342 
1996 2.1 04 1.889 3.993 
1997 1.213 1.221 2.434 
1998 1.593 2.049 3.642 
1999 3.055 2.576 5.631 
2000 1.49 1.963 3.453 
2001 1.277 1.397 2.674 
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Appendix III 
Monthly catch per Area for the Squid Fishery: 1995-2002 
Monthly Catch (in kgs) per area for the Squid Fishery: 1995 
Area Jan Feb Mar Apr May 
Elsewhere 
East London 59 1860 
Port Alfred 21343 825 674 250 496 
Algoa Bay 121105 62066 58185 17205 17075 
Port Elizabeth 305262 61314 53964 83836 179201 
Jefferys Bay 244871 56420 88217 92563 239909 
Seal Bay 22380 19999 24473 9587 24006 
Tsitiskamma 115620 78496 58709 70313 85838 
Plettenberg Bay 149700 78142 71107 28383 66706 
Mossel Bay 
Still Bay 877 10871 254 
Hermanus 427 
False Bay 246 349 8 
Total 981831 368482 355337 302450 615091 
-- - - -- - - --
Jun 
2145 
578 
160218 
88837 
195937 
3665 
31785 
8243 
66 
20763 
3089 
10 
515336 
L 
Months 
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
737 250 17205 18192 
4086 37548 86219 729 132646 
156 38354 82072 154229 11685 80827 391489 
69265 62832 86482 265227 26931 223645 1170236 
99852 69254 118212 251975 123612 293293 1728612 
167644 74994 85111 93588 40478 74268 1454200 
27127 3712 6159 4065 8508 45874 199555 
28126 59261 67015 51796 81668 132592 861219 
11342 17593 56959 82699 141 920 158917 871711 
332 95 493 
1380 210 60 311 94 34820 
2260 5776 
5 7 45 104 51 825 
405429 331128 539875 1007359 437260 1010196 6869774 
-- - - - - - - -
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Monthly Catch (in kgs) per area for the Squid Fishery: 1996 
Months 
Area Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Elsewhere 20 4 363 127 514 
East London 16136 6783 2303 17118 26328 20396 261 89325 
Port Alfred 75765 4408 949 7269 6015 9855 6994 5410 4550 6282 56228 119747 303472 
Algoa Bay 106381 27161 23980 22243 241131 208750 37385 57366 72826 39005 57771 173102 1067101 
Port Elizabeth 198177 179527 121144 11 1284 267910 80854 64294 127681 126376 95600 96100 140622 1609569 
Jefferys Bay 65896 62527 140286 117228 161975 79574 78551 140044 142232 86843 120737 92832 1288725 
Seal Bay 39257 16635 30837 11552 21317 5569 9235 17215 10470 4338 15760 12064 194249 
Tsitiskamma 99248 57505 194878 128257 55170 30279 17145 102953 35460 76297 85345 150109 1032646 
Plettenberg Bay 149049 74250 187811 203201 39461 21174 12521 28958 70121 98487 214592 304178 1403803 
Mossel Bay 2599 226 1820 5016 805 307 5229 16002 
Still Bay 292 192 1361 25381 13389 14400 9819 1360 11135 10 1045 78384 I 
I 
Hermanus 6 32 313 786 493 5442 400 57 15099 422 186 23236 
False Bay 3 9 29 60 11 49 22 183 
Total 734094 422246 704158 601264 835282 458569 253346 508143 489907 453838 646965 999397 7107209 
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Monthly Catch (in kgs) per area for the Squid Fishery: 1997 
Months 
Area Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Elsewhere 265 100 69 434 
East London 160 185 125 25 30 655 754 1147 211 86 1590 66419 92276 
Port Alfred 29473 6920 1585 16146 2992 6405 1970 3813 12178 163622 80127 478680 803911 
Algoa Bay 77164 12090 12531 15533 17404 55732 26522 23586 23907 61307 62931 71182 459909 
Port Elizabeth 136653 21053 38489 18902 6163 25713 31469 91897 11 0179 195167 29186 149655 854526 
Jefferys Bay 29855 4332 17897 27041 23583 10451 24284 94734 72940 91276 14339 63939 474671 
Seal Bay 4651 196 4807 422 91 650 4388 8517 7861 13390 13352 58325 
Tsitiskamma 44970 12927 70801 62058 1672 2596 21388 16756 96164 31624 19943 69365 450264 
Plettenberg Bay 77975 7688 153106 50152 2130 3605 161 29 8641 30808 28969 8609 155514 543326 
Massel Bay 3892 17 150 185 4244 
Still Bay 2180 37478 15657 3906 1859 907 13813 5704 537 991 83032 
Hennanus 2573 34154 9929 2281 95 1546 4945 6233 1878 63634 
False Bay 138 236 6 114 59 51 557 67 69 972 2269 
Total 409704 137259 324944 196737 54244 105241 130261 254700 375887 612381 217331 1072132 3890821 I 
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Monthly Catch (in kgs) per area for the Squid Fishery: 1998 
Months 
Area Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Elsewhere 6 35 41 
East London 70 10 2931 235 1001 5435 96 49 9827 
Port Alfred 35962 3220 4952 2778 1062 3060 14061 17988 3825 79020 1162 441885 608975 
Algoa Bay 13516 5319 8244 11962 15711 58822 65286 194865 67783 100667 26139 531066 1099380 
Port Elizabeth 89157 45766 191 636 62251 69172 65629 51584 107525 80693 82338 3100 161260 1010111 
Jefferys Bay 42005 22542 137644 43826 96734 106843 61835 117476 85980 116277 4525 130175 965862 
Seal Bay 3999 10883 26814 7769 23981 14754 7855 12526 5170 8974 33207 155932 
Tsitiskamma 80298 54249 159916 66480 182887 135871 69559 42903 41744 150768 2500 277677 1264852 
Plettenberg Bay 144126 106026 187467 82816 50347 146927 51814 33594 34933 133659 4900 197838 1174447 
Mossel Bay 202 244 22322 2082 330 16000 41180 
Still Bay 8010 28789 13445 10037 906 7858 11381 17266 17263 30135 36 1195 146321 I 
Hennanus 4342 7664 1760 7305 1493 5310 7040 10715 6 45635 I 
False Bay 384 237 342 57 281 517 37 632 397 233 36 109 3262 
Total 421805 284695 732220 288046 441283 547875 337836 572642 345829 720303 42830 1790461 6525825 
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Monthly Catch (in kgs) per area for the Squid Fishery: 1999 
Months 
Area Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Elsewhere 300 15 315 
East London 20865 41521 5300 80 108 65 8041 75980 
Port Alfred 103750 3496 12798 4767 15783 60851 10502 3962 3891 6659 63737 367711 657907 
Algoa Bay 165192 23047 17432 23120 70205 308035 179224 53399 13740 10758 18291 72511 954954 
Port Elizabeth 150718 51962 72781 59902 178966 139671 107896 92071 60925 58231 42844 133491 1149458 
Jefferys Bay 172994 90843 94577 112560 383121 199799 138739 103850 75955 32755 8873 79650 1493716 
Seal Bay 35212 33939 5953 10536 33858 14780 8614 8546 8973 6453 26035 192899 
Tsitiskamma 189489 88296 118912 78380 180334 125340 80573 28848 36973 56875 1954 96764 1082738 
Plettenberg Bay 126360 60645 166606 140285 277091 74068 19822 15383 17753 47219 136133 1081365 
Mossel Bay 48 70 362 50 5051 8239 31712 45532 
Still Bay 39976 16430 17346 3741 4570 154 2643 10961 26480 146 12657 135104 
Hermanus 1127 3543 537 105 1272 305 20715 8741 1752 21123 59220 
False Bay 346 210 155 45 329 467 11 8 290 53 542 447 356 3358 , 
Total 985212 368938 510465 433386 1144794 949186 591224 311954 258258 286533 138124 954472 6932546
1 
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Monthly Catch (in kgs) per area for the Squid Fishery: 2000 
Months 
Area Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Elsewhere 25 69 2831 1100 44 5959 1300 11328 
Easl London 6069 3241 3499 11206 45049 86212 26699 28365 7463 210518 428321 
Port Alfred 23299 3839 1795 4742 12427 6871 11607 33700 82040 127538 32096 59131 399085 
Algoa Bay 31690 22518 20893 42128 79949 201961 154188 111278 107488 122953 57570 56167 1008783 
Port Elizabelh 104272 78600 33592 73811 65122 126962 83884 42963 158679 93825 164013 156802 1182525 
Jefferys Bay 55439 74680 28567 38530 74520 103296 135540 64277 60223 66311 27758 105128 834269 
Seal Bay 14794 7494 7878 24754 18161 16585 11058 25385 22454 10156 2278 28138 189135 
Tsitiskamma 96827 146028 95088 87843 11 0839 73293 65414 53321 80976 133702 11112 14211 3 1096556 
Pleltenberg Bay 57044 104312 6504 1 50903 114241 87863 77018 47949 70867 134898 41240 165239 1016615 
Mossel Bay 1367 410 2270 3914 558 6087 20 16626 
Still Bay 1798 6803 4363 14363 1012 5366 180 14494 7607 9511 12249 77746 
Hermanus 5125 11466 6489 7968 12385 13968 25416 36525 22122 4057 5355 12901 163777 
False Bay 500 15 12 30 28 72 25 34 7 199 922 
Total 392155 462234 263731 350634 498930 649057 609426 524216 639155 721903 364362 949885 6425688 
-
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Monthly Catch (in kgs) per area for the Squid Fishery: 2001 
Months 
Area Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Elsewhere 88480 70 1649 6526 8416 2969 330 10216 10940 129596 
East London 208129 5233 1772 893 24028 3772 1257 4024 73388 90457 412953 
Port Alfred 37169 3827 3134 6678 15671 20200 22422 13458 8292 12642 16148 33772 193413 
Algoa Bay 32389 17639 5224 6194 14317 17772 6935 911 3 37019 74288 98123 191344 510357 
Port El izabeth 27228 5685 29869 63094 38240 42668 11 334 11312 27611 20425 151 68 72390 365024 
Jefferys Bay 10254 3857 3795 1011 6 10633 4552 2750 2865 71 36 10565 18287 20886 105696 
Seal Bay 41350 14375 15520 36840 58277 32073 11694 7236 42808 72113 54003 234689 620978 
Tsitiskamma 30803 13612 5523 21430 19090 28864 19945 4403 78749 82700 42872 185389 533380 
Plettenberg Bay 4278 39 2993 350 4314 11974 
Mossel Bay 6371 6410 3258 1021 5604 6452 17353 27521 73990 
Still Bay 11454 12814 18368 3808 480 4293 1160 10070 1533 63980 
Hermanus 164 6910 11 830 2075 18120 26663 54773 
False Bay 38 30 15 212 295 
Total 493791 87800 84730 156129 159660 147532 108627 70472 214633 310914 346325 895796 3076409 
- --- --
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Monthly Catch (in kgs) per area for the Squid Fishery: 2002 
Months 
Area Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Elsewhere 1149 3175 6837 664 2359 14184 
East London 6965 1979 1830 1137 1404 711 5823 14348 4924 8032 147278 194431 
Port Alfred 37675 30571 23284 29020 25608 24129 30232 35213 134621 125739 11089 25316 532497 
Algoa Bay 126722 33694 42386 21013 18976 26606 61271 33622 62460 229930 9157 73631 739468 
Port Elizabeth 118528 32777 26869 45889 14797 35384 88149 92700 49175 140399 129055 85277 858999 
Jefferys Bay 31881 13431 29546 8136 6385 7010 9309 4675 4949 8419 1115 5471 130327 
Seal Bay 198113 103286 147743 76715 92464 60823 52965 46671 70722 163749 20549 78358 1112158 
Tsitiskamma 161761 75201 45080 48599 49367 35265 82031 74441 34823 239747 86943 64695 997953 
Plettenberg Bay 863 505 250 1200 10300 13118 
Mossel Bay 3090 5395 5963 3167 334 7768 1225 100 4597 1227 550 33416 
Still Bay 14140 5696 3694 8363 898 12936 2088 655 6569 14130 69169 
Hennanus 2965 1601 1823 2538 146 115 240 2470 130 12028 
False Bay 4048 7450 390 2113 304 2608 270 564 212 3114 21073 
Total 705888 301652 333994 246094 215480 214950 331209 301257 383732 930946 270254 493365 4728821 
--- --- --
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Appendix IV 
Total Employment per Sector for the Squid Fishery (1999/2000 season) 
Full time Part time 
Squid Industry Sectors Black While Black White 
Vessel Employment 244 51 1629 134 
Factory Employment 554 22 87 0 
Company Employment 39 48 13 19 
Total Employment 837 121 1729 153 
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Appendix V 
Employment nnmbers, per Company, by skill and race for the Squid Fishery (1999/2000 season) 
SQUID Professional/Managerial Skilled Middle services Semi·skilled Unskilled 
Full time Part time Full time Part time Full time Part time Full time Part time Full time Part time 
Employment NUMBER per Company Black White Black White Black White Black White Black White Black White Black White Black White Black White Black White 
TOTAL 39 48 13 19 39 81 11 7 44 18 6 6 48 10 9 1 177 3 88 3 
Andrews LA 
Barnard TI 
Bertie-Roberts 
Biz Afrika 32 (Pty) Ltd 0 1 0 2 0 
Blackbeard 
Breedt 
Brigitte Trust 
C & K Fisheries C.C. 
Calamari Fishing (Pty) Ltd 0 4 2 1 1 0 2 0 10 0 
Caylash Fishing Trust 
Christina Fishing CC 0 1 0 1 0 
Christy T 
Coetzer P 
Comach (Ply) Ltd 
Computer Visserye CC 2 0 1 0 
DavelL 
De Bruin C 2 0 
De Castro Fishing CC 
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DMA Fishing Enterprises (Pty) Ltd I 0 I 4 I I 2 I 0 I I 2 I 0 I I 8 I 2 
Dodeka Fishing CC 
Ensemnle Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd 
Evervest Thirty Two (pty) Ltd I 0 I 1 I I 0 I 1 I I 1 I 0 
Fairwinds Fishing (Ply) Ltd 
Faulkner 
Genrard RW 
GGA Fishing Enterprises CC 
Goldstone Commercial Fishing CC 
I I I I I I I I I 
2 0 
Gradwell MJ 0 2 0 1 2 0 
Groenewald Familietrust 
Hendricks S 
Hess AJ 
Heuwllkor Agtien (Pty) Ltd 
Highland Fisheries CC 
Hill,P/D. 
HomanJ 
Hooke, R.T. 
Irvin & Johnson Ltd 33 27 33 79 I 0 22 I 4 3 2 103 I 2 
J & J Investment Trust 
Jurassic Fishing Industries (Pty) Ltd 2 2 0 0 I 1 I 0 
Kendal Trust 
Knobel 
Knysna Fishing Co (Pty) Ltd 
Komicx Prod. & Knysna Fishing 
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Komicx Products (Pty) Ltd 3 4 3 I 0 I 3 I 0 I I 1 I 0 I I 37 I 0 
La-Landi Vissery BK 0 0 
Lawley Business Partners 
LM Fisheries (Ply) Ltd I 2 I 0 
Lusitania Fishing Co. (pty) Ltd 
Marais 
Marine Dream Trust 
Mast Fishing (pty) Ltd 
Mihenon Fishing (Ply) Ltd I 0 I I 2 
Montidan Fisheries (Ply) Ltd 
Muller IP 
Natasja Vis BK 
Ocean View & Masiphumelele Fishing I I 0 I I 2 I 0 
Offshore Fishing Co (Ply) Ltd 
Paarman Fisheries CC 
Peregrine Trust I 1 I 1 I 4 I 0 
Perils N 
Peter Platt Enterprises CC 
Peterson 
Pioneer Fishing (Ply) Ltd 
Premier Fishing SA (Ply) Ltd 
Prima Seevisserye EDMS BPK I I I 8 I 0 I I I 4 I 0 I I I I I I 8 I 0 
R C L Fishing CC 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Raka Trust 
Ristgans Visserye CC 
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Robberg Sea Freeze (pty) Ltd 
Ruacana Investments CC 
Rupestris Investments CC 
SA Commercial Fishermans Corp. 
Sabalaza Fishing CC 
Sagittarius Fisheries CC 
Sangoma Fishing 
Shehasta Trust 
Smith 
Smith, D.C. 
Smith, EW. 
Solitaire Fishing Trust 
Squid Packers (pty) Ltd 
St Francis Sea Products CC 
Stander 
Starfish Trust 
TT M Fishing 
alhado ishing Ent (pty) Ltd 
Tamarin Fishing CC 
The Piscean Trust 
Total Inventions One CC 
Trade Off 65 (pty) Ltd 
Trade Up-Front 156 (Pty) Ltd 
Trevors Commercial Fishing CC 
Tucker JD o 2 
-~.-
o 
o o 
o 
o o 
o 
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o 
o 
o 
5 
2 o 
o 
3 o 
Ulandi Trust 
UmsoOOmvu Fishing (Pty) Ltd 
Van Bouen. T.T. 
Van Ginkel A J 
Van Ginkel M 0 1 
Van Niekerk Fisheries CC 
Viking Fishing Co (Pty) Ltd 3 11 3 0 22 13 47 10 67 1 
Viljoen 
Vorster 
West Point Fishing Corp. 
Westem Star Enterprises Fishing 0 1 1 0 
Zingara Trust 
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